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Summary
It is said among historians, that there are two remarkable innovations in
modern finance: deposit banking in southern Europe and negotiable bills in
northern Europe, especially Antwerp. Although negotiable bills are as impor-
tant as deposit banking (because they became a foundation of modern com-
mercial banking and stock markets), they are not often studied. Part I of the
thesis studies indirect loan contracts which do not rely on either bank-specific
technologies or legal protection. It focuses on the concept of negotiability and
explains its characteristics, including the substitutability of deposit banking and
negotiable bills. Negotiable bills, or resaleable bills, can be interpreted as an in-
direct loan contract. The buyer of the bill, i.e. the initial lender, can re-sell the
bill to a third party to satisfy his liquidity needs. So the initial issuer of the bill
borrows from a third party, through the initial lender (acting as an intermedi-
ary). Previous studies have focused on direct loan contracts: between banks and
borrowers, depositors and banks, or suppliers and buyers. There are few papers
studying the incentive problems faced by all three players. To fill this gap, in
Chapter Two, we study indirect loan contracts that a lender and a borrower can
make only through an intermediary agent, where the borrower and the lender
cannot observe any transaction between the other two. Under this severe infor-
mation asymmetry, the existence of loan contracts as a sequential equilibrium is
proved, although they are less eﬃcient compared with direct loan contracts. In
Chapter Three, we consider role of collateral in improving eﬃciency. Chapter
Four concludes, summarising the characteristics of these contracts: only less
risky borrowers can issue negotiable bills and riskier borrowers need to seek a
direct relationship with lenders (or, they are rationed).
In the 1990s, the Japanese economy experienced a prolonged recession, the
so-called ’lost decade’. It is discussed that a cause of the problem was the ”zom-
bie lending” problem: chronic loss-making firms (zombies) still obtained finance
from their banks. Part II of the thesis aims to address the following issues with
a microeconomic model. Firstly, why did banks not liquidate bankrupt borrow-
ers? Secondly, how did it aﬀect macroeconomic productivity? And thirdly, how
did it aﬀect the procyclicality of land prices as in Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)’s
credit cycle? A bank, in this model, has an incentive not to liquidate insolvent
borrowers: the liquidation of collateral asset (land) will invite the collapse of
land market and the bank has to bear a large loss. The loss may make the
bank under-capitalised and force it to close its business. The bank, to avoid the
forced closure, does not liquidate insolvent borrowers. This ”zombie borrowers”
occupy their land unused, and the bank can squeeze land supply to push up
land price: the bank’s own capital is then kept higher than it should be. In
the final chapter, based on this model, optimal post-crisis policies are discussed
by comparing two options; public capital injection and toxic asset purchasing
scheme.
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Part I
Self-Enforcing Trade Credit
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
We study multilateral self-enforcing financial contracts among non-financial institutions, where
players can make contracts only through an intermediary. In particular, we first explain when
and how firms can make indirect loan contracts without any help of bank-specific technologies
or legal enforcement. Then we discuss their ineﬃciency and possible solutions.
There have been two remarkable innovations in the history of finance1. One was the emer-
gence of deposit banking in southern Europe, and the other was the resaleability or negotiability
of bills in northern Europe. The success of deposit banking is widely known: in the thirteenth
century, large deposit banks in Italy became a centre of international settlements and their
bank-notes were circulated as a convertible money (so-called ’inside money’). Since coinage
was always scarce in medieval Europe and it was costly and risky to bring metal coins to
remote merchants, this enabled the rapid expansion of international trade in Europe.
On the other hand, the Low Countries (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) innovated
a diﬀerent style of finance, based on Antwerp, another predominant financial centre in medieval
Europe (Van der Wee(1963), Kohn(1999a)). The remarkable feature of Antwerp was that
businesses were run without banks: in contrast to southern Europe, the rulers of the city had
banned deposit banking since the 1480s. This caused a serious settlement problem in the city,
since bank deposits and bank-notes were the main instruments for settlement. Merchants in
1Van Der Wee(1967), cited and translated by Youji(2004).
2
Antwerp solved the problem by making their debts (especially bills) assignable, transferable
or negotiable2. This meant that current holders of the bills (or other debts, like bonds) could
make payment by giving the bills they possessed, instead of money, when they needed to pay.
This innovation made bills (bills obligatory and bills of exchange) a convertible money with a
certain limitation compared with cash. Thus merchants in Antwerp succeeded in developing a
completely diﬀerent type of inside money that did not rely on deposit banks. Later on, this
second innovation, negotiability of bills, was mainly utilised for international trade credit; while
the first innovation, deposit banking, provided a clearing service for local transactions, as we
now explain.
In the seventeenth century, after Antwerp had declined due to the malfunctioning of its port,
Amsterdam took up the position of financial centre of northern Europe, with two remarkable
institutional innovations: the Bank of Amsterdam and the Dutch East India Company. The
Bank of Amsterdam, established in 1609, was the first exchange bank in northern Europe
and succeeded in combining these two financial systems: deposit banking and negotiable bills.
According to Quinn and Roberds(2006), the municipality of Amsterdam required the settlement
of bills of exchange through the bank: so merchants in the city had to open a deposit account
with the bank. This was the first link between deposit banking and credits using negotiable
bills. The negotiable bills then transferred to London and became even more sophisticated, with
the innovation of the discounting of bills. Bills of exchange had been popular as an instrument
of short-term loans in London until the First World War, when they were replaced by the
commercial banking system in the form of bank advances (Day(1957)).
Even though their importance has declined compared with the medieval era, negotiable bills
still play an important role in modern financial markets, especially in trade credit market. Even
in Japan, known for the dominance of deposit banking, Kagabayashi(2004) points out that the
sales credit (trade receivable) of small-medium sized manufacturing firms occupies more than
2To be precise, these three terms have diﬀerent definitions. Assignability means that holder of bills can resell
them to third parties before its maturity. Transferability makes the bills more impersonal. Negotiability allows
the third party to claim a repayment of the default debt not only against the initial borrower, but also against
the seller (initial holder) of the bill. What we study is a mixture of assignability and negotiability. To avoid
confusion, we will use the word ’resaleability’, as in Kiyotaki and Moore(2003), hereafter.
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25%3 of their total assets. Emery(1984) reports similar figures for US manufacturing firms: he
points out that 26.5% of the total assets of manufacturing firms was accounts receivable created
by trade credit sales.
The other remarkable innovation in Amsterdam was the first stock issuance in history - made
by the Dutch East India Company. As Neal(1990) writes, the permanent capital fund that the
company issued in 1609 was irredeemable, and shareholders were entitled to receive annual
dividends and to transfer their shares to other investors. He points out that this first issuance
of shares was a successful blend of ’early financial innovations - safe and rapid international
movement of funds in the bill of exchange, and safe and liquid long-term investment in the
perpetual annuity’.
Considering these two factors, it may not be an exaggeration to say, as some historians do,
that the negotiability initiated in Antwerp in the sixteenth century became the foundation of
modern financial markets.
There are two critical features in this transaction involving negotiable bills: no bank-specific
technologies or informality. First, it does not rely on any bank-specific technologies, since it
was innovated in Antwerp, where deposit banking was banned. This feature allows both non-
financial firms and banks to use this instrument for their credit transactions. This feature
was especially helpful for northern European countries, where deposit banking was weak (e.g.
London), to establish eﬃcient financial markets without banks.
As a modern illustration of this non-banking characteristic, consider what happened in Ire-
land in 1970 when all oﬃces and branches of major clearing banks were closed for six months
due to industrial disputes and it took a year for the banking business to go back to normal.
Bank deposits, which accounted for more than 80% of the money supply, were unavailable for
a year; the economy lost a major instrument of settlement, or finality, for all transactions.
Murphy(1978) shows how the Irish economy sorted this problem out. Businesses issued their
3The ratio was more than 35% in the 1980s and steadily decreasing (in the large manufacturing firms, the
number was around 20% in 2000). Kagabayashi(2004) points out that the decline was due to the simultaneous
increase in the firms’ assets and their own capital (not due to large declines in trade credit among non-financial
firms).
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own IOUs, instead of bank-notes or bills of exchange drawn on the bank, for their settlements.
Sometimes the privately issued IOUs were re-sold for further settlements, and acted as alter-
native settlement instruments instead of bank deposit until the clearing banks restarted their
businesses.
The second characteristic of negotiable bills was informality. As Kohn(1999a) points out,
bills in Antwerp were basically informal documents4. As we will see below, courts ratified the
merchants’ custom (implicit contract) of negotiability; and finally the custom was enacted into
law. Thus, the informal contracts in Antwerp became the archetype of modern negotiability.
This implies the importance if studying negotiable bills as informal loan contracts. Furthermore,
it is not unrealistic to assume that inter-firm credit has less legal protection than bank credit,
considering its business nature. It would be less verifiable, negotiation costs are relatively larger
for small firms, and there are too many firms to audit. Some empirical studies actually show
that trade credit tends to be used in areas with less legal protection (see below).
In the following chapters, we will see what kind of contract could re-create these features.
As both history and some empirical research (see below) show, these two characteristics coexist
in many cases. This implies the importance of studying self-enforcing debt contracts without
bank-specific technologies. Furthermore, to re-create the negotiability (or resaleability) of bills
in a game-theoretic framework, we focus on indirect debt contracts, where borrowers and lenders
can make loan contracts only through an intermediary agent.
In this chapter, we will proceed as follows. In discussing previous studies of trade credit and
its characteristics, it is shown that trade credit studies tend to assume some ”supplier-specific”
technologies, instead of bank-specific technologies; but we cannot take this approach because
negotiable bills have been used among pure financial institutions5 as well (c.f. negotiable CDs6).
Instead, we focus on relationship lending (using reputation as the enforcement mechanism),
which does not have to rely on bank-specific or supplier-specific technologies. At the same
4He also points out that this does not mean they had no legal protection. We will come back to the point in
Chapter Four.
5De Roover(1948) points out as follows: ’Not all medieval bills of exchange were commercial bills. A large
proportion of bills were what might be called finance bills.’ It implies that these bills relied neither on bank-
specific technologies nor on supplier-specific technologies.
6Certificates of Deposit: mainly traded in interbank markets.
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time, it is shown the reason why negotiability or resaleability is diﬃcult to describe in this
relationship-lending approach. The significance of the informal contract is emphasised, although
legal protection easily allows the negotiability. Last of all, several past studies relating to
indirect loan contracts are reviewed, followed by a summary of the core model of this part, to
be explained in Chapters Two and Three.
1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Trade Credit
Trade credit, non-banking inter-firm credit transactions that resemble the financial system in
Antwerp without deposit banking, has been studied in the last several decades, mainly to tackle
the question of why interfirm credit is used while bank credit is available. As many empirical
research show, implicit interest rates on trade credit are usually higher than that of bank
credits. For instance, Cun˜at(2006) shows that a common trade credit, ”2-10 net 30” contract,
implicitly imposes about 44% annually7. This is obviously higher than the bank loan rate, and
it is natural to expect that bank loans should dominate trade credit.
Yet, as Emery(1984), Kagabayashi(2004) and other papers show, trade credit plays an
important role in today’s financial markets. Most of the studies of trade credit try to deal with
this paradox. According to Petersen and Rajan(1997)8, there are two major categories of trade
credit studies. The first emphasises its industrial aspect. For instance, Brennan, Miksimovic
and Zechner(1988) argue that trade credit is used as a tool of price discrimination among
buyers, by considering the case in which a credit customer has lower reservation price than a
cash customer. Lee and Stowe(1993) argue that trade credit (delayed payment) rather gives
an opportunity for the buyer to check the quality of a purchased good. Thus, for the sellers,
oﬀering delayed payment acts as a signal of product quality.
7Wilner(2000) mentions that trade credit interest rates commonly exceed 18%.
8Many other papers make similar taxonomies.
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The second answer was in terms of the imperfect credit circumstance of trading firms.
Petersen and Rajan(1997) further categorise this into three, and the following taxonomy is its
modification. The first one regards trade credit as a result of ex-ante information asymmetry.
For instance, Smith(1987) argues that trade credit is used as a screening device. If buyers prefer
trade credit to cash transactions at discount, it implies the buyers’ credit deterioration. Or,
Biais and Gollier(1997) regard trade credit as a signalling device. Their signalling mechanism
is similar to Holmstrom and Tirole(1997): if a supplier has private information of a buyer’s
creditworthiness, the supplier’s behaviour (of lending / not lending) acts as a signal for a
third party, a bank. Burkart and Ellingsen(2004) suppose that suppliers have an information
advantage about their borrowers’ transaction, since traded intermediate goods are firm-specific,
in contrast to cash. This creates a relative advantage over banks who deal with cash, which is
anonymous.
The second assumes that a supplier can control a buyer’s behaviour to some extent, to
solve a borrower’s moral hazard problems. Typical assumptions are that the supplier has some
relationship with the buyer and it is costly to reconstruct the relationship again. With the
relationship, the supplier can enforce the buyer’s repayment by threatening them with the cut-
oﬀ of the relationship. At the same time, the supplier has an incentive to help the buyer who is
suﬀering from temporary liquidity shortage; or, the buyer goes bankrupt and the supplier loses
the valuable relationship with the buyer. The relationship enables the supplier to lend to the
buyer who is credit-rationed by a bank due to information asymmetry. Smith(1987) was the first
one who mentioned such a relationship and its role, and Cun˜at(2006) models it fully. He argues
that such a kind of relationship is achieved when a buyer produces final goods with a specific
intermediate good that is produced by a monopolistic supplier of the good. It is costly for both
the buyer and the supplier if the relationship is broken, since the buyer has to use generic goods
which give lower productivity, and the supplier loses the customer. Kim and Shin(2007) can
also be categorised into this ”trade credit as a result of moral hazard problems”. They consider
a vertical production chain: a supplier produces an intermediate good for another supplier, who
produce another intermediate good for another, downstream supplier. The chain ends when it
reaches a supplier of the final good. They argue that the longer production chain means there is
a longer time lag between the production of an intermediate good and the receipt of its revenue.
7
It means that each supplier has a claim on his downstream supplier, and the claim acts as a
”stake” of the relationship (the production chain itself). The final good supplier can force the
suppliers of the intermediate goods to stay in the chain by borrowing from upstream suppliers
and promising to repay appropriately (the suppliers would lose their revenues (repayments from
downstream suppliers) if they stop participating into the chain).
The third one assumes that suppliers have an advantage in liquidating collateral seized from
default buyers. This skill, better than banks, allows trade credit to be advantageous (see Mian
and Smith(1992)). Frank and Maksimovic(2004) make a similar model, with many players. In
the theories of banking, Diamond and Rajan(2001) use a similar approach.
1.1.2 Characteristics of Trade Credit Studies
The common characteristics of these trade credit studies is that they assume some specialities
of non-bank suppliers; the necessity of signalling or screening, the collateral collection skill of
suppliers, and so on. Of course it is natural to assume this, to show the preference of trade
credit to bank credit. Yet instruments or technologies used in trade credit transactions are
actually common among bank credit transactions, too. As we see in the history of Antwerp
(see Appendix), trade credit emerged through utilizing bills obligatory and bills of exchange
in medieval Europe. Some historians point out that these instruments began to be used for
pure financial transactions (e.g. exchange rate arbitrage) as well, soon after these have been
used for trade credit. The boundary of trade credit and bank credit would be, that is to say,
more ambiguous than was thought previously. The ambiguity can be observed in the case of
Ireland (see Appendix for further information). Trade credits with cheques drawn on the closed
bank substituted bank credit during the period of bank closure. It is essentially not bank
credit, because people might not expect that the cheques would be repaid9. Thus, it should be
regarded as non-bank credit. The cheques became banks’ credit again when the banks restarted
business.
9Considering the accumulated backlog of unsettled cheques during the dispute, it was not diﬃcult for people
in Ireland to expect that the bank cheques would not be settled on time, at maturity date, according to the
Central Bank of Ireland(1971).
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Considering this, it would be valuable to concentrate on the characteristics and mechanisms
of the instruments used in trade credit, instead of focusing on the characteristics of its users
by distinguishing banks and non-banks as previous researchers have done. This means that we
need to make a model of credit transactions using bills, which relies neither on special banking
skills (i.e. monitoring, collateral collection, commitment to a demand-deposit contract etc.)
nor on the suppliers’ special skills (i.e. enforcement ability using intermediate goods, collateral
collection skill, signalling needs etc.). Through the model, we may see why trade with bills has
become the foundation of the modern financial system, with its flexibility that can be used by
any players.
Considering the characteristics of bills transactions, we do not have to limit our attention to
the literature about trade credit. Although it is rarely referred to in trade credit studies, theories
of banking have similar approaches to the arguments in trade credit. For example, the signalling
model in the information acquisition approach mentioned above is similar to Holmstrom and
Tirole(1997). In their model, the bank is not a signal receiver, but a signal maker. The
third parties who receive the signal are uninformed investors, not banks, in Holmstrom and
Tirole(1997). It is also common in banking theories to assume a certain ability to enforce
repayment as well. Diamond(1984) assumes that a bank can enforce a borrower’s repayment
directly and a depositor can enforce a bank’s repayment by non-pecuniary penalty. Calomiris
and Kahn(1991) assume that banks can commit to a demand-deposit contract and this gives the
incentive of monitoring to depositors. Or, Diamond(1991), Rajan(1992) and Boot, Greenbaum
and Thakor(1993) study how relationship and reputation work in financial contracts. The
advantage in collateral liquidation skill is studied by Diamond and Rajan(2001), for example.
1.1.3 Relationship Lending and Resaleability
Unless we assume the existence of supplier-specific or bank-specific skills, debt contracts are
enforceable only through relationship (reputation). Such relational contracts have been studied
both in trade credit and banking theories. In the theories of trade credit, an exclusive rela-
tionship is assumed in Smith(1987), Wilner(2000), Cun˜at(2006) and others. Smith(1987) and
9
Wilner(2000) argue that a relationship between lender and borrower gives the lender an incen-
tive to help a borrower in trouble, because the relationship is assumed to be valuable for the
lender and it will be lost if the borrower goes bankrupt. This can be regarded as a Soft Budget
Constraint of Kornai(1979) or Dewatripont and Maskin(1995), as Boot(2000) points out in the
context of banking studies. Cun˜at(2006) uses the relationship to enforce borrowers to repay
as well. Smith(1987) and Wilner(2000) assume that making such relationships needs a certain
sunk cost that is exogenously given, while Cun˜at(2006) uses user-specific intermediate goods to
make an exclusive relationship between a lender and a borrower. A positive correlation between
trade credit and firms’ relationship is empirically shown by McMillan and Woodruﬀ(1999) and
Uchida, Udell and Watanabe(2006).
Similar issues are discussed in the theories of banking. One of the most notable topics
is competition between relationship-based banking and transaction-oriented banking, which
Boot(2000) surveyed. According to Boot(2000)’s definition, relationship-based banking relies
on private information obtained by bank-specific monitoring or screening and also on multi-
ple interaction that enables intertemporal information reusability. The transaction-oriented
banking is, in contrast, mainly done by ”less-informative” investors like bond-holders; arm’s
length lending, proprietary trading and other debts frequently traded in secondary markets
are included in this category. Many papers study the reasons why relationship-based banking
is dominating, or coexisting, with transaction-oriented banking. For instance, Diamond(1991)
argues that high-credit firms choose transaction-oriented banking because their reputation is
suﬃcient to bind themselves to behave honestly towards less-informed investors. By contrast,
lower credit firms need banks’ costly monitoring technology. Sharpe(1990) and Rajan’s(1992)
arguments are similar to this point. Holmstrom and Tirole(1997) describe how banks provide
credible signals to other uninformed investors.
One common characteristic of relationship lending, regardless of trade credit or banking, is
that it is basically focusing on the bilateral relationship between lender and borrower. Although
some banking studies look like games with three players (borrowers, banks and depositors), these
studies concentrate on the relationship between banks and depositors, by assuming that there
is no incentive problem between borrowers and banks. For instance, Diamond(1984) assumes
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banks’ skills of monitoring their borrowers. Diamond and Rajan(2001) assume that borrowers’
loans are perfectly secured by collateral. Neither models describe borrowers’ decision-making.
In this sense, these banking studies are still essentially bilateral loan contracts.
The impossibility of the three players’ multilateral loan contract is explained by Dia-
mond(1984). He points out that bank loans are not resaleable, because banks lose the incentive
to enforce their borrowers’ repayments once the banks sell their loan contracts to third parties.
As Boot and Thakor(2000) argue, most banking studies, including the consumption insurance
approach as in Diamond and Dybvig(1983), are part of relationship-based banking. Accord-
ingly, loan contracts cannot be enforceable once the relationship has broken down. If the bank
sells its loan to a third party who does not have a relationship with the initial borrower, neither
the bank nor the third party can enforce repayment since the initial relationship is lost (even
if the bank retains the relationship, it has no incentive to help the third party, since there is
no relationship between the bank and the third party). This is the reason why loan sale is not
allowed in the theories of relationship-based banking.
This restriction would be too strong, considering the modern financial system from the
sixteenth century onward. As explained in the history of financial development in medieval
Europe, bills obligatory and bills of exchange, forms of loan contracts, have been re-sold for
settlement. At the present time, Boyd and Gertler(1994) and Gorton and Pennacchi(1995) point
out the rapid growth of securitisation and the sale of bank loans. In that sense, as Boot and
Thakor(2000) point out, the boundary of relationship-based banking and transaction-oriented
lending is ambiguous. These facts imply the importance of studying resaleable loan contracts,
in contrast to the previous studies both of banking and trade credit.
1.1.4 Informality of Loan Contracts
One would think that these re-sales of loans is enabled by legal enforcement, and that the rela-
tionship is not necessary in the system; i.e., observed resaleability of loans does not contradict
the claim of relationship-based banking theories. In fact, this is partly true. Many historians,
e.g. Van der Wee(1964) and Kohn(1999a), argue that legal enforcement played a certain role
11
in diﬀusing resaleable financial instruments, i.e. negotiable bills. At the present time, bond
issuers are legally enforced to repay their debts to any holders, regardless of the existence of a
relationship.
Yet, as Kohn(1999a) points out, bills of exchange and bills obligatory initially emerged as an
informal instrument. Legal enforcement was made afterwards, in accordance with merchants’
custom (see Guest(1998), for instance)10. The custom was initially ratified by court in 1437, in
the case of Burton v. Davy. The court confirmed the mercantile customs at that time and gave
legal guarantee. This famous case is regarded as a milestone of financial laws among jurists (see
Beutel(1938) or Munro(2003)). See Greif(1989,1993) and others as well for historical studies of
informal relationship.
Even at the present time, legal enforcement mechanism is still far from perfect, especially
in developing countries. For instance, McMillan and Woodruﬀ(1999) surveyed private firms in
Vietnum and found that 91 percent of the firms did not think courts could enforce a contract
with a customer. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ(1999) surveyed transition countries11 as
well in 1997, and found that more than 30% of the firms had negative view regarding reliability
of courts’ enforceability12. Furthermore, less than 40 percent of the firms used courts when they
had the latest dispute. Such kind of informal finance is empirically reported by Ghate(1992)
and Fisman and Love(2003) as well.
1.1.5 Multilateral Loan Contracts
These issues stated above lead us to consider informal multilateral loan contracts, relying on
neither bank-specific technologies nor supplier-specific technologies. There are a few studies of
multilateral loan contracts with more than three players. Kiyotaki and Moore(1997) study a
kind of production chain. Each player produces an intermediate good that is specific to the other
10For example, negotiability (resaleability) of bills that are payable to the bearer was left informal for a long
time in the UK, as Megrah and Ryder(1983) point out.
11Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
12In particular, both Russian and Ukrainian firms were negative (more than 40 percent of the firms thought
courts could not enforce contracts).
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player. This is slightly diﬀerent from normal loan contracts, because suppliers (lenders) give
their products in exchange for payment (in a sense, it is perfectly collateralised). They study
the propagation of liquidity shock in this chain. Kim and Shin(2007) study a diﬀerent type of
multilateral contracts, a production chain. In their model, each intermediate good’s supplier has
to bear a time lag from his/her production until payment of the production as the production
chain becomes longer. This is because it takes time to transfer their intermediate goods to
downstream firms. This loan asset makes the suppliers stake-holders, and loan contracts giving
suﬃcient rent to every suppliers are enforceable. Shin(2005) studies a circle-shaped production
chain and obtains the unique equilibrium asset price determined in the circle. Mobius and
Szeidl(2006) study a loan contract from the network approach. They assume a valuable network
(friendship) as an exogenously given condition and consider loan contracts in the network.
These studies assume symmetric information, although some of them deal with the (recur-
sive) moral hazard problem (Kim and Shin(2007)). This is the reason why they can avoid the
impossibility noted by Diamond(1984). Symmetric information is a reasonable simplification,
but it would be worth removing this assumption because information asymmetry is the heart
of relationship-based lending, as Boot(2000) argues. As far as I know, there are two studies
tackling multilateral loan contracts with information asymmetry. One is Frank and Maksi-
movic(2004). There are three players, bank, seller and buyer. The bank can lend to the buyer
directly, but the seller has better collateral collection skill; accordingly, it would be better for
the bank to lend to the buyer through the seller. Yet, in this indirect finance, the bank cannot
observe the buyer’s creditworthiness, which is the seller’s private information. The authors
study when and how the bank chooses indirect lending through the seller (trade credit).
Another one is Kiyotaki and Moore(2003), studying the resaleability and possibility of re-
saleable papers being used as inside money. In their model, the initial lender and final borrower
have to trade through an intermediary, due to the intertemporal lack of double coincidence.
The repayments from the borrower to the intermediary and the intermediary to the lender are
guaranteed by collateral (and equivalent collateral collection skill). Yet there is an adverse
selection problem. The initial creditor can learn about credit quality before the creditor re-sells
the claims she possesses, so she has an incentive to pick bad claims to sell these to third parties.
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This adverse selection problem prevents third parties from purchasing second-hand claims and
the claims become non-resaleable. The authors showed that this adverse selection problem can
be solved by suﬃciently low credit rationing in bilateral contracts, or by a banking technology
to bundle the claims that prevents the initial creditor from picking.
1.2 Summary of the Model
The model explained below is another version of multilateral loan contracts. The critical dif-
ference of this model from previous studies is its self-enforcing characterization. It does not
assume any legal enforcement, any collateral, or any special technologies of banks or suppliers.
Additionally, it assumes severer information asymmetry: the lender cannot observe any transac-
tion between the borrower and intermediary, and the borrower cannot observe any transaction
between the lender and intermediary. This assumption makes players’ beliefs complicated,
compared with Frank and Maksimovic(2004), which gives players’ beliefs exogenously13.
Instead, I have simply assumed that the relationships among players are given and fixed: a
lender can lend resources to a borrower only through an intermediary agent. The borrower can
repay the loan only through the intermediary agent. This assumption contrasts with previous
trade credit studies that try to explain the reason why an exclusive relationships are sustained
between players (player-specific intermediate goods achieve the relationship in many papers).
This ex-ante relationship is basically for simplification, but can be justified with McMillan and
Woodruﬀ(1999)’s survey. They used location of firms as a proxy of relationship and find positive
correlation to the amount of trade credit. This means that relationships among firms are given
by geographical conditions - namely, exogenously given. The Central Bank of Ireland(1971) also
mentioned that personal relationships made in pubs played an important role in the financial
13Frank and Maksimovic(2004) need several assumptions to make their model workable. The first one is the
independent default probability of the buyer(borrower) and seller(intermediary), which simplifies players’ beliefs.
The second is that the buyer (borrower) gives his repayment to the initial lender directly in case the seller
(intermediary) is bankrupt. This exogenous commitment power given to the borrower helps their model work
more easily.
In this model presented here, default ratios are strongly correlated because the borrower’s repayment is only
the source of repayment for both borrower and intermediary. This assumption would be plausible, and convenient
to descrive chains of defaults (contagion), which are sometimes observed in reality.
14
transactions among non-banking firms. In the next chapter, I assume that the lender and
the borrower live in diﬀerent countries and only the intermediary agent, a` large merchant, has
branches in both countries. This is close to the situation in medieval Europe, where cross-border
transactions became popular.
We will see in the next chapter that such kinds of multilateral loan contracts are possible,
but less eﬃcient, because a severer penalty strategy is necessary and it is inevitable for a
borrower to be punished even when the borrower behaves honestly. The penalty strategy needs
to be exponentially more severe as the borrower’s investment project is riskier; and more severe
penalty inevitably lowers the eﬃciency of the economy. We will see how we can ease the penalty
in Chapter Three, by discussing collateral or mediator. If the borrower has suﬃcient amount
of collateral, we can achieve the first best equilibrium (although this requires the borrowers to
be wealthy to some extent).
This part continues as follows. The core model is discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter Three
modifies the model with collateral. Chapter 4 concludes, and we will see that the characteristics
of the model show a good fit to the case of Antwerp, Ireland and others.
1.3 Appendix to Chapter One
1.3.1 Emergence of Transaction with Bills in Antwerp
It is said that there are two remarkable innovations in modern finance. One is the emergence
of deposit banking in southern Europe and the other is the resaleability or negotiability of
bills in northern Europe. These two innovations arose from the same need: scarcity of money
(coinage). Many historians point out that metal money was scarce in medieval Europe, even
during periods of economic downturn. Kohn(1999c) points out that there was a serious shortage
of gold coin in Bruges around 140014, for example.
14Kohn(1999d) also points out that the scarcity was aggravated by public policy that enforced the use of gold
coin, not bills of exchange.
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Shortage of Coinage and Emergence of Banking
There are three main reasons for this shortage. The first one is its bad quality. According to
Kohn(1999c), after the collapse of the Roman empire, minting policy became very loose. Each
manor minted to their own standard, and minting was taken over by private goldsmiths and
silversmiths. Due to the crude minting technology, it was easy to counterfeit coins. Clipping
and culling were common among money-changers and others. It lowered the amount of coinage
available for transactions. Second, quantity of gold minted was stagnant by the middle of
the fifteenth century. During the fourteenth century, silver, which had been minted badly,
was largely replaced by gold, which was generally of good quality. Yet European economies
relied on Africa for the production of gold and it was scarce historically, due to the prolonged
interruption in Mediterranean trade during the Dark Ages. The scarcity continued until new
mines were discovered in central Europe and then America. Third, as de Roover(1948) points
out, long-distance trades, which became common in medieval Europe, lowered the velocity of
these coins significantly. It took a long time to ship gold bullion or other metal currencies,
and merchants had to prepare a` large amount of commodity money. Fourth, these precious
metals had been used not only for transaction purposes, but also for non-monetary uses, such
as hoarding and decoration, as Kohn(1999c) points out.
Van der Wee(1963), Kohn(1999d) and other historians point out that money-changers, gold-
smiths and silversmiths began to act as a sort of bankers in this era. Since coinage varied in
quality, merchants needed to ask money-changers to check and certify this quality in every
transaction. According to Kohn(1999d), it was more eﬃcient for the money-changers to count
and check coins only once and then store them, rather than check the same coin in every trans-
action. When merchants needed to pay or receive money, they ordered it to the money-changers
and the money-changers settled by transferring the money on their books. Kohn(1999d) points
out that this is a primitive book-entry system. Goldsmiths and silversmiths, who had to keep
precious metals for the time being, issued a kind of securities in trust, and these acted as a
primitive form of deposit certificates. These primitive bankers made it possible to trade without
coinage.
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Frequent Bank Failure and Bans of Banking
Yet, as de Roover(1948, p331) wrote, ’In the Middle Ages, commercial banking was not a
conservative business but a risky game’: their business was unstable due to several reasons.
First, they did not have safe borrowers: sovereign debt was one of the most risky loans for the
bankers, since they needed to rely on their personal relationships with royal families to collect
the repayments. They lent to high-risk business ventures directly, which was of course illiquid.
The size of their balance-sheets was still too small to be a buﬀer from liquidity shocks. In
addition, central banks, which prevent liquidity shocks from propagating, did not exist at that
time. De Roover(1948) mentioned an episode in which 96 banks out of 103, which had existed
in Venice at one time or another, came to a bad end. Frequent bankruptcy in the other cities
are also reported; Bruges by de Roover(1948) and Antwerp by Van der Wee(1963).
These bank failures, accompanied by the ruin of ”all classes of people” (de Roover(1948,
p340)), made rulers of Antwerp prohibit banking business itself. The Dukes of Burgundy
declared bans on banking business in 1433, 1467 and 1480; Van der Wee(1963) showed that
only one money-changer was still reliable in 1480 and the last money-changer finally run in
1484. Also, in 1486 there was a series of bankruptcies of bankers, and deposit and clearance
banking businesses in Antwerp were completely ruined.
De Roover(1948) points out that the rulers had other reasons to prohibit the banking busi-
ness. Since the banking business was risky, as mentioned above, the bankers needed to hold
suﬃcient amounts of gold specie as their own capital, a buﬀer from liquidity shock. This means
that currency debasement was favourable for them: the value of gold bars became relatively
higher than coin and the bankers’ capital was reinforced. In a sense, currency devaluation
policy was not only a monetary policy, but also a policy of prudence to rescue ailing banks. In
addition, the bankers’ picking and culling also debased coinage and had a great benefit to the
bankers. The Dukes of Burgundy or Maximilian of Austria intended to improve the quality of
the coinage by forcing the bankers to bring their species back into circulation. This monetary
stability policy and the following deflation (currency appreciation) was critical for the banking
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business15.
Emergence of Bills as a Financial Revolution
Merchants in Antwerp, then, had to seek another measure of settlement other than banking,
since coinage was still scarce. This prompted the development of another financial technology,
bills of exchange and bills obligatory. Merchants paid by bills, and oﬀset the liability by another
receivable. Bills were circulated instead of coins. Yet trades with bills had significant drawbacks
compared with coinage; that is, the resaleability of bills was very limited, while coins could be
handed over to anybody. That is, a seller who received a bill might face diﬃculty when he/she
had a liquidity need, since he/she could not pay by the bill received (that is to say, they could
not re-sell the bill received). This was because the third party, who is oﬀered the bill by the
seller, did not know about the creditworthiness of the issuer of the bill. The seller would
correctly expect this and refused to receive the bill. Such a kind of problem did not occur when
they traded with coins, or through banks; since every transaction was concentrated on banks,
the banking business did not face such a resaleability problem.
Accordingly, we can say that the history of bills in medieval Europe is the history of making
the bills resaleable. Van der Wee(1963) categorises the developmental progress of transactions
with bills into three stages. The first one was normal assignment, which had been diﬀused in
the fifteenth century. Van der Wee(1963) points out that the assignment was not a transfer
of the rights of a creditor. The seller of a bill remained the debtor, until the initial creditor’s
receivable was satisfied by the issuer of the bill. The second stage was the assignment of bills
that was payable to bearer, which was established in Antwerp by 1510. Compared with the bills
that was payable to order, bills that was payable to the bearer were convenient for creditors,
since anybody, not only the creditors themselves or their proxies, could receive the repayment
from their debtor, if they presented the bills. Yet it was risky system at the same time, since
15Van der Wee(1963) countered that the public prohibition was not the critical reason for the ruin of Antwerp
banking, by pointing out that after the ordinances of 1433, 1467 and 1480 the crafts of money-changers and
bankers were flourishing in Antwerp. He argues that a monetary crisis of the last quarter of the 15th century
was fatal for banks.
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even robbers of the bills could obtain the right to receive the repayment. The other problem
was the anonymity caused by assignment. If bills that was payable to the bearer were assigned
several times, it became diﬃcult for creditors (holders of the bills) to specify the initial debtor.
This problem was solved in the third stage, endorsement. Endorsement required every seller
to sign their names when they re-sold their bills. Important point is that signers undertook an
obligation to repay the debt if the initial debtor failed to repay. If the holder of the bill could
not receive repayment from the initial borrower, the holder could claim the repayment against
the last endorser(signer). The endorser could then claim the repayment against the previous
endorser, and this continues until it reaches the initial debtor. That is to say, endorsement
was, and is, a sequential guarantee mechanism. This mechanism could solve the problem of
anonymity cited above, and the alternative financial system reached completion. They could
use bills for their settlement instead of coinage, without the help of deposit or clearance banking.
Many historians regard this negotiability of bills as a financial revolution in medieval Eu-
rope. This technology was introduced in London in the seventeenth century, and became the
foundation of the modern financial system.
1.3.2 Informal ”Money” in Ireland in 1970
Antwerp was an interesting case showing how the economy worked without banks in medieval
Europe. Now we look at the other economy without banks in 1970. From May 1st to November
17th 197016, Ireland’s major clearing banks (Associated Banks, Chase, and Bank of Ireland In-
ternational) were closed for business due to an industrial dispute. Since the Associated Banks
(main clearing banks) accounted for 75% of total bank credits (Central Bank of Ireland(1971)),
this closure meant that people in Ireland lost most of their instruments for settlement. (Mur-
phy(1978) points out that current and deposit accounts with the banks made up 85% of M2
in 1970.) The decline in money supply was partly oﬀset by increases in currency in circulation
and by the current accounts of the other operating banks. But Murphy(1978) estimated that
the increase constituted less than 1/12 of the Associate Banks’ current and deposit accounts.
16Central Bank of Ireland(1971) and Murphy(1978) point out that we can consider that the closure eﬀectively
continued for a year, since these banks’ clearing business was stuck before and after the closure.
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A notable characteristics of the banks’ closure in Ireland is that the malfunctioning bank
credit had been replaced by cheques drawn against the closed banks and other trade credits.
Usually, the cheque drawn by an issuer would be settled in a few days. Yet, during the bank
closure, an acceptor of the bill could not expect immediate repayment of the bill; furthermore,
the acceptor could not be sure when the banks would restart the business and he/she would
receive the repayment. As Murphy(1978) argues, essentially the cheques or bills were drawn not
against the current accounts of the closed banks, but against cheques and bills the issuer had
received (but, of course, not settled) or the acceptor’s view as to the issuer’s creditworthiness.
That is to say, during the bank closure, issuers and acceptors of the cheques or bills made
implicit debt contracts without the banks’ support or legal support. These debt contracts,
which should be regarded as trade credits, functioned as an alternative money in Ireland.
This alternative settlement mechanism had several distinct features compared with the
banking system. First, acceptors (lenders) had to consider not only their direct borrowers’
creditworthiness, but the borrowers’ payers. In many cases, one borrower’s repayment was
contingent on another’s, who was indebted to the borrower (this was the case when the borrower
had drawn the bills against his/her unpaid cheque or bill received). Second, there was limited
negotiability. If we trade with money, we do not have to consider how many times the note has
been used, since perfect resaleability (or negotiability) of money is assured. Yet, the ”alternative
money”, cheques or bills did not have perfect negotiability. Murphy(1978) writes that negotiated
bills or cheques were accepted only when acceptors had suﬃcient information about initial
issuers’ creditworthiness. Third, this alternative money was accepted mainly within Ireland;
foreign firms accepted it less.
The main question is why the alternative finance system worked without banks’ support17.
Both Central Bank of Ireland(1971) and Murphy(1978) point out the close-knit social networks
in Ireland. The population in Ireland was only three million in 1970, which enabled ”a high-
degree of personal contact amongst members of the community” (Murphy(1978))18. This would
17To be precise, many transactions were done with bills drawn on the closed banks’ accounts and it was
expected that the banks would settle these after they restarted the business. In that sense, the system was still
partly supported by the banks. It must be pointed out, however, that many transactions were actually cleared
and cancelled during the closure, because the closure was prolonged for a year.
18The Central Bank of Ireland(1971) points out that the potential credit of the closed banks also helped the
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also explain why the alternative money was rarely accepted by foreign firms.
Thanks to the system, Ireland’s rate of growth was still positive in 1970 (4% in 1969 and 2%
in 1970, according to the Central Bank of Ireland(1971)), although the money supply declined
drastically at that time.
Another notable fact was a seamless linkage of bank credits and non-bank credits. The al-
ternative money, trade credit, mainly used cheques drawn on the closed banks as an instrument,
although they did not rely on bank credit directly. After the bank closure, however, the trade
credits with cheques drawn on the banks became a part of bank credit, although these were
not permitted by the banks ex ante. As a result, bank credit was increased after the closure.
According to the Central Bank of Ireland(1971), the overall increase in credit was 20% (year
on year basis) in April 1971, which was 8% points higher than expected.
system. The firms used cheques drawn on the closed banks, knowing that they did not settle. It should be
interpreted that issuers and acceptors of the cheques made implicit debt contracts, with a stochastic guarantee
that the closed banks would settle the cheques some day. According to the Central Bank of Ireland(1971), some
market participants expected that the bank closure would not last long and they would not accept these cheques
if they correctly anticipated the length of the closure.
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Chapter 2
Trade Credit as a Multilateral
Relational Contract
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies multilateral self-enforcing financial contracts among non-financial institu-
tions, which players can make contracts only through an intermediary. In particular, this chap-
ter explains when and how firms can make an indirect loan contract with their counterparts
through an intermediary, without any help of bank-specific technologies or legal enforcement.
We will then discuss its ineﬃciency: possible solutions are discussed in the next chapter.
As explained in the last chapter, the phenomenon we are going to examine is ”how a lender
and a borrower who cannot make contact directly make a loan contract via an intermediary
agent, without assuming any bank-specific technologies or legal enforcement”. The clearest
example was observed in Antwerp in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. At that time, the rulers
in Antwerp banned the deposit banking business due to frequent bank failures and bankers’
immoral activities. This made bank-notes as a major settlement instrument unavailable, and
merchants in the city needed to innovate alternative measure of settlement. The system of
bills of exchange and bills obligatory emerged in such circumstances. Initially, bills were issued
in bilateral relationship, but gradually merchants tended to pay by bills issued by the other
22
merchants. The resaleability of bills was initially informal contracts; later on, courts accepted
the merchants’ custom and ratified them. Such kind of resale of IOUs without legal enforcement
can be observed in many cases, as we have seen in the last chapter. Many historians and
economists point out in the studies of these cases that relationships among agents (firms)
played an important role in such kinds of financial contracts.
This implies that we can use relational contracts to describe these phenomena. The previous
studies regarding relational contracts have, however, focused on bilateral contracts (Thomas and
Worrall(1988), MacLeod and Malcomson(1989) or Levin(2003)). In this chapter, by contrast,
I will consider multilateral relational contract, which lender and borrower cannot have contact
directly.
I assume that there are three players in the economy (A, B and C)1. A is a borrower, and
he has a profitable project but without input goods to start. C is a lender: she is endowed
with the input good but has no project. It is assumed that A and C cannot trade directly for
some reason (e.g. they are living in diﬀerent countries). Only B, who has neither a project nor
endowment, has a relationship with both A and C; C can lend to A only through B (i.e. B is
a` large merchant and has branches in both countries). C lends to B, B then lends to A; then
A starts the project and receives its stochastic outcome; A repays to B based on the outcome,
and B transfers A’s repayment to C2. This stage game is repeated infinitely. See Figure 2 for
an overview of the whole transaction.
With the information asymmetry, C faces several incentive problems. She is not sure whether
A will honestly repay, and whether B will honestly transfer A’s repayment; in addition, A is
not sure whether C will really lend to B or B will steal C’s loan. In order to convince C
that she will be repaid appropriately, B has to bear some penalty in case A fails to repay.
1To be precise, bills of exchange and bills obligatory have diﬀerent transaction processes and transaction
of bills of exchange is more complicated than the model shown here (bills of exchange need three players: an
issuer orders a drawee to pay to a payee). Yet in transactions with bills of exchange, two players out of three
participants in contracts belong to the same firm (but diﬀerent branches) and no incentive problem would occur,
as many historians point out. Thus, here we do not assume bills-of-exchange-like transaction, to concentrate on
the regotiability of the bills.
2In terms of bills of exchange, A is an accepter / underwriter, B is a drawer and C is a payee. In terms of
bills obligatory, A is a drawer and B is initial payee; then B sells the bill to C.
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By showing that default is costly for B, C is sure that B will repay appropriately to C, and
she lends her endowment to B who transfers it to A. Considering that this indirect finance
resembles the transaction of negotiable (resaleable) bills (see footnote 2 in Chapter One), this
B’s commitment to C can be interpreted as an endorsement (backing) of the bill. Endorsement,
a critical mechanism that has enabled the negotiability of bills, is a declaration of the seller
that he is responsible for the debt he is selling (the buyer of the bill can claim the repayment
against the seller in the case of the initial borrower’s (issuer’s) default).
There are many papers studying more than one principal and more than one agent in the
relational contracts approach, but such multilateral contracts, in which principal and agent do
not meet directly, have never been studied as far as I know3.
This structure has something in common with Kiyotaki and Moore(2000), who also assume
three players and that lenders cannot lend directly, due to an intertemporal lack of double-
coincidence. But the self-enforcing nature of this model makes two critical diﬀerences. First,
they assume exogenously that a lender (C, in this chapter) can extract only a certain fraction
of debt service from her indirect borrower (A) (the so-called resaleability constraint). In this
model, whether the lender can extract repayment from the indirect borrower or not is endoge-
nously determined. Second, they assume that all loans are collateralised and all players have
the same collateral collection skills. This assumption helps them to define inside money (cir-
culated bills) without banking. In this model, there is no collateral; we see that bills can be
traded only with reputation as a bind4.
Yet this self-enforcing indirect finance is less eﬃcient compared to direct finance, as we
will see. The indirect finance mechanism needs more severe penalties and safer projects (risky
projects cannot obtain finance even though they are profitable). Some ineﬃciency was reported
in Antwerp as well, before legal enforcement system was established(Kohn(1999a)). We see
3There are several papers studying financial contracts as relational contracts; i.e. Boot, Greenbaum and
Thakor(1993) and Rajan(1992). However, both of them study bilateral contracts, not indirect multilateral
contracts.
4Kiyotaki and Moore(1997) and Cunat(2005) also study trade credits. The diﬀerence of the model is that
we focus on pure financial transactions. Kiyotaki and Moore(1997) and Cunat(2005) assume that all financial
transactions are backed by underlying physical trades. We do not take their idea here, since Kohn(1999a) points
out that the bills of exchange have been used for pure financial transactions as exchange rate arbitrage.
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that such ineﬃciency can be eased, or solved, by several measures such as legal enforcement
mechanisms or collateral.
I believe that such multilateral relational contracts are widely observed phenomena and
are worth studying. Other than the financial contracts we are going to study, it is common
that suppliers of intermediate goods trade with assembly firms through trading agencies, or
labor force is supplied to companies through staﬃng agencies. In particular, we cannot expect
strong legal supports for international contracts, contracts among small to medium size firms
or contracts in emerging markets. I hope that the self-enforcing contracts studied here shed
light on these fields as well.
In this chapter, we will proceed as follows. First, we study bilateral loan contracts, where
a borrower and a lender can make a loan contract directly. Secondly, the loan contract is
extended to the three players’ case, namely, multilateral contracts: conditions for the existence
of equilibrium and the eﬃciency of the equilibrium obtained there are then discussed. Section
Four concludes.
2.2 The Bilateral Game
2.2.1 The Nature of the Game
Stage Game
The basic structure of the game is analogous to the traditional debt contract studies with
limited liability and without costly state verification, like Sappington(1983) or Innes(1990) (we
will assume ex-post information asymmetry, so it is closer to Sappington(1983) in this sense).
As we will focus on self-enforcing relational contracts, however, we cannot apply their models
directly; they have assumed that principals (lenders) can commit their state-contingent payoﬀ
function to their borrowers.
In addition, we will restrict the principals’ penalty measures further, by assuming that
principals cannot control repayment from borrowers. The principal’s action is assumed to be
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only the choice of lending. Therefore, it is trivial that we cannot construct the stage-game
loan contract and we have the unique autarky equilibrium that the borrower cheats and the
lender does not lend. Yet, in the repeated game context, it is still available for principals to
punish borrowers in case of default, by a termination threat, and trading equilibrium may be
retained. In this sense, the following argument about bilateral debt contract is close to Bolton
and Scharfstein(1990), although our game is repeated infinitely5.
Now we will set up the model in detail. There are two risk-neutral infinitely-lived players
A and C (we assume linear utility to eliminate consumption smoothing matters, which are not
relevant in this argument). Player A has a profitable investment project, which requires one
unit of endowment to start. Only player C is endowed, while she does not have the project.
The investment project yields stochastic output y ∈ {0, Y }, with a prior probability distribution
{π, 1− π} where π > 0. Its expected value is
E[y] = πY + (1− π) · 0 ≥ 1 (2.1)
and its distribution is i.i.d. over time.
At the beginning of the period t, C receives a unit of endowment and chooses her action,
lending amount to A, aCt ∈ {0, 1}, based on her history hCt = {τ0, ..., τ t−1, aC0 , ..., aCt−1} ∈ HC ,
thus a˜C : HC → {0, 1} (the endowment is assumed to be indivisible for simplicity). Player A
immediately starts his investment project only when he receives aCt = 1 (We ignore A’s choice
of whether he invests the borrowed resource or not for simplicity).
The project matures in the same period and nature picks y ∈ {0, Y }, which is not observable
for C. Based on his type y and his history hAt = {τ0, ....., τ t−1, aC0 , ....., aCt−1} ∈ HAt , A chooses his
repayment amount τ ∈ [0, Y ] to C. Stage game payoﬀs are gA = aCt (y−τ) and gC = −aCt +aCt ·τ .
Since we assume a linear utility function for both players, the payoﬀs are at the same time
players’ utility. This stage game is repeated infinitely. The discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) is common
among players, and both π and Y are common knowledge among players.
5In the studies of trade credits, Cunat(2006) adopts a similar approach.
26
A
Borrower
(drawer)
A’s bill
C’s Input Good
A’s repayment τ
C
Lender
(payee/taker)
lending
repaying
Figure 2-1: Stage Game Transaction in Bilateral Contracts
Since the players’ utility is obviously bounded, and the probability distribution over the
outcome y is i.i.d. and δ < 1, we can restrict our attention to a stationary structure without
any loss of generality, from the principle of optimality. In addition, we assume no negative
wealth constraint:
0 ≤ τ ≤ y (2.2)
The Nash Equilibrium of the stage game, after any history, is {a˜A∗, a˜C∗} = {τ = 0, aC = 0},
as explained above.
Repeated Game
Consider now the repeated game. The stage game shown above is repeated infinitely, given the
common discount factor δ. One of the repeated game equilibria is obvious: infinite repetition
of stage-game Nash equilibrium {a˜A∗, a˜C∗} = {τ = 0, aC = 0}. Under the equilibrium, all
financial transactions are halted. The payoﬀs, denoted as autarky payoﬀs, are UAautarky = 0 and
UCautarky = (1− δ)
P∞
i=0 δ
i · 1 = 1.
We will show that A and C have better equilibria, which player A honestly repays to C. A
repeated game payoﬀ is defined as U it = (1 − δ)
P+∞
j=t δ
i−tgij(·), where gi(·) is player i’s stage
game payoﬀ. A surplus from autarky payoﬀs is defined as ui = U i − U iautarky for ∀U i and
∀i = {A,C}. We are going to specify sequential equilibria with a positive surplus of the game.
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Now we can define a Bayesian extensive game (Γ, {Θ}, {p}, {u}); Γ is a two-players extensive
game with perfect information defined above, a set of the agent’s type is Θ = {0, Y }, p is a
probability measure on Θ and p(Y ) = π and p(0) = 1− π, and u is a utility function such that
ui : Θ×H → <+ and uit =
P∞
j=t δ
j−tgi(yj , aAj , a
C
j ) for i ∈ {A,C}.
Since we can limit our attention to the stationary structure, we can describe the payoﬀ
function ui in the functional form. The continuation payoﬀ function x ∈ X ⊆ <2+ is defined as
follows; x = (xA, xC) : <+ ×<++ → <2+, mapping from C’s repayment amount τ and discount
factor δ to continuation payoﬀ vector x.
Players’ utility in the functional form can be defined as follows:
uA = E
£
(1− δ)aC (y − τ) + δxA(τ , δ)
¤
(2.3)
uC = E
£
(1− δ)
¡
−aC + aC · τ¢+ δxC(τ , δ)¤ (2.4)
The continuation payoﬀs xi(·) should be designed to punish the cheater, or honest behaviour
cannot be enforced. Continuation payoﬀs are:
xi(τ) = ui for ∀τ ≥ τˆ (2.5)
xi(τ) = δl · ui for ∀τ < τˆ (2.6)
for i ∈ {A,C}. This means that when C finds τ is smaller than the threshold τˆ , he will
choose aC = 0 for l periods then come back to aC = 1 at the period l + 1, regardless of A’s
choices during the penalty phase6. A’s best response for this strategy is, only when τ is smaller
than the threshold τˆ , a˜A(Y ) = 0 for l periods and then come back to a˜A(Y ) = τˆ as well, since
he cannot expect any reward by choosing honest behaviour during the phase. This strategy is
a Nash Equilibrium since C’s best response to A’s response is identical to her original strategy
(this strategy is not stationary but the corresponding payoﬀ is stationary).
6This penalty is common in the real economy. In the case that we fail to repay, we cannot borrow money for
the time being (in Japan, this takes approximately 2-7 years).
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If A’s repayment is not smaller than τˆ , he will keep lending to A. Under the definition,
we can simplify A’s strategy space as aA ∈ {0, τˆ}, where τˆ ≤ Y , since A’s utility function is
monotonically decreasing w.r.t. τ . The level of τˆ depends on the relative bargaining power
between A and C; it is given and fixed throughout the chapter, as mentioned before.
In order to attain its enforceability, the following constraints must hold:
(1− δ)aC (Y − τˆ) + δxA(τˆ , δ) ≥ (1− δ)aC (Y − τ0) + δxA(τ0, δ) (2.7)
(1− δ)aC (0− τ0) + δxA(τ0, δ) ≥ (1− δ)aC (0− τˆ) + δxA(τˆ , δ) (2.8)
The latter violates the non-negative wealth constraint and can be ignored. In addition, we
have two participation constraints,
ui ≥ uiautarky = 0 for i ∈ {A,C} (2.9)
The first constraint automatically holds from the non-negative wealth constraint. By sub-
stituting (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) into (2.9), A’s participation constraint (2.9) can be rewritten
as
πτˆ ≥ 1 (2.10)
on the assumption that the enforcing constraints hold. If (2.10) holds, (2.9) also holds for
any long period of autarky.
The equilibrium strategies of this game are combinations of A’s choice (aA ∈ {0, τˆ}), C’s
loan (aC ∈ {0, 1}) and C’s choice of continuation function (xA,C), which satisfy the participation
constraint (2.10), and the enforcing constraint (2.7). Here we skip to define the corresponding
posterior beliefs, since the state of the economy changes every period. We will show that this
combination of strategies and beliefs is sequential equilibria.
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2.2.2 Model Solution
For (2.7), substitute continuation payoﬀs (2.5) and (2.6) into (2.7) and we have the following
enforcing constraint:
(1− δ)aC (Y − τˆ) + δuA ≥ (1− δ)aC (Y − τ0) + δl+1uA
If aC = 0 then the above inequality obviously holds, so we assume aC = 1 and solve for uC :
³
1− δl
´
uA ≥ 1− δ
δ
τˆ ≥ 1− δ
δ
1
π
(2.11)
The right inequality comes from (2.10).
Now we will check the one-stage deviation. Define A’s expected surplus if he behaves
honestly as follows;
uA = (1− δ)π(Y − τˆ) + δ
n
π · uA + (1− π)δl · uA
o
(2.12)
and solve this for uA, and substitute it into the enforcing constraint:
ln
µ
δπY − τˆ
πY − τˆ
¶
≥ (l + 1) ln δ (2.13)
Since δπY−τˆπY−τˆ < 1 and δ < 1, these logarithms are negative.
l ≥ l
¯
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ln
³
δπY−τˆ
πY−τˆ
´
ln δ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯− 1 (2.14)
This inequality holds only when δπY − τˆ > 0. This lower bound is strictly bigger than zero,
since δ > δπY−τˆπY−τˆ . Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The necessary condition that the finite period autarky penalty can enforce A to repay
honestly is δπY > τˆ .
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Combined with the participation constraints, we have πY > τˆδ ≥
1
πδ . Or, E[y] = πY >
1
πδ .
At the same time, A can enjoy strictly positive benefit πY − τˆδ if he succeeds to repay. This fee
is necessary for A to have an incentive to repay honestly.
Proposition 2 if E[y] > 1πδ , then ∃ δˆ s.t. for ∀δ > δˆ and ∀l ≥ l¯(δˆ), a˜
A(y = Y ) = τˆ , which A
repays C honestly, is enforceable.
Proposition 3 Autarky length l has an uniform lower bound for any π, Y, τˆ and δ in any
trading Sequential Equilibrium.
We have two equilibria: one is trivial autarky equilibrium, (a˜A(y) = 0, aC = 0, xA(·) =
xC(·) = δ∞uA,C) for ∀y. The other equilibria are (a˜A(Y ) = τˆ , a˜A(0) = 0, aC = 1, xi(τˆ) =
δui, xi(0) = δlui) for ∀i ∈ {A,C}, ∀l ≥l
¯
, satisfying δπY > τˆ ≥ 1π . Corresponding beliefs
can be calculated with the Bayesian rule but it is skipped here, since the state is updated
every period. Thus, C has to punish A even with a firm belief of A’s honesty. If it trembles,
μC(yt = Y | τ t = 0) = ε for some small ε > 0, C’s optimal strategy still does not change since
C has taken suﬃciently severe punishment from the beginning. All the other information set is
singleton, on the assumption that players do not refer to past history in the trading phase (in
the punishment phase, they only care about the length of the punishment); the Nash Equilibria
are, therefore, consistent. Sequential Rationality has been proven above, so the strategy and
corresponding beliefs are Sequential Equilibria. This study, however, has not specified whole
equilibrium set of the game. An aim of the study is proving that the existence of some interesting
equilibria and that the equilibria are sequential equilibria.
2.3 The Multilateral Game
2.3.1 Nature of The Game
There are three risk-neutral infinitely-lived players A, B and C. Player A has a profitable
investment project, which is equal to that of previous section, yielding y ∈ {0, Y } with the
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constraint (2.1). Only player C is endowed with one unit of good to start the project, while he
does not have the project. Player B has neither project nor endowment.
There is an additional assumption here. C cannot lend to A directly while C can lend to
B and B can lend to A. In other words, only B is endowed with an asset of ”relationship”.
This assumption can be justified in several ways. First is simply assuming that the network
structure has been restricted somehow: i.e. A and C speak a diﬀerent language and cannot make
a contract without B, who can speak both languages. Second, some specific time structures a` la
Kiyotaki and Moore(2000) with intertemporal lack of double coincidence can justify a similar
situation. Third, if B has better person-specific monitoring skills of A than C has, it is better
for C to lend his endowment to B and ask him to lend to A with monitoring. This argument
is common in banking research(i.e. Diamond and Rajan(2001)).
Here, we adopt the first justification for simplicity. This exogenously-assumed relation-
ship can be justified empirically. For example, Mcmillan and Woodruﬀ(2000) study positive
correlation between location of firms and amount of trade credit. Or, the Central Bank of
Ireland(1971) and Murphy(1978) point out that personal relationships (in pubs) help loan con-
tracts among people or firms. With this assumption, each player’s information set becomes
slightly complicated. The three players’ histories are, respectively:
hAt = {aB0 , ..., aBt , τ0, ..., τ t−1, y0, ..., yt}
hBt = {aC0 , ..., aCt , aB0 , ..., aBt−1, τ0, ..., τ t−1, ω0, ..., ωt−1}
hCt = {aC0 , ..., aCt−1, ω0, ...ωt−1}
A’s output y is private information. C cannot observe any trade between A and B (τ and
aB). A cannot observe any trade between B and C (aC and ω) either. See Figure 2 for an
overview of this.
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Stage Game and Participation Constraints
At the beginning of the period t, C receives an endowment and decides aCt ∈ {0, 1}, amount
of lending to B, based on his history hCt = {aC0 , ..., aCt−1, ω0, ...ωt−1}. If B receives a unit of
endowment from C and he chooses his action, amount of lending to A, aBt ∈ {0, 1}7, based on
his history hBt = {τ0, ..., τ t−1, ω0, ..., ωt−1, aB0 , ..., aBt−1} ∈ HB, thus a˜B : HB → {0, 1}. Player
A immediately starts his investment project if he receives aBt = 1 (We ignore A’s choice of
whether he invests the borrowed resource or not for simplicity). A cannot start his project if
he receives aBt = 0.
The project matures in the same period and nature picks y ∈ {0, Y }, then A receives aBt · y.
A observes this and repays τ to B (a˜A(y) = τ). B observes τ and then determines his transfer
amount ω (a˜B2(τ) = ω). C receives ω and the stage game ends.
This stage game is repeated infinitely. Discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) is common among players.
We limit our attention to the stationary structure as well, and each player’s surplus from
autarky is
uA = E
£
(1− δ)aC · aB (y − τ) + δxA(τ)¤ (2.15)
uB = E
£
(1− δ)aC · aB(τ − ω) + δxB(τ , ω)¤ (2.16)
uC = E
£
(1− δ)aC · aB · ω + δxC(ω)¤ (2.17)
and their participation constraints are ui ≥ 0 for i ∈ {A,B,C}.
We will specify the continuation payoﬀ functions later, but it is clear that B and C have
to impose a trigger strategy to enforce honest behaviour on their counterparts, based on their
received repayments τ and ω. The thresholds of the trigger strategy, τˆ and ωˆ, are given and
fixed throughout the argument, as well as the bilateral game. The restriction for τˆ and ωˆ will be
given later, but the following arguments apply to any τˆ and ωˆ which suﬃce for the restrictions.
7As in the previous section, we wil limit the action space to aB,C ∈ {0, 1} for simplicity.
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Figure 2-2: Stage Game Transaction in Multilateral Contracts
It is assumed that τˆ and ωˆ is common knowledge among players, which implies that the players
know their relative bargaining power.
Basic Structure of the Game
Since there is no public signal among the players, it is not trivial to construct the equilibria of
the game. First, we will specify A and B’s possible strategy (and corresponding belief) sets,
and define C’s best response for each of the strategies and beliefs. Then we will specify B and
C’s possible strategy and belief sets, and consider A’s best response. Finally, we will specify A
and C’s possible strategy and belief sets, and find B’s best response. The fixed points of the
best responses and corresponding consistent beliefs are the sequential equilibria of the game.
The purpose of the section is to reveal the characterization of the equilibria. We will find that
there are several additional incentive problems and that these are solved in the equilibria.
Since the rule of the game is common knowledge, each player can delete their counterparts’
strictly dominated choices from the possible strategy set. This enables us to simplify the possible
strategy set for each combination of the players.
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2.3.2 Equilibria in the Repeated Game
A’s Possible Strategies
A has to decide a˜A(Y ) and his continuation payoﬀ function xA(·) relying on his beliefs about aC ,
a˜B(·), a˜B2(τˆ), xB(·) and xC(·). He can choose a˜A(Y ) = τˆ only when the following conditions
hold:
a˜B2t (τˆ) = ωˆ (2.18)
a˜Ct+1(ωt = ωˆ) = 1 (2.19)
a˜Bt (a
C
t = 1) = 1 (2.20)
δπY > τˆ (2.21)
l ≥ l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ) (2.22)
The latter two conditions are equivalent to the bilateral case; l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ) is defined at (2.14).
If these conditions are violated then A finds it profitable to cheat a˜A(Y ) = 0. The first three
conditions are additional conditions in the multilateral contracts; which are necessary to ensure
aBt+1 = 1 after τ t = τˆ . In the bilateral game, A can be sure that C always has an incentive to
lend to A as long as A successfully repays. In the multilateral contracts, by contrast, A cannot
be sure that A can borrow C’s endowment after the successful repayment, since (1) B might
steal A’s repayment and report to C that A did not repay, (2) C might not lend her endowment
to B even after C receives repayment ωˆ, or (3) B might steal C’s endowment and report to C
that A did not repay.
Here A only believes that the first three conditions hold; he will find out that his belief is
correct in the trading equilibria. (2.21) and (2.22) hold when B adopts the punishment strategy
defined in the proposition 2. From the fifth condition, A’s continuation payoﬀ function becomes
xA(τ = τˆ) = uA and xA(τ = 0) = δluA.
If any of the conditions is violated, A chooses a cheat strategy, a˜A(Y ) = 0 (B and C are
never repaid).
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B’s Possible Strategies
B has to decide a˜B(aC), a˜B2(τ) and the continuation payoﬀ function xA(·) based on his beliefs
about a˜A(Y ), aC , xA(·) and xC(·). From the non-negative wealth constraint, we can assert that
a˜Bt (aCt = 0) = 0 and a˜B2t (τ t = 0) = 0.
B’s Incentive Problem (a˜B): Firstly, B will choose a˜B(aC = 1) = 1 only when the condition
a˜A(Y ) = τˆ holds. As we have seen in the bilateral contracts (or in the previous paragraph),
this condition is equivalent to the following two constraints:
δπY > τˆ (2.23)
l ≥ l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ) (2.24)
B’s Incentive Problem (a˜B2): Secondly, we will think the condition of when B chooses
a˜B2(τˆ) = ωˆ. B chooses to repay honestly only when the future reward is suﬃciently large
compared with the current sacrifice ωˆ. So B and C need to construct the following penalty
strategy: B and C enter the penalty phase (aC = 0, aB = 0 and a˜B2(τˆ) = ωˆ) if they observe
ω = 0. The penalty phase continues for n periods; both B and C continue the punishment
strategy for any outcome. They restart the trading strategy at n+1 periods, regardless of what
has happened in the penalty phase. This penalty strategy is obviously a Nash Equilibrium (a
similar argument to the bilateral contract applies). We will formulate this enforcing constraint
below.
Since the players’ payoﬀ function has a stationary structure, as we have seen in the bilat-
eral contracts, we use a one-stage deviation principle. B’s honest payoﬀ in functional form is
described as follows:
uBt = (1− δ)π(τˆ − ωˆ) + δ
©
πuB + (1− π)δn · uBª (2.25)
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The continuation payoﬀ is defined as follows: xi(ω) = ui if ω ≥ ωˆ and xi(ω) = δnui,
otherwise (for i ∈ {B,C}). This continuation payoﬀ function is imposed by C, as we will see
later. The participation constraints are uB ≥ 0. Then, the enforcing constraint is:
(1− δ) (τˆ − ωˆ) + δuB ≥ (1− δ) (τˆ − 0) + δn+1uB
Substitute (2.25) into the inequality above, we have
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ln
³
δπτˆ−ωˆ
πτˆ−ωˆ
´
ln δ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯− 1 = n¯ ≤ n (2.26)
This inequality holds only when δπτˆ − ωˆ > 0. We can show the LHS of the inequality n
¯
> 0
using the same procedure as in the previous section. Therefore, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The necessary condition that the finite period autarky penalty can enforce B to
transfer A’s repayment(τ) honestly is δπτˆ > ωˆ.
Therefore, n has a uniform lower bound n
¯
for any π, τˆ , ωˆ and δ if δπτˆ > ωˆ. At the same
time, we have the following relationships from the lemma 4 and the participation constraints:
πY >
τˆ
δ
>
ωˆ
δ2π
≥ 1
δ2π2
E[y] >
1
δ2π2
In addition, this lower bound can be eﬀective only when B and C have a belief a˜A(Y ) = τˆ .
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 if E[y] > 1δ2π2 and B and C have a belief a˜
A(Y ) = τˆ , then ∃ δˆ s.t. for ∀δ >
δˆ and ∀n ≥ n
¯
(δˆ, π, τˆ , ωˆ), a˜B2(τ = τˆ) = ωˆ, which B transfer A’s repayment to C honestly, is
enforceable. Autarky length n has a uniform lower bound for any π, τˆ , ωˆ and δ.
Subsequently, we can now formulate B’s conditions to be honest about a˜B2(τˆ).
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δπτˆ > ωˆ (2.27)
n ≥ n
¯
(δ, π, τˆ , ωˆ) (2.28)
If these conditions do not hold, B finds out that a˜B2(τˆ) = 0 is profitable.
If either of the first two conditions (2.23) and (2.24) is violated, the latter conditions (2.27)
and (2.28) become meaningless and B chooses cheating strategy aB = 0 and a˜B2(τˆ) = 0 eternally
(if C lends to B, she will never be repaid). If the first two conditions hold (thus a˜A(Y ) = τˆ)
but either of the latter two is violated, B will choose the other cheating strategy aBt = 1 and
a˜B2t (τˆ) = 0 for any t. If all four conditions hold, B chooses trading strategy aB = 1 and
a˜B2(τˆ) = ωˆ.
C’s Possible Strategies
C has to decide aC and continuation payoﬀ function xC(·) based on her beliefs about a˜A(Y ),
a˜B(aC = 1),a˜B2(τˆ), xA(·) and xB(·). C can choose aC = 1 only when she can expect A’s honest
repayment and B’s honest transfer; thus, the following four conditions are necessary:
• ωˆ ≥ 1π
• a˜B(aC = 1) = 1
• a˜A(Y ) = τˆ
• a˜B2(τˆ) = ωˆ
The first one is C’s participation constraint. The fourth condition is equivalent to the
following two conditions, as we have seen:
• δπτˆ > ωˆ
• n ≥n
¯
(δ, π, τˆ , ωˆ)
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However, C knows that these two conditions require a˜A(Y ) = τˆ . So C has to be assured
that A chooses trading strategy. This is not an easy task for C, since C cannot observe the flows
between A and B, so that C cannot confirm l ≥l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ) directly(since we have assumed that
C can observe the threshold τˆ and that {π, Y } are common knowledge, she can check directly
whether δπY > τˆ or not).
We can overcome this problem, under the assumption that only C has an endowment to
start the project; from the non-negative wealth constraint, C knows that l ≥ n. C can calculate
l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ) by herself, so C can enforce A’s honest behaviour indirectly by setting n ≥l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ).
C also knows that the second condition is always satisfied when the third constraint holds.
Accordingly, C’s conditions for a trading strategy (aC = 1) can be rewritten as follows:
• δπY > τˆ
• δπτˆ > ωˆ
• n ≥l
¯
(δ, π, Y, τˆ)
• n ≥n
¯
(δ, π, τˆ , ωˆ)
• ωˆ ≥ 1π
The corresponding continuation payoﬀ function is xC(ω = ωˆ) = uC and xC(ω = 0) = δnuC .
If any of the conditions does not hold, C chooses an autarky strategy, aC = 0, eternally.
Fixed Points of the Best Responses
From the argument above, each player chooses the trading strategy only when all the following
constraints are satisfied (the consistency of these beliefs are shown in the appendix):
• l = n ≥ max(l
¯
,n
¯
)
• δπY > τˆ
• δπτˆ > ωˆ
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• ωˆ ≥ 1π
Equilibrium strategies should satisfy the condition l = n. If l > n (l ≮ n because of the non-
negative wealth condition), B and C restart the trading phase; nevertheless, A is still choosing
autarky. Of course B cannot lend to A, and he cannot repay ωˆ > 1 (from C’s participation
constraint). C regards this as a deviation and starts another penalty phase. When A restarts
the trading phase, A has already entered another penalty phase and B cannot lend to A.
This triggers another penalty between A and B. This is Pareto ineﬃcient, and all players have
incentive to choose l = n. In addition, the trading strategies are supported by the following
beliefs:
• μi(aB2t = ωˆ | τ t = τˆ) = 1 i ∈ {A,C}
• μi(aCt+1 = 1 | τ t = τˆ , ωt = ωˆ) = 1 i ∈ {A,B}
• μi(aBt = 1 | aCt = 1) = 1 i ∈ {A,C}
• μi(a˜At (yt = Y ) = τˆ) = 1 i ∈ {B,C}
The conditional beliefs of all information sets can be calculated using these. Obviously, these
beliefs are consistent with the corresponding strategy. Now we have the trading equilibria. Of
course, we have another trivial equilibrium, autarky, such that {a˜A(y = Y ) = 0, a˜B(aC = 1) =
0, aC = 0, a˜B2(τ = τˆ) = 0, xA(·) = δ∞uA, xBt (·) = δ∞uB, xCt (·) = δ∞uC}.
Now we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If δπY > τˆ and if δπτˆ > ωˆ ≥ 1π , ∃ δ˜ s.t. for ∀δ > δ˜ and ∀q ≥ max(l¯,n¯ ), there
are trading equilibria that each player’s actions are appropriately enforced with penalty length
q.
Proposition 7 The penalty length l = n has a uniform lower bound max(l
¯
,n
¯
) > 0 for any
π, Y, τˆ , ωˆ and δ which satisfies the conditions above.
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Lemma 8 The equilibria specified here are sequential equilibria.
See Appendix for the proof. As mentioned in the bilateral game, the equilibria we specified
here may not be the whole set of equilibria of the game. This study aims to show the existence of
some interesting equilibria, and specifying the whole set of equilibria is left for future research.
2.3.3 Eﬃciency of the Self-Enforcing Trade Credit
Penalty Length and the Second Best Economy
From the definition of the lower bounds for the penalty lengths l
¯
and n
¯
, (2.14) and (2.26)
respectively, we characterise the following properties. First, l
¯
is strictly increasing against τˆ
while n
¯
is strictly decreasing against τˆ . This is very intuitive, because a high τ reduces A’s
margin(Y − τ) while it increases B’s margin(τ − ω). A higher margin raises the surplus to
participate in the contract honestly. Similarly, n
¯
is increasing against ωˆ for a given τˆ .
Since the penalty is costly for all players, we have some τˆ∗ and ωˆ∗ such that the lower bound
of the penalty length max(l
¯
,n
¯
) is minimised, namely, the economy is the second-best eﬃcient
(the first-best is l = n = 0, which is impossible in this model). Solving (2.14) and (2.26), we
have the following relationship:
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ln
³
δπY−τˆ
πY−τˆ
´
ln δ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯− 1 ≥
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ln
³
δπτˆ−ωˆ
πτˆ−ωˆ
´
ln δ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯− 1 if l¯≥ n¯
Since logarithm is monotonic and all ln(·) is negative, it is equivalent to
δπY − τˆ
πY − τˆ ≤
δπτˆ − ωˆ
πτˆ − ωˆ
Y · ωˆ ≤ τˆ2
For any given ωˆ, max(l
¯
,n
¯
) is minimised when we set τˆ such that Y · ωˆ = τˆ2. This is because,
if l
¯
≥n
¯
then we can reduce l
¯
and increase n
¯
by lowering τˆ ; thus max(l
¯
,n
¯
) =l
¯
is lowered. If l
¯
≤n
¯
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then we can reduce n
¯
and increase l
¯
by increasing τˆ ; thus max(l
¯
,n
¯
) =n
¯
is lowered. Such kind
of improvement becomes impossible only when l
¯
=n
¯
, namely, Y · ωˆ = τˆ2. n
¯
is minimised for
given τˆ when we set ωˆ = 1π . Thus, if we can pick τˆ and ωˆ to achieve the second best economy,
τˆ∗ =
q
Y
π and ωˆ
∗ = 1π .
Optimization and Endogenised Thresholds
Here we will endogenise τˆ and ωˆ, which have been assumed to be exogenously given and fixed,
by assuming that B writes all contracts. Then τˆ and ωˆ can be obtained as maximisers of the
following optimization problem:
max
τˆ ,ωˆ
uB = (1− δ)π(τˆ − ωˆ) + δ
n
πuB + (1− π)δmax(l¯,n¯)uB
o
subject to
• l = n = max(l
¯
,n
¯
)
• δπY > τˆ
• δπτˆ > ωˆ
• ωˆ ≥ 1π
Players’ enforcing constraints and participation constraints are summarised in the four con-
ditions. It is obvious that we have a corner solution for ωˆ, ωˆ = 1π since lowering ωˆ raises B’s
surplus and shortens the lower bounds of the penalty length n
¯
. But τˆ must be an interior
solution, because the higher τˆ increases B’s current payoﬀ but lowers the continuation pay-
oﬀ through longer penalty length (τ ≥
q
Y
π ). This prevents the economy from achieving the
second-best equilibrium. Therefore, the self-enforcing contract can achieve at best a third-best
equilibrium.
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Only Less Risky Projects Can Be ”Resaleable”
That the multilateral contract requires E[y] > 1δ2π2 implies that it is diﬃcult for A to issue
liquid (resalable) IOUs if A’s project is risky (π is small). If π decreases, the required E[y]
would increase exponentially; the borrowers with low π find it diﬃcult to obtain finance even
if the expected profit of their project is the same as the borrowers with a high π.
This happens because the lender C has to share a certain amount of her surplus with both A
and B, as a compensation for punishment on the equilibrium path (A and B are punished even
if they behave honestly, because C has no way to distinguish their deviation from the unlucky
event that y = 0. C has to punish A and B, nevertheless C is sure that A and B do not deviate
on the equilibrium path, to give A and B an appropriate incentive to behave honestly). This
mechanism is slightly similar to the recursive moral hazard by Kim and Shin(2007)8.
If the project is riskier, compensation to both A and B will increase. This is the reason why
the requirement of profitability becomes more severe exponentially, as the risk of the project
increases (π decreases). This implies that if we have a longer credit chain, with more than four
players, the requirement to E[y] accelerates further as π decreases. Thus, only the borrowers
with a very high π can issue ”very liquid” IOUs that can be re-sold more than twice, although I
do not provide formal proof here. In contrast, borrowers with high risk have to rely on bilateral
contracts, because the requirement is looser, E[y] > 1δπ , as proposition 2 shows. Their loan
contracts are not resaleable.
It would be possible to regard the bilateral contracts as a kind of bank loan, which is also not
resaleable. Or, it would be better to regard it as ’angels’, who invest in venture businesses with
their own money. Less risky borrowers do not have to rely on these banks or angels, because
they can issue resaleable IOUs like bonds. This division of roles in the financial market would
be a plausible hypothesis and convenient to explain several phenomena, such as the emergence
8Compared with the model here, Kim and Shin’s(2007) model is simpler. In their model, studying the moral
hazard problem of many players with a vertical relationship that is similar to the model discussed here, it is
suﬃcient to give a certain amount of surplus to each of suppliers to prevent deviation, because there is no
uncertainty. In addition, no private-monitoring-like problem occurs, because information is symmetric in their
model. This shows that information asymmetry is a critial problem in these multilateral contract models, like
credit chain (a la Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)) or production chain problems.
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of banking in northern Italy in the thirteenth century or banking in developing countries. Why
did big merchants become bankers? Why do banks in the countries with undeveloped property
right systems behave as financial intermediaries, even though undeveloped property rights mean
that collateral collection, the transfer of property right, is very diﬃcult? With this definition,
we can answer such the questions, as an essential feature of banking is neither monitoring
ability nor collateral collection skills but bilateral relationships with many borrowers. We will
discuss this again in Chapter Four, after we discuss collateral and other eﬃciency-improving
mechanisms.
2.3.4 Relationship to the past literature
One-Sided Private Monitoring
Compared with normal public monitoring games using the framework of Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti(1986,1990) or Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin(1994), the model discussed here is com-
plicated. This complexity comes from its characteristics which resembles private-monitoring. In
the normal public monitoring games, where players share common signals, players can shift to
a diﬀerent phase (e.g. penalty phase) at the same time, according to the public signal. Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti(1990) show that we can construct a simple recursive structure to have
coordination, under certain assumptions. In the private monitoring game, however, we cannot
use this approach since players do not share any common information and they cannot be sure
when punishment is ”triggered”. That is to say, we cannot coordinate players of any game
to punish a deviator from equilibrium strategies: trigger strategies, commonly used in public
monitoring games, are not available, or at least very diﬃcult to utilise.
This characteristic of private monitoring requires players to construct a conditional belief
of other players’ private histories, to infer their actions that is a function of their own private
histories, as Kandori(1992) surveyed. At the same time, a recursive structure is not available
because they cannot have a simple public strategy that relies only on any current public signal.
These factors introduce considerable complexity into the model. Due to the above reasons, as
far as I know, a coordination equilibrium is found only in extreme cases; for example, almost
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perfect and almost public monitoring by Mailath and Morris(2002); almost perfect monitoring
by Ely and Va¨lima¨ki(2002) and Piccione(2002); or the other extreme case, assuming the signal
is completely non-informative by Matsushima(2004). Yet, the intermediate case remains an
open question.
The model discussed here has similar characteristics. The borrower A and the lender C
do not share any common signals (A cannot observe ω, the amount C receives, and C cannot
observe τ , the amount A pays). In this sense, this model can be categorised as a private
monitoring game. Moreover, ω contains suﬃciently large noise, so it is impossible to apply the
almost-perfect monitoring approach. Yet we are still able to construct a non-trivial equilibrium,
because C is sure that when C starts her penalty phase, A must start the penalty phase as
well. This assurance comes from the non-negative wealth constraint and from the assumption
that only C has an endowment to start A’s project. If C stops lending, A has no way to obtain
an endowment to start his project. That is to say, this game is not the full private monitoring
discussed by previous studies, but a ”one-sided” private monitoring game, in which C is assured
of A’s private histories9 but A needs to infer C’s private histories.
This one-sided assumption simplifies the problem drastically, although it is still complex
compared with public monitoring. In the ”double-sided” private monitoring games discussed
in the above papers, we have a higher-order belief problem. When one of the players of the
”double-sided” private monitoring game chooses his action, he needs to make his conditional
belief about other players’ private histories to determine their best responses. At the same time,
he knows that the other players also infer his private histories; he has to infer their conditional
beliefs as well. This inference continues infinitely.
Such a kind of higher order problem does not occur in public monitoring games. Every
player knows that the other players’ actions only depend on public signals (and their history),
so no inference is needed. In the ”one-sided” private monitoring, A has to infer C’s private
history about ω. By contrast, C does not have to infer aB (to be precise, C needs to infer
y, but C does not use this inference for coordinated punishment). The inference stops at the
9To be precise, C can be assured of history of aB only. The history of y is still A’s private information and
C has no way to be assured.
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first order, since A knows that C can correctly infer aB and he does not have to infer C’s
conditional belief about aB and its history. Thus, ”one-sided” private monitoring is relatively
more tractable, as shown below and in the Appendix.
Compared with public monitoring games, A has a diﬃculty to find the timing of the penalty
phase oﬀ the equilibrium path. If he finds aBt+1 = 0 after he repays τ t = τˆ , he understands that
B or C deviates equilibrium strategy, but he cannot distinguish which of them deviates. If B
deviates by stealing τ and choosing ωt = 0, this is the first period of the penalty phase. If C
deviates by choosing aCt+1 = 0 after receiving ωt = ωˆ, or B deviates by choosing a
B
t+1 = 0 after
aCt+1 = 1, this is the last period of the trading phase and the next period is the first period of
the penalty phase. Although A has no clue to distinguish when the penalty phase starts at this
time, he can find that the penalty phase is finished when he observes aBt+l+1 = 1. Otherwise,
the penalty phase finished at t+ l+1 period and the trading phase restarts from the following
period. Thus, A can overcome the coordinated punishment problem of the private monitoring
game (see Appendix for a detailed explanation).
The one-sided private monitoring gives certain limitations to the model at the same time.
Since C can infer correctly what A observes is critically important, and this is sustained by the
assumption that C’s endowment is only the source of A’s investment, any other endowments
to the other players are not allowed. For instance, if B also receives an endowment for the
initiation of A’s project, the equilibrium discussed here would collapse since this assumption
leads to double-sided private monitoring. Even if C chooses a suﬃciently long penalty phase to
enforce A’s repayment, there is no guarantee that B cooperates with the penalty. If C chooses
too long period of the penalty, B would find that bilateral trade with A is more profitable
than multilateral trade with A and C, even though C’s endowment is somehow preferable to
B’s endowment. C also rationally expects the possibility that B does not cooperate with the
penalty strategy; this prevents players from coordinative equilibrium.
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Impossibility of Statistical Inference
Some point out that the trigger strategy is not eﬃcient (Radner(1981), Abreu, Milgrom and
Pearce (1991), Stocken(2000), and so on), regardless of the length of the penalty phase. In the
case that the principal cannot distinguish an agent’s deviation from stochastic bad events, it
is inevitable to punish occasionally the agent who behaves honestly. Since the wrong punish-
ment normally leads to a Pareto ineﬃcient outcome, as in the model discussed here, strategies
with the trigger strategy cannot be eﬃcient (some penalty strategies do not incur Pareto ineﬃ-
ciency, especially in renegotiation-proof contracts like Kletzer andWright(2000). In their model,
penalty means transfer of excess surplus of the contracts and it does not incur ineﬃciency).
One possible solution to the problem is statistical inference. If the principal can track credit
history and calculate its average repayment, the principal can review her agent’s behaviour
more precisely. This type of strategy, studied by Radner(1981,1985,1986), Abreu, Milgrom
and Pearce(1991), Stocken(2000) and Matsushima(2004), is called a review strategy. Its basic
mechanism is as follows. In repeated games with infinite repetition, the principal fixes his action
for T periods: A set of the T periods is called a review phase. She receives an outcome every
period, which is a function of the agent’s action and stochastic circumstances (both variables
are the agent’s private information, although the principal knows the probability distribution
of the stochastic circumstances). The principal collects the outcomes in the review phase and
calculates the success ratio. If the success ratio is suﬃciently low compared with the expected
ratio when her agent behaves honestly, the principal switches to the penalty phase, a finite
repetition of stage game Nash equilibrium. After the penalty phase finishes, the economy
restarts the review phase again.
The review strategy has an advantage over trigger strategies in terms of precision of signal
interpretation, by making the length of the review phase T suﬃciently large. Yet it has serious
drawbacks at the same time. The largest drawback is that the principal has to keep the
information unused for the time being, until the review phase ends. Generally speaking, such
kind of delay cannot be eﬃciency-improving. Matsushima(2004) points out that the delay
finally breaks down coordination between principal and agent. If the agent fortunately succeeds
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certain times and he is sure that he will pass the review, or if the agent fails certain times and
he is sure that he cannot pass the review at the end of the phase, the agent has no incentive
to act honestly during the rest of the review phase. Based on the fact that the agent will
choose cheating action by the end of the phase, keeping the same (cooperative) action by the
end of the phase cannot be the best response for principal either. The principal should stop
the review phase immediately and start a new phase. Yet this principal’s response must be
correctly anticipated by the agent. The agent’s best response to the interruption of the phase
is to choose a cheating action one period earlier than when he is sure that he can cheat safely.
Of course, this is correctly inferred by the principal and the review phase ends one period
earlier. Matsushima(2004) points out that this repetition continues and finally breaks down all
coordination during the review phase10.
This problem has been solved (or avoided) in various ways. Radner (1981,1986) assumes the
discount factor to be unity. By assuming this, any one-shot deviation profit becomes negligible
in infinitely repeated games. Accordingly, the agent is still indiﬀerent between an honest and
a cheating action even after he is sure that he has passed (or that he will never pass) the
review; a cooperative strategy is still weakly supported as an equilibrium. Abreu, Milgrom
and Pearce(1991) simply assume that actions during the phase are fixed. Abreu, Milgrom
and Pearce’s(1991) assumption is non-generic and hard to apply. Radner’s(1981,1986) no-
discounting assumption is criticised by Matsushima(1994). He argues that Radner’s(1981,1986)
arguments strongly rely on the characteristics of the time-average criterion that x/T → 0 as T →
∞ for any large x; this assumption is extreme and not plausible, he argues. Matsushima(2004),
instead, assumes the non-informative property, that neither principal nor agent can infer their
counterpart’s history of private information at all. With this property, the agent does not
have any incentive to deviate in the middle of review phase. The non-informative property is,
however, still non-generic for application purposes.
Stocken(2000) studies the review strategy from a diﬀerent viewpoint. The papers cited
10To be precise, the agent gives up acting honestly immediately after he infers from his private signal that the
principal receives a bad signal even though the agent acts honestly. This fragility comes from the severity of the
penalty strategy. In order to enforce the best outcome, the principal needs to expand the length of the phase T
and to raise the threshold of the success ratio as high as she dares to. Accordingly, any wrong signal immediately
breaks down cooperation in the review phase.
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above assume private monitoring, that players do not share any common signals. Stocken(2000)
focuses on public monitoring (cheap talk game). Since it is public monitoring, now we can
shorten the review phase when players are sure that the agent passes or fails the review. Under
this assumption, we just need to ensure that the agent has no incentive to deviate when he
expects the phase is closed in the next period. Stocken(2000) shows that the review strategy can
achieve coordination between principal and agent if the discount factor is suﬃciently close to
one the and the probability of success is suﬃciently close to 100% (the stochastic circumstance
is almost non-stochastic). A problem of this research is that the trigger strategy will be almost
eﬃcient when the discount factor and success probability are close to one (for instance, penalty
length converges to zero, as discount factor δ and probability of success π converge to one.
This is obviously eﬃcient). If the review strategy is possible, trigger strategy becomes almost
eﬃcient and the review strategy is unnecessary.
The impossibility of review strategy does not change even when we allow mixed strategy.
We can randomise players’ actions at two diﬀerent points. The first one is at the end of each
phase. When the principal finds that the agent passes the test, she restarts the review phase
with certain probability. The principal can randomise her action when she shifts from the
penalty phase to the review phase. By setting appropriate probability, we can make the choice
of the review phase and penalty phase indiﬀerent for the players. This simplifies the definition
of equilibria drastically, since both choosing the review phase and penalty phase are the best
responses to any history given. This approach, Interchangeability, is initially adopted by Ely
and Va¨lima¨ki(2002) and Piccione(2002), although they study normal grim trigger strategies.
The other possible randomisation is using mixed strategy equilibrium in every stage game.
In this case, of course, we do not have the incentive problem cited above. Yet this is obviously
ineﬃcient because the principal now has to set the threshold much lower than pure strategy
equilibria. In this case, there is no guarantee that the review strategy is more eﬃcient than
trigger strategies. Moreover, mixed strategy equilibrium is possible only when the players are
indiﬀerent among some elements of their choice sets. It is easier to find such a kind of set in
the case of the simultaneous move game, but the stage-game in the model we have discussed is
a sequential move game and one choice (deviation) strictly dominates the other. Consequently,
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mixed strategy equilibrium does not help us to solve the impossibility of statistical inference11.
2.4 Conclusion
The multilateral relational contracts discussed in this chapter show several interesting char-
acteristics. First, it is possible to construct indirect loan contracts with reputational bind,
although the degree of information asymmetry is more severe than bilateral contracts. A, the
borrower, does not know how B and C trade, and C, the lender, does not know how A and B
trade (B is the intermediary agent). This is a diﬃcult problem setting, because Yet, the penalty
strategy that punishes A and B at the same time, can sort this problem out.
The penalty strategy, which punishes both A and B at the same time, incurs ineﬃciency
as well. Even if A fails to repay and B does not do anything wrong, B would be punished
as well. This is because C cannot distinguish whether A or B deviates from the equilibrium
strategy, and C does not have any measures to punish A or B specifically. This means that B
needs a compensation for the unreasonable punishment. The lender C has to share a certain
amount of her profit with B, to give B an incentive to behave as an honest intermediary.
Similar compensation is necessary for A as well. Since A’s investment outcome is stochastic, A
also would be punished even though he behaves honestly, when the investment outcome turns
out to be zero with some positive probability. A requires compensation for the unreasonable
punishment.
The punishment needs to be more severe when A’s investment project is riskier. Accordingly,
the compensation must be larger if A’s investment project is risky. The compensation increases
exponentially as the project is riskier, because C has to pay the compensations to both A
and B. This means that if the project is risky, C’s participation constraint would be violated
unless the project is very profitable. Since the requirement of the expected profitability is
11Bhaskar and van Damme(2002) also study mixed strategies under private monitoring, although their set-up
is far diﬀerent from the model here. Their two periods game assumes almost perfect monitoring and that there
are two pure Nash Equilibria in the stage-game.
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exponentially more severe as the project is riskier, only less risky borrowers can obtain finance
in this multilateral relational contract.
In bilateral contracts, C only has to pay compensation to her lender (A) directly, and the
requirement to the expected profitability is relaxed. In this sense, multilateral contracts are
less eﬃcient than bilateral contracts; of course, they are still better than autarky, if the indirect
relationship is given exogenously.
The implications of the model for the real economy are discussed in Chapter Four.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Multilateral Contracts as Sequential Equilibria
In order to show that the trading equilibria shown in the body text are sequential equilibria,
we need to show their sequential rationality and consistency. It is not trivial that the equilibria
are consistent. First, we see that, on the equilibrium path, the equilibrium strategies are
sequentially rational w.r.t. consistent beliefs. Each player has one non-singleton information
set on the equilibrium path. A’s information set when A chooses τ t has two elements: one is
(τ t−1 = τˆ , ωt−1 = ωˆ, aCt = 1, aBt = 1) and the other is (τ t−1 = τˆ , ωt−1 = 0, aCt = 1, aBt = 1). If
the former is true, A should choose a˜A(Y ) = τˆ , but if A is at the latter node, A should choose
a˜At (Y ) = 0, because it is the first period of the penalty phase and he does not expect aBt+1 = 1
in the following period, if B and C follow an equilibrium strategy. B also has an information
set with two elements when it receives τ = 0: y = 0 and y = Y . C’s non-singleton information
set, after receiving ω = 0, has four elements: (y = 0, τ = 0), (y = Y, τ = 0), (y = Y, τ = τˆ) and
aB = 0.
An Additional Assumption and the Flavour of Private Monitoring
The penalty strategy is slightly complicated because of this model’s private-monitoring-like
characteristics. In the public monitoring argument, where every players observes the same
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signal which triggers the penalty, each player knows the current status(phase) of the economy:
I.e. everybody knows when the economy entered the penalty phase and when it will come back
to the trading phase. In this model, by contrast, player A cannot realise when the economy
shifts to the penalty phase, if B deviates in the previous period. And if C deviates from her
own punishment and chooses aC = 1, A has no clue to realise he is in the penalty phase, and
may choose a˜A(Y ) = τˆ , or, this equilibrium strategy itself cannot be sustainable in the worst
case. We will see that the players can infer when the penalty is triggered even if they do not
share the common public signal.
The detailed strategies are as follows:
σA(aA = τˆ | y = Y ) = 1 in the trading phase
σA(aA = 0 | ∀y) = 1 in the penalty phase
σB(aB = 1 | aC = 1) = 1 in the trading phase
σB(aB = 0 | ∀aC) = 1 in the penalty phase
σB(aB2 = ωˆ | τ = τˆ) = 1 in the trading phase
σB(aB2 = 0 | ∀τ) = 1 in the penalty phase
σC(aC = 1 | ω = ωˆ) = 1 in the trading phase
σC(aC = 0 | ∀ω) = 1 in the penalty phase
Consistency of A’s On-Path Information Set
Since we have limited our attention to the pure strategy equilibria, A can choose a˜A(Y ) = τˆ
without doubt. But if we introduce trembles, A chooses a˜A(Y ) = τˆ only when the following
inequality holds:
μA
©
(1− δ)(Y − τˆ) + δuA
ª
+ (1− μA)
©
(1− δ)(Y − τˆ) + δnuA
ª
(2.29)
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≥ μA
n
(1− δ)Y + δl+1uA
o
+ (1− μA)
©
(1− δ)Y + δnuA
ª
where μA is A’s belief that he is at an on-path node. 1 − μA is the probability that B
deviates from the trading phase and C deviates from the penalty phase. This is based on the
equilibrium strategy of B and C, σB(ω = ωˆ | τ = τˆ) = 1 − ε1, σC(aC = 1 | ω = ωˆ) = 1 − ε2,
σC(aC = 0 | ω = 0) = 1− ε3, σB(aB = 1 | aC = 1, ω−1 = ωˆ) = 1 − ε4 and σB(aB = 1 | aC =
1, ω−1 = 0) = 1− ε5. From the Bayesian rule, if B deviates with a small probability,
μA =
1− ε2
(1− ε2) + ε3
And if C deviates (with a small probability ε),
μA =
(1− ε1)(1− ε4)
(1− ε1)(1− ε4) + ε1(1− ε5)
From the proposition 5, 6 and 7, for any l ≥l
¯
and δ ≥ δ, in the inequality (2.29) are
suﬃciently large such that the first term in the LHS is larger than the first term of the RHS.
Since δl+1 is monotonically decreasing with respect to l and δ, for any l >l
¯
and δ > δ, the first
term in the LHS is strictly rather than the one in the RHS. For these l and δ, the inequality
(2.29) holds with μA that is suﬃciently close to 1. Namely, the inequality (2.29) holds for
suﬃciently small ε3 > 0 or ε1 > 0 (other εi for i = 2, 4, 5 can take any value).
Consistency of B’s On-Path Information Set
B has a non-singleton information set when B receives τ = 0. μB denotes B’s ex-post belief
about A’s decision aA. As we have seen above, B will punish A even when A behaves honestly
(a˜A(Y ) = τˆ). B’s optimal strategy is, therefore, sequentially rational with respect to any
tremble of A’s action.
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Consistency of C’s On-Path Information Set
C has a non-singleton information set with four elements: (y = 0, τ = 0, ω = 0), (y = Y, τ =
0, ω = 0), (y = Y, τ = τˆ , ω = 0) and aB = 0. For any node, C’s optimal strategy is punishing
A and B: C’s penalty strategy (n periods autarky) is sequentially rational for any perturbation
of A and B.
Consistency of A’s Oﬀ-Path Information Set
When A observes aBt = 0 after τ t−1 = τˆ , there are two possibilities. One is that ωt=1 = 0, and
that this period is the first period of the penalty phase (Case 1 hereafter). The other is that
aBt = 0 or aCt = 0 after ωt=1 = ωˆ; its penalty phase starts at the next period (Case 2 hereafter).
In addition, in the case that aBt = 1 and aCt = 1 after ωt=1 = 0, B and C restart the penalty
phase from the next period; this is also included in Case 2. At this moment, A has no clue to
distinguish Cases 1 and 2. This causes a problem at the end of the penalty phase; at t+ n+ 1
period, A might be in the first period of the restarted trading phase, or the last period of the
penalty phase. But A gets a clue at this period. If aBt+n+1 = 1, it implies that the penalty
phase is over. Instead, if aBt+n+1 = 0 then it is the last period of the penalty phase. A should
choose a˜A(Y ) = τˆ in the former case and a˜A(Y ) = 0 in the latter case12.
Assume that σB(ω = ωˆ | τ = τˆ) = 1 − ε1, σC(aC = 1 | ω = ωˆ) = 1− ε2, σC(aC = 0 | ω =
0) = 1−ε3, σB(aB = 1 | aC = 1, ω−1 = ωˆ) = 1−ε4 and σB(aB = 1 | aC = 1, ω−1 = 0) = 1−ε5.
The conditional belief of A in the information set aB = 0 after τ = τˆ , denoted as P , is obtained
from the Bayes rule as follows:
P =
ε1(1− ε3)
ε1(1− ε3) + {(1− ε1)(1− ε2)ε4 + (1− ε1)ε2 + ε1ε3ε5}
Therefore, the penalty phase ends at period t + n with probability P, and ends at period
t+ n+ 1 with probability 1− P .
12Even with the strategy, C does not have any incentive to choose aC = 1 at the end of the penalty phase to
shorten the phase, because the given B’s strategy is aB2 = 0 for any outcome at the end of the penalty phase.
54
By focusing on single player’s deviation, P becomes:
P =
ε1
ε1 + (1− ε1)ε4
when only B perturbs its actions
P = 0 when only C perturbs its actions
In the former case, however, B cannot choose its action when aC = 0. Accordingly, the
probability that A observes aBt = 0 after τ t−1 = τˆ is zero with any arbitrary perturbation of a
single player.
The Other Information Sets
All A’s information sets in the penalty phase on the equilibrium path are singleton. B can
observe almost all information except for y, so only the non-singleton information set is y =
{0, Y } when he observes τ = 0. However, he has no choice in this information set so we can
ignore this. C’s non-singleton information set is the one when he chooses aC . The element of the
set is {aB = 0, aB = 1 but y = 0, aB = 1 and y = Y but a˜A(Y ) = 0, aA = τˆ but aB2(τ) = 0}.
In the trading phase, based on A and B’s equilibrium strategies, the probability assigned for
the elements is {0, 1, 0, 0}. Since C chooses to enter the penalty strategy even though she is
sure that both A and B do not cheat, any tremble cannot change her choice. Therefore, the
consistency problem does not arise here.
Now we have seen that the trading equilibria satisfy both sequential rationality and con-
sistency. The trading equilibria are therefore sequential equilibria. The autarky equilibrium is
obviously a sequential equilibrium as well. ¥
55
Chapter 3
Collateral, Money and the Eﬃciency
of the Economy
3.1 Introduction
In the arguments above, we have assumed that any loans are not secured by collateral. This
assumption may not be plausible. As Coco(2000) reports, 85% of small business loans in the
UK are more than fully-secured by collateral (Black, de Meza and Jeﬀreys(1996)). In the US,
’nearly 70% of all commercial and industrial loans are currently made on secured basis’(Berger
and Udell(1990)). In this chapter, we will see how collateral coexists with the relationship
lending discussed in the last chapter, and how it improves the eﬃciency of the economy.
3.1.1 Literature Review
The role of collateral has been discussed in the last several decades and it can be categorised
as follows. The first one assumes ex-ante information asymmetry (hidden information, adverse
selection) and uses collateral to reveal the hidden information. For instance, the lender would
oﬀer two diﬀerent loan contracts: one imposes low interest rates but requires collateral and
the other has a high interest rate but is not secured by collateral. Low-risk borrowers would
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prefer former one, since they know their own default ratio, which is private information, and
they can infer that collateral is likely to be back on their hands; i.e. for low risk borrowers,
giving collateral does not incur a large cost. In contrast, high-risk borrowers would prefer a
non-collateralised loan, because they know that the probability of collateral seizure is high.
This is a common argument that uses collateral as a screening device. Such a kind of argument
is made by Bester(1985), Besanko and Thakor(1987) and others. Chan and Kanatas(1985) uses
collateral as a signalling device.
The second one assumes intermediate information asymmetry (hidden action or moral haz-
ard). If the lender cannot observe her borrower’s eﬀort level (say), the threat of seizing collateral
in the case of project failure can discipline the borrower and the borrower would make his maxi-
mum eﬀort to raise the probability of success. Such kind of argument has been made by Aghion
and Bolton(1992)1, Boot and Thakor(1994)2, and others.
These two approaches are, however, not supported by empirical studies. A prediction of
these models is that a collateralised loan is safer than a non-collateralised one, because only safer
borrowers want to pledge more collateral in the adverse selection model and because borrowers
would make more eﬀort when they pledge their collateral. Yet, as Berger and Udell(1990),
Jime´nez and Saurina(2003) and other papers show, a positive correlation between the amount
of pledged collateral and the risk premium of the borrowers (or default probability) is observed.
This contradicts with the previous literatures.
There are several studies which attempt to solve the contradiction. For example, Inderst and
Mueller(2007) explain the positive correlation with a incomplete competition model, not with
asymmetric information. The model explained in this chapter also has the positive correlation
between riskiness and collateral, using asymmetric information. As shown in the previous
chapter, it is assumed in the model that there is ex-post information asymmetry. We will see
that the positive correlation can be naturally observed in this setting3.
1Aghion and Bolton(1992) do not use the word ”collateral” explicitly, but they discuss the same thing.
2Collateral is used in their stage-game equilibrium. In dynamic equilibrium, collateral is not used.
3Barro(1976) also assumes ex post information asymmetry, but he assumes constant output and stochastic
collateral value; there is no concept of ”riskiness of borrowers” in his model.
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3.1.2 Informal Collateralised Loan
A collateralised loan is a debt contract that gives lenders a legal right to seize collateralised
assets in the case that their borrowers fail to repay. With collateral, lenders can secure their
loan and can lend to borrowers easily; or lenders can discipline (or screen) their borrowers. It
is an important mechanism to avoid ineﬃcient credit rationing, for example.
A possible problem that might occur when we introduce collateral into the model discussed
in the last chapter is inconsistency of assumption. The self-enforcing structure assumed there
postulates a lawless economy. If we assume pledgeability of collateral (exogenous commit-
ment technology of collateral in case of default), it might be inconsistent with this lawlessness.
Yet, historically, collateralised loans have been made with poor legal protection. For instance,
mortgage loans were popular in the eleventh or twelfth century, mainly to finance the Cru-
sades, according to Kohn(1999e). Land was used as a collateral, but courts were sympathetic
to the borrowers, i.e. the Crusaders, and did not give suﬃcient legal protection. Moreover,
Kohn(1999e) also points out that land-pawning has a long history, dating back 5000 years to
ancient times. It is hard to suppose that the collateral was secured by an exogenous legal
system.
Accordingly, here I try to model two diﬀerent informal collateralised loans, which do not
need exogenous legal guarantees. This means that borrowers need to commit their collateral
delivery. One way of doing this is through pawnbroking. This requires borrowers to deliver
their collateral ex ante, when they receive the loan. According to De Roover(1948), many
goods were brought to pawnbrokers, such as jewelry, plate, clothing, kitchenware, or furniture.
An advantage of the pawnbroking business is that there is no commitment problem. Until
the borrower’s repayment, lenders can control the collateral. The other is the rather normal
collateral. Borrowers are required to deliver their collateral when they fail to repay. If they did
not deliver the pledged collateral, they would be punished. Such kind of collateralised loan were
common historically as well. For example, according to Kohn(1999d), loans to peasants took
the form of the forward-purchase of their crops in Florence around 1500. Essentially This was
collateralised loan, but lenders avoided using a loan contract because this would be regarded
as usury, which was prohibited. So, I will compare these two contracts.
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In the following argument, we adopt a simple approach: at the beginning of each period,
the borrower A receives some endowment of output good, d. He can consume it freely, but this
is not an input good; he still has to borrow C’s endowment (input good) for his production. He
can also use this output good as a collateral4.
The borrower can give his collateral in the diﬀerent timing. First, he can give the output
good before the project starts, when he receives C’s endowment. It means that he ”bought” C’s
endowment partially. Namely, the output good acts as commodity money in this case. Second,
he can give the output good after the project is finished. If he finds out that y = 0, then he
gives his collateral to the lender instead. Namely, the output good here acts as collateral under
the normal definition. We will study the both cases in this section, because both definition
might be plausible under specific situation. For example, we can think a situation that delivery
of output good is costly. In this case, the former definition might be less useful (suppose that C
ships her endowment to A. the ship waits at A until the project finishes, and bring A’s output
good back to C. In this case, A has to hire another ship to deliver his commodity-money to C at
the beginning of the project). Then we will compare these eﬃciency and conclude the section.
3.2 Bilateral Contracts
3.2.1 Settings
First, we will discuss the bilateral contract. The extensive form game is almost the same as
the one without collateral, but now A receives a certain amount of collateral d ≤ τˆ . A has
a chance to receive d at the beginning of every period, and C knows it. We will add a new
action a˜A3 : HA → {0, d}. Indivisibility of d is assumed for simplicity. If the loan contract is
pawnbroking, namely, borrowers give their collateral when they borrow, a˜A3 is chosen at the
4The assumption that the borrower receives collateral every period as an endowment, is clearly not plausible.
However, some degree of simplification is inevitable here, for simplicity. It is not impossible to endogenize the
amount of collateral, by assuming the output good is storable. Then we can construct the stochastic dynamic
programming problem, with the next period’s wealth(collateral) as an action choice and the outstanding collateral
as the state variable. But the value function is far from its regular form, and analytically almost intractable
because the normal principle of optimality is not available.
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beginning of each period. If it is a normal collateralised loan, a˜A3 is chosen after the choices of
y and τ .
3.2.2 Collateralised Loan (ex post Delivery)
First, we will assume that A will give his collateral when he finds out that he cannot repay.
Then the collateral is seized, or A gives it to C voluntarily. It is common in the moral-
hazard arguments to assume that a lender has some collateral collection skill (equivalently,
assuming that collateral is somewhat verifiable in terms of Hart and Moore(1994) as Kiyotaki
and Moore(2000) or Diamond and Rajan(2001)). By contrast, here we assume that the borrower
voluntarily gives his collateral to avoid the longer penalty. Lenders cannot seize their borrowers’
collateral by compulsion, due to an imperfect legal system.
Now the enforcing constraints imposed to the borrower are as follows:
(1− δ) (Y + d− τˆ) + δuA ≥ (1− δ) (Y + d− d) + δk+1uA (3.1)
(1− δ) (Y + d− d) + δk+1uA ≥ (1− δ) (Y + d− 0) + δl+1uA
(1− δ) (0 + d− d) + δk+1uA ≥ (1− δ) (0 + d− 0) + δl+1uA (3.2)
The first one guarantees that the borrower wants to repay τ rather than give d when he
succeeds to obtain Y . The second and third one compel the borrower to give collateral in the
event that he does not repay τ . The penalty length k is imposed when the borrower fails to
repay τˆ but gives his collateral d to C. If he does not give the collateral, C would impose penalty
length l (this l would be diﬀerent from non-collateralised case in the previous chapter). It is
obvious that the second and third are equivalent5.
Then we can rewrite the equation (2.12), A’s expected surplus when he behaves honestly,
as:
5To be precise, it is optimal for C and ineﬃcient for the economy enforcing A to give τ + d in the case of
success, by imposing a longer penalty. We will ignore the possibility here.
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uA =
1− δ
1− δπ − (1− π)δk+1
{π(Y − τˆ) + d}
Substituting this into (3.1) and (3.2) :
δ(1− δk)
1− δπ − (1− π)δk+1
{π(Y − τˆ) + d} ≥ τˆ − d
δ(δk − δl)
1− δπ − (1− π)δk+1
{π(Y − τˆ) + d} ≥ d
The first one is arranged as follows:
δπY − τˆ + d(1 + δ − δπ)
πY − τˆ + d(2− π) ≥ δ
k+1 (3.3)¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ln
³
δπY−τˆ+d(1+δ−δπ)
πY−τˆ+d(2−π)
´
ln δ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯− 1 = k¯ ≤ k
The last inequality works as long as δπY − τˆ + d(1 + δ − δπ) > 0 and it obviously holds
δπY − τˆ , the necessary condition of lemma 1. Note that this lower bound k
¯
is smaller than l
¯
,
which is defined in the bilateral contracts without collateral.
Lemma 9 The necessary condition for the enforceability is eased, δπY − τˆ +d(1+ δ− δπ) > 0,
when the loan contract is collateralised.
The second inequality is arranged in a similar way and we have:
δl+1 {π (Y − τˆ) + d}+ d(1− δπ)
π (Y − τˆ) + d(2− π) ≤ δ
k+1 (3.4)
While the first inequality gives a lower bound of k, the second one gives its upper bound.
The k satisfying both constraints exists only when the following inequality exists:
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δπY − τˆ + d(1 + δ − δπ)
πY − τˆ + d(2− π) >
δl+1 {π (Y − τˆ) + d}+ d(1− δπ)
π (Y − τˆ) + d(2− π)
The inequality holds, because the denominator of RHS is greater than the one of LHS
and the numerator of LHS is greater than the one of RHS, if l is suﬃciently large such that
δπY − τˆ + δd > δl+1 {π (Y − τˆ) + d}. Therefore, there exists k that satisfies the two enforcing
constraints.
3.2.3 The Mechanism of Pawnbroking
Second, we will examine the diﬀerent usage of the collateral. In the previous argument, we
have assumed that the collateral is given when the borrower fails to repay. This is a normal
assumption, but we have the other usage of the collateral: ex-ante delivery of the collateral.
The borrower has received d at the beginning of each period. Accordingly, he can give the
collateral to C when he contracts with C. If he successfully repays, the collateral comes back to
A (in this model, the collateral and repaid output good are the same, so it would be balanced
out). This type of contract can be regarded as a pawnshop business, or, A ”purchases” C’s
input good by paying with an output good. The latter definition implies that the collateral can
act as a commodity money.
This is obviously a better strategy for both A and C compared with the non-collateralised
case, because now A does not have to commit to give collateral in the case of default and he
just needs to commit τˆ − d when he succeeds in the project. Now C has only to impose one
constraint:
(1− δ) {Y − (τˆ − d)}+ δuA ≥ (1− δ)Y + δl+1uB
This is equivalent to the constraint (3.1) in the previous ex-post collateral delivery. (Since
A does not have to commit the collateral delivery, we do not need (3.2)). The penalty length
l is, accordingly, the same as the penalty k of the ex-post delivery case. In this sense, the ex-
ante delivery (pawnbroking) and the ex-post delivery (collateral) are equivalent in this bilateral
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contract. Of course, it is the same as the case in which lenders can seize borrowers’ collateral
by compulsion.
Proposition 10 Eﬃciency of the ex-ante collateral delivery and that of the ex-post delivery
are equivalent in the bilateral contracts, in terms of the penalty length.
3.3 Multilateral Contracts
Now we are ready to discuss the role of collateral in the multilateral relationship. The general
setting is the same as the non-collateralised case discussed above. Additionally, A will receive
indivisible collateral d at the beginning of each period, and this is a common knowledge among
players.
In the multilateral relationship. the role of the collateral becomes more important. The
collateral is delivered from A to B, in order to shorten the penalty length l, then B gives the
collateral to C, to shorten the length n. Now it may not be appropriate to regard the ex-ante
delivery of the collateral as pawnbroking. Rather, it is a variation of commodity money. B
purchases C’s input good by paying the money, and A purchases the good from B by paying
the money.
In the case of the ex-post delivery, we will face a similar diﬃculty to that, which is argued
by Diamond and Rajan(2001). C needs the collateral in case of default, but C has to force B
to transfer the collateral, not only A. This needs an additional enforcing constraint; we will see
that the additional constraint makes the problem very diﬃcult and possibly causes considerable
ineﬃciency.
3.3.1 The Mechanism of Pawnbroking (Commodity Money)
First, we start by considering a simpler case. I assume that A delivers his collateral ex-ante,
when they contract and that A receives C’s input good. This needs only a minor modification
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to the non-collateralised case. A gives his collateral d to B ex ante; thus A has to commit to
repay τˆ − d to B at the end of the project. B transfers A’s collateral to C ex ante; thus B has
to commit the transfer ωˆ − d to C at the end of the project. Accordingly, now we have the
following modified enforcing constraints:
(1− δ) {Y − (τˆ − d)}+ δuA ≥ (1− δ)Y + δk+1uA
(1− δ) {(τˆ − d)− (ωˆ − d)}+ δuB ≥ (1− δ)(τˆ − d) + δn+1uB
The first one is the same as the constraint of the bilateral contracts. The expected payoﬀ uB
is the same as in the non-collateralised case (2.25), because B merely transfers the indivisible
collateral d from A to C. Substituting (2.25) into the second constraint and rearranging it, we
have:
δ(1− δn)
1− δπ − (1− π)δn+1
π(τˆ − ωˆ) ≥ ωˆ − d
Solving this for δn+1,
δπτˆ − ωˆ + (1− δπ)d
πτˆ − ωˆ + (1− π)d ≥ δ
n+1
The necessary condition for the existence of such n is δπτˆ − ωˆ+(1−δπ)d > 0. This is easier
than the non-collateralised one, δπτˆ − ωˆ > 0; namely, some riskier (but profitable) borrowers
are now able to obtain finance. If its LHS is bigger than the LHS in the non-collateralised case
(2.26), the lower bound of the penalty length becomes shorter in the contract with commodity
money. Thus, we need to prove the following:
δπτˆ − ωˆ + (1− δπ)d
πτˆ − ωˆ + (1− π)d −
δπτˆ − ωˆ
πτˆ − ωˆ > 0 (3.5)
Rearrange it,
(1− δ)πτˆ − (1− δ)πωˆ > 0
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This obviously holds as long as τˆ > ωˆ, which is the non-negative wealth constraint we have
assumed at the beginning. To be precise, the constraint allows τˆ = ωˆ, but it is possible only
when the contract is fully secured, d = ωˆ6. Substitute this into (3.5), and we see the inequality
holds.
We have already seen that ex-ante delivery of the collateral would shorten the penalty length
l between A and B. Now we have proved the following:
Proposition 11 max(l, n) under the ex-ante collateral delivery (pawnbroking) is strictly shorter
than the one in the non-collateralised case. Pawnbroking is strictly more eﬃcient than in the
non-collateralised case.
The equilibrium strategy profile and the corresponding beliefs are exactly the same as the
one in the previous chapter, since the pawnbroking simply reduces the required repayment
amounts. Defining these is, therefore, skipped in this section.
3.3.2 The Mechanism of collateralised Loan (ex post Delivery)
We then assume that A delivers his collateral ex-post, after he fails to repay. In this case, as
we have seen, B and C have to enforce not only their borrower’s repayment but also collateral
deliveries. A’s enforcing constraints are the same as (3.1) and (3.2). B’s enforcing constraints
are designed as follows:
(1− δ)(τˆ − ωˆ) + δuB ≥ (1− δ)τˆ + δn+1uB (3.6)
(1− δ)(d− d) + δp+1uB ≥ (1− δ)d+ δn+1uB (3.7)
6Otherwise, B is indiﬀerent between trading strategy and autarky penalty, and C’s punishment never works.
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where p is penalty length if B fails to transfer ωˆ, but succeeds to transfer d. The penalty
length n is imposed when B does not give anything to C. B’s expected payoﬀ when he behaves
honestly is:
uB = (1− δ)π(τˆ − ωˆ) + πδuB + (1− π)δp+1uB
If A gives his collateral when he fails to repay, he has to bear penalty p. As long as he
behaves honestly, A does not have to bear a penalty for n periods. Solving this for uB, we have:
uB =
(1− δ)π(τˆ − ωˆ)
1− πδ − (1− π)δp+1
(3.8)
Substitute this into (3.6), we have:
(1− δπ)d+ δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
π(τˆ − ωˆ) + (1− π)d ≤ δ
p+1 (3.9)
The inequality shows p has an upper bound. The necessary condition to hold the inequality
is that LHS is strictly greater than zero. This is satisfied if δπτˆ > ωˆ, the condition of lemma 4.
Likewise, substitute (3.8) into the second constraint (3.7), we have:
¡
δp+1 − δn+1
¢
π(τˆ − ωˆ)
1− δπ − (1− π)δp+1
≥ d
Solving for δp+1,
(1− δπ)d+ δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
π(τˆ − ωˆ) + (1− π)d ≤ δ
p+1 (3.10)
Both (3.9) and (3.10) give the same lower bound of p, but no lower bound for p is defined.
Additionally, n is increasing w.r.t p7. There is no upper bound for n so we can take any
arbitrary n, because it does not aﬀect the players’ expected payoﬀ when they behave honestly.
7To be precise, we need to check that the LHS of (3.10) is smaller than 1 and bigger than zero. It is not
diﬃcult to show it is smaller than 1, but for the suﬃciently large p, it must be negative and any n cannot
enforce B’s honest behaviour. Even if p = 0, δπτˆ − ωˆ− δ(1− π)ηωˆ > 0 must hold, which is more strict than the
non-collateralized case.
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Now we have four penalties in the ex-post collateral delivery: k, l, p and n. k is decreasing
w.r.t l and n is increasing w.r.t p. Players want to lower p as much as possible, but p cannot be
lowered below k, as we have seen in the non-collateralised case: C will impose max(k, p) and
max(l, n), in order to avoid the penalty-length mismatch problem. Likewise, now we cannot
assume l = n = +∞, because the penalty is no longer an oﬀ-path punishment.
Accordingly, we have k = p < l = n < ∞. These figures, therefore, have to satisfy the
constraints shown above, (3.3), (3.4) and (3.9). Since we have seen that there exists a penalty
length k that satisfies the first two constraints, now we need to check if there exists any penalty
length p between the upper bound (3.9) and the lower bound (3.3). Namely, we need to check
if the following inequality holds or not (k = p and l = n are substituted already):
δπτˆ − ωˆ + (1− δπ)d
πτˆ − ωˆ + (1− π)d −
(1− δπ)d+ δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
π(τˆ − ωˆ) + (1− π)d > 0
Rearranging this:
dδπ(πωˆ + Y − πτˆ − ωˆ) + dπ(2τˆ − Y − ωˆ)
+δπ2Y τˆ − δπ2Y ωˆ − πτˆ2 + πτˆ ωˆ − d2(1− δ)− δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
= δπ {τˆ(2− δπ)− ωˆ(1 + δ − δπ)− (1− δ)Y }+ (δπY − τˆ)(τˆ − ωˆ)− δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
= {δπY − τˆ + d(1 + δ − δπ)}π(τˆ − ωˆ)− (1− δ)(Y − dπτˆ)− δn+1π(τˆ − ωˆ)
The first term of the last equation is the same as the necessary condition. Since the latter
two terms are negative8, the condition that guarantees the existence of appropriate penalty
length p is more severe than the necessary condition. Namely, compared with the bilateral loan
contract or multilateral pawnbroking, the collateralised multilateral loan contract with ex-post
collateral delivery is less eﬃcient.
Proposition 12 In the multilateral relationship, the ex-ante collateral delivery (using collateral
8To be precise, the second term can be positive if Y −dπτˆ < 0. Yet there exists some d such that Y −dπτˆ > 0.
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as a commodity money) is favourable compared with the ex-post collateral delivery, because the
feasible enforceable set is smaller.
The equilibrium strategies specified here are sequential equilibria. See the appendix for the
proof.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we see how collateral can improve the eﬃciency of loan contracts in the bilateral
and multilateral relationship. We have checked two diﬀerent collateral systems. The first one
is pawnbroking: a borrower gives his collateral ex ante when he borrows. The benefit of
pawnbroking is that the borrower does not have to commit his collateral delivery in the case of
default. The other one is normal collateral delivery: a borrower gives his collateral only when
he fails to repay. If a legal system is established, the borrower still does not have to commit this
delivery. Yet historically, such ex-post collateral delivery can be observed without appropriate
legal support. In this chapter, therefore, I compare between pawnbroking and ex-post collateral
delivery without legal enforcement.
In bilateral contracts, we see that both collateral deliveries (ex ante and ex post) are equiv-
alent and eﬃciency-improving. Essentially, ex-post delivery is less eﬃcient because there is an
extra incentive problem that the borrower may not give his collateral when he fails to repay.
Yet the lender can enforce the borrower’s honest behaviour by threatening him with a very long
penalty in the case that the borrower does not give his collateral when he defaults (l would be
close to positive infinity). Since there is no uncertainty for this behaviour (collateral delivery)
and the behaviour is observable, a suﬃciently long penalty can enforce borrowers’ honest be-
haviours without eﬃciency loss. In both collateral deliveries, the necessary penalty length is
shorter than in the non-collateralised case.
In contrast, in multilateral contracts, ex-post collateral delivery is less eﬃcient. Lender C
has two penalty strategies. One punishes B if B does not repay ωˆ (but gives collateral d) and
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the other punishes B if B does not give collateral d when B cannot repay ωˆ. C can use diﬀerent
penalty lengths (p and n respectively), and a suﬃciently long penalty can solve the problems.
However, if C punishes B by penalty for p periods when B fails to repay ωˆ but gives d (it is
necessary for C to force B to repay ωˆ honestly), B would lose the incentive to give d when B has
nothing to repay. Furthermore, this penalty length p is automatically applied to A; p periods
of penalty must be appropriate to force A to repay honestly at the same time. We have seen
that there is no guarantee to have such p. Accordingly, a feasible set of parameters is smaller
in multilateral loan contracts with ex-post collateral delivery, compared with ex-ante delivery
(pawnbroking).
The reason why the collateral in this chapter improves eﬃciency is that the value of the
collateral is constant (and therefore, common knowledge among agents). If the value of the
collateral is stochastic, as Barro(1976) assumes, players’ penalty functions become costly, just
as the penalty strategies in the last chapter. In this case, collateral is not necessarily eﬃciency-
improving. In other words, if the economy has something common among players, it would
improve eﬃciency. For instance, if this economy has a mediator who can reveal the true state
of a default borrower with positive probability and announce the revealed information to the
public, the information acts as a public signal of the economy. This public signal allows players
to coordinate with the public monitoring approach a` la Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti(1990). I
have argued this mediator system in another paper, Ota(2006).
The eﬃciency of ex-ante delivery in a multilateral loan contract would support the circula-
tion of commodity money or primitive money in less developed financial markets. We will look
at this issue in the next chapter.
3.5 Appendix: Sequential Equilibria with Ex-post Collateral
Delivery
In the case of the ex-ante delivery, pawnbroking, we do not have to change the structure of
the game, because the delivery of collateral is done when the contract is made. The ex-ante
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delivery is therefore common knowledge among players, and there is no additional action in the
game.
In the case of ex-post delivery, on the other hand, the game’s action space and the players’
beliefs change. First, A has another action aA2 ∈ {0, d}, whether A gives its collateral to B
when A fails to repay τ or not. A does not have any incentive to give the collateral when A
repays τ , because it violates the participation constraint that the loan contract should provide
better payoﬀ than autarky. In the following argument, it is assumed that A does not have the
choice of aA2 if τ = τˆ for simplicity. B now has three information set: a singleton set τ = τˆ ;
τ = 0 and aA2 = d; and τ = 0 and aA2 = 0. The second set has two elements y = Y and y = 0.
The third one also has two, y = Y and y = 0. B has another action as well, aB3 ∈ {0, d},
whether B deliver A’s collateral to C or not.
C also has three information sets. The first one is singleton, ω = ωˆ. The second set is ω = 0
and aB3 = d. This set has two elements, (y = Y, aA2 = aB3 = d) and (y = 0, aA2 = aB3 = d).
The third set is ω = 0 and aB3 = 0. This set has five elements, (y = Y, τ = τˆ , aA2 = aB3 = 0),
(y = Y, τ = 0, aA2 = d, aB3 = 0), (y = Y, τ = 0, aA2 = 0, aB3 = 0), (y = 0, τ = 0, aA2 = d, aB3 =
0) and (y = 0, τ = 0, aA2 = aB3 = 0). The penalty strategies defined above enforce aA2 = d
only when y = 0 and aB3 = d only when aA2 = d. The other equilibrium strategies are identical
to the previous chapter.
The consistent beliefs are derived in a similar way to the previous chapter. In the previous
chapter, when A arrives the informant set (τ t−1 = τˆ , aB = 1), A has some oﬀ the equilibrium
nodes. A’ ex-post belief on this information set is μA(ωt−1 = ωˆ, aA2t−1 = a
B3
t−1 = 0, a
C
t = 1, aBt =
1) = 1, even with B or C’s trembles (see the previous chapter for the proof).
B has, after receiving d, the following ex-post belief:
μB(y = 0 | aA2 = d) = (1− π) · σ˜
A(aA2 = d | y = 0)
π · σ˜A(aA2 = d | y = Y ) + (1− π) · σ˜A(aA2 = d | y = 0)
The incentive compatibility constraint (3.7) ensures that a˜B3(aA2 = d) = d is optimal for
any belief μB(y = 0 | aA2 = d); thus, any belief is consistent to the strategy. Likewise, C’s
ex-post belief is defined as follows:
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μC(y = 0 | ω = 0, aB3 = d) = (1− π) · σ˜
A(aA2 = d | y = 0) · σ˜A(aB3 = d | aA2 = d)
Y
where Y = π · σ˜A(aA2 = d | y = Y ) · σ˜B(aB3 = d | aA2 = d) +(1 − π) · σ˜A(aA2 = d | y =
0) · σ˜A(aB3 = d | aA2 = d). Again, the penalty strategy imposing p (= k) periods autarky is
optimal for any belief. Another ex-post belief is defined as follows. σ˜A(τ = τˆ | y = Y ) = 1−εA1,
σ˜A(aA2 = d | τ = 0) = 1− εA2, σ˜B(ω = ωˆ | τ = τˆ) = 1− εB1, σ˜B(aB3 = d | aA2 = d) = 1− εB2,
μC(τ = τˆ | ω = 0, aB3 = 0)
=
π · (1− εA1) · εB1
π(1− εA1)εB1 + πεA1(1− εA2)(1− εB2) + πεA1εA2 + (1− π)(1− εA2)εB2 + (1− π)εA2
μC(y = Y, τ = 0, aA2 = d | ω = 0, aB3 = 0), μC(y = Y, τ = 0, aA2 = 0 | ω = 0, aB3 = 0),
μC(y = 0, τ = 0, aA2 = d | ω = 0, aB3 = 0), and μC(y = 0, τ = 0, aA2 = 0 | ω = 0, aB3 = 0)
are also defined in the same way. The optimal penalty (autarky) lengths for each belief are n,
k, l, k, and l. The optimal penalty length is max(n, l) > k: thus, the penalty strategy defined
above is optimal for any ex-post beliefs (any ex-post belief with tremble is consistent).
There exist, therefore, two sequential equilibrium strategy profiles. One is, a˜A(y = Y ) = τˆ ,
a˜A2(τ = 0) = d, a˜B(aC = 1) = 1, a˜B2(τ = τˆ) = ωˆ, a˜B3(aA2 = d) = d, C takes max(k, p)
periods autarky if B gives ω = 0 and aB3 = d, and max(n, l) periods autarky if B gives ω = 0
and aB3 = 0. Corresponding beliefs are shown above. The other one is autarky: all the above
actions becomes zero. ¥
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Chapter 4
Conclusion: A Financial Revolution
Money is normally categorised into two types: outside money and inside money. Outside money
includes fiat money and commodity money, which is guaranteed exogenously. Inside money can
be further categorised into two, bank deposits (bank-notes) and negotiable bills. Although we
tend to limit our attention to bank deposits when we consider inside money, as money supply
statistics show, the history shows that negotiable bills can be a substitute for bank deposit as
an inside money(see Chapter One).
From this viewpoint, the study in the previous chapter can be thought as a piece of research
into an alternative inside money, which has been rarely studied1. In this chapter, we will look at
its characteristics and then compare the other studies of inside money with a similar framework,
Kiyotaki and Moore(2003).
1As a study of money, this study is slightly oversimplified compared with other studies. Generally we assume
random matching models with finitely many players or something similar in order to study money, as in Bern-
hardt(1986) or Kiyotaki and Wright(1989). In this thesis, by contrast, we assume only three players and there
is no random matching aspect. Yet this assumption still gives some important implications, and Kiyotaki and
Moore(2003) also adopt a similar framework to discuss inside money and outside money.
72
4.1 Costs and Benefits of Multilateral Contracts
The arguments shown above give several simple characterizations of the self-enforcing2 contract
of indirect finance, or Credit Chains, using Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)’s term. First, with
reputation, the borrower’s IOU can be resaleable only when the intermediary is collectively
responsible to A’s and his own honest behaviour. This mechanism is equivalent to endorsement,
which guarantees a negotiability of the bills, initiated at Antwerp in the sixteenth century.
Endorsement is one of the critical features of modern finance. When a holder of bills
sells a bill purchased from somewhere else, she has to sign her name on the back of the bill.
As Day(1957) points out, endorsement is the declaration of the seller to be responsible for
repayment of the bill; i.e. the buyer of the bill is endowed with a right to claim the debt service
in the case that the issuer of the bill fails to repay. In other words, the seller has collective
responsibility for the repayment. This joint responsibility mechanism is the same as the model
we examined in Chapter Two.
Kohn(1999a) argues that Antwerp had to introduce this because deposit banks were banned
and they could not use bank-notes for their settlements. In other words, they used resaleable
bills as an alternative instrument for settlement. bank-notes are normally regarded as a form of
money because banks’ credit is exogenously guaranteed (by government), or banks have certain
special technologies that makes bank-notes credible for others. But in our model, as in Antwerp,
traders are able to create another form of money (although its function is limited compared
with bank-notes) without any special technologies of banks. Such kind of substitutability of
trade credits in economics without banking is currently observed as well. For example, Petersen
and Rajan(1997) and Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Maksimovic(2001) empirically show that trade credit
tends to grow if the legal system and banking system are less established. The case of Ireland
in 1970 has been explained in Chapter One.
2The contracts discussed here are not renegotiation proof, in the spirit of Farrel and Maskin(1990)’s weak
renegotiation proofness. This is because we have to rely on the autarky penalty, which is costly for both. There
are several ways to overcome the problems suggested in the related literature (i.e. Levine(2003) or Kletzer and
Wright(2000), but, neither are available here. Instead, we can use a diﬀerent definition of renegotiation proofness,
proposed by Pearce(1987). In the relational contracts literature, Macleod and Malcomson(1989) adopt the same
definition. See Ota(2006) for detailed discussion.
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Second, the role of intermediary B is limited compared with other theories of banking. As
Boot and Thakor(2000) summarise them, theories of banking have two diﬀerent definitions
of banking: relationship banking and transaction banking. Relationship banking is close to
commercial banking; the banks have certain relationships with borrowers and monitor or enforce
them with their own technologies. Transaction banking is close to investment banking or
securities broking. They underwrite stocks or bonds without relationships with borrowers or
technologies. This is possible because information asymmetry is negligible in their markets. The
shift to transaction banking has been discussed because of declining information asymmetry,
due to publicly observable credit scoring, for instance.
B’s function in this model is simple: merely guaranteeing A’s repayment by bearing joint
liability (endorsement). No special activities such as costly monitoring or person-specific col-
lateral collection skills are required (this resembles British accepting houses). In this sense,
this intermediary business is close to transaction banking; nevertheless, this economy is under
severe information asymmetry and the model is essentially categorised as relationship banking.
There are many papers studying the diﬀerence between relationship banking and transaction
banking. Yet the model discussed here implies that the boundary of these two banking systems
is not so clear, as Boot and Thakor(2000) point out. In this model, A and C do not have
a direct relationship and they cannot obtain the other’s private information directly, whereas
the indirect loan contract between A and C (through B) requires exclusive multiple interaction
between them. Normally, relationship banking presumes that the lender can obtain proprietary
information about her borrower through screening, monitoring and so on. Transaction bank-
ing tends to assume symmetric information or public signals about borrower’s quality, such as
credit scoring. The model discussed here is diﬀerent from both. A and C cannot observe the
other’s action directly, and do not share any public signal. In this sense, the model in Chapter
Two is diﬀerent from these two major categories.
This feature, diﬀerent from transaction banking and relationship banking, is useful when
considering securitisation as well. As Gorton and Pennacchi(1995) point out, it is diﬃcult to
explain securitisation of bank loan with the traditional theory of banking, as in Diamond and
Dybvig(1983) or Diamond(1984). On the other hand, it would be diﬃcult to assume that there
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is no information asymmetry, as transaction lending tends to assume. The model discussed
here is able to give some explanation relating to this issue. The intermediary B acts as an
underwriter of the securitised loan, by taking collective responsibility3.
Third, a longer credit chain needs a longer period of penalty. As shown above, C needs
to impose max(l, n) to enforce the borrower C’s honest behaviour. If we assume that players’
relative bargaining power is exogenous, l in the multilateral game must be lower than in the
bilateral one. This is because the borrower can enjoy a smaller allocation of the project surplus
in the multilateral game and he loses the incentive to behave honestly; his honest repayment
should now be enforced by a more severe penalty. Namely, a bilateral loan contract is always
weakly preferable to a multilateral contract. The penalty phase can be interpreted as a form
of ”financial disruption”, since no financial transaction occurs during the penalty phase. In
this sense, this non-banking informal indirect finance is fragile compared with direct finance, or
other financial systems with legal support or with collateral4. This implication is supported by
some empirical works which argue that financial panics frequently occurred in past, or occur
in emerging countries rather than developed countries (see Allen and Gale(1998) or Lindgren,
Garcia and Saal(1996)). Also, in medieval Europe several conflicts are reported by Kohn(1999a,
1999e) before legal support for negotiability was established.
Fourth, only borrowers with relatively safe projects can issue resaleable bills. The bilateral
and multilateral contracts need E[y] > 1δπ and E[y] >
1
δ2π2 respectively, or any penalty cannot
enforce the honest behaviour of borrowers. This condition is necessary to give suﬃcient margin
to both A and B, to compensate for the utility loss incurred when they behave honestly (due to
the information asymmetry, they are punished when the project fails even though they behave
honestly). Accordingly, the lender should give a greater margin to all involved players if π is
low. The restriction is exponentially more severe in the multilateral contract, because now the
3Another explanation of the securitization is Kiyotaki and Moore(2003)’s bundling. In their study, a bank
will bundle many borrowers’ debts and securitizes their averaged repayment. As long as the borrowers’ risk is
idiosyncratic, buyers of the securitized loan can presume that repayment is constant. In contrast to the model
here, they assume that bundling technology is exogenously given and no picking is allowed (ruled out exogenously)
there.
4Ghosal and Miller(2003) argue that there is a similar fragility in sovreign debt crises. They point out that
’excessive project termination’ is required to give an appropriate incentive to sovereign debtors.
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lender should give the bigger margin to both A and B. As a result, longer credit chains need
safer projects.
See Figure 4-1, which describes what kind of project can obtain finance assuming that the
discount factor δ is close to 1. The vertical axis represents risk of the project π (higher is
safer). The horizontal axis is the expected profit of the project E[y] (a` large number means
profitable). The dark shaded area is a set of projects that cannot obtain finance under bilateral
contracts even though these are profitable. Under the multilateral contracts, projects in the
light and dark shaded area are not able to borrow. Only the project with high π (blank area)
can issue their resaleable bills and obtain finance without any exogenous support. In other
words, the fact that the bills have been re-sold acts as a signal of credit quality of the issuers5.
This explains the reason why the Bank of England discounted commercial bills or took these
as collateral only when the bills were ’signed’ (endorsed) twice6, according to Day(1957). Our
model shows the reason why the Bank of England could regard the bills as eligible; only bills
with safe investment projects could be traded(re-sold) and endorsed.
4.2 Collateralised Loan and Primitive Money
We have seen, in Chapter Three, that collateral can improve the eﬃciency of the economy, which
means shorter penalty length and a wider set of parameters than is feasible for uncollateralised
loan contracts (both bilateral and multilateral: see Figure 4-1). One conclusion of the chapter
is that ex-ante collateral delivery, which resembles pawnbroking, is better than ex-post delivery,
which is close to normal collateralised agreement, because lenders do not have to impose an
additional penalty strategy to enforce collateral delivery. Collateral plays a more important role
in multilateral contracts, because one collateral can alleviate the commitment problem twice.
Firstly A now has to commit a fraction of his repayment τ(the rest of the repayment has been
5This signalling mechanism has not been discussed in this thesis, because we limit our attention to the three
players in charge.
6One of the signers must be an accepting house.
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Figure 4-1: Risk, Profitability and Funding Opportunity
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covered by the collateral delivered). Secondly, B has to commit a fraction of his transfer ω.
(Essentially, ex-ante collateral delivery is equivalent to ex-post collateral delivery with legal
collateral collection without additional cost.)
The alleviated incentive problem described in Chapter Three explains why pawnbroking
has had a long history of 5000 years (Kohn(1999e)). De Roover(1948) point out that various
goods had been used as collateral in pawnbroking in the sixteenth century: jewelry, plate,
clothing, kitchenware, kettles and furniture. Pawnbrokers kept these goods until repayment.
It is interesting that similar goods were used as primitive money as well. It is famous that
metal money such as gold, silver and copper were used as commodity money in the past. Yet,
according to Braudel(1967), a wide variety of goods were used as ”money” (Braudel(1967)
regards these as primitive money). For instance, salt in Upper Senegal (17th century), cotton
cloth in the Gulf of Guinea, dried fish in Iceland (15th century), furs in Alaska and Russia,
tobacco, sugar and cocoa in colonial America, were all used as kinds of money. He points
out that these rudimentary forms of money appeared ’as soon as commodities are exchanged’.
As Bernhardt(1986) points out, both money and loans can support intertemporal exchange
when there is an absence of a temporal coincidence of wants. Commodity money or primitive
money emerged to alleviate possible problems occurring in intertemporal barter transactions.
Collateral emerged to alleviate problems occurring in intertemporal financial transactions. In
this sense, ex-ante delivery of collateral and primitive money played a very similar role. If
collateral is suﬃciently large to cover everything (i.e. d ≥ τˆ) in Chapter Three, borrower
A ”pays” his collateral to B and purchases C’s intermediate good instead. B also pays the
collateral to C, to lay in a stock of the good. In this sense, the argument in Chapter Three can
be regarded as an explanation of primitive money as well.
4.3 Inside Money and Financial Expansion
Figure 4-1 also implies the transition of financial systems as the financial market expands. If
the market is small, borrowers would have direct relationships with all possible lenders and
it is not diﬃcult for them to make bilateral loan contracts, without an intermediary. As the
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market expands, however, the network in the market becomes sparse and it becomes diﬃcult for
borrowers to find lenders who have a direct relationship with the borrowers. Figure 4-1 shows
that only safer borrowers can obtain finance if the financial market expands and its network
becomes sparse, because a sparse network requires negotiable bills to be issued and only less
risky borrowers can do this.
It is interesting to compare this result with Kiyotaki and Moore(2003)’s study of inside
money. They argue that economies rely on both outside money (e.g. fiat money) and inside
money (e.g. bank-notes) initially, but outside money is not required as financial deepening
proceeds, and even inside money is not necessary when financial deepening proceeds further.
They assume financial deepening to be a higher negotiability of IOUs and a higher degree
of mortgageability (high leverage): both are given exogenously in their model (in the model
discussed here, by contrast, negotiability is endogenously determined and mortgageability does
not exist because leverage through collateral is impossible in our set-up).
We can say that the model discussed here studies the relationship between inside money
and financial expansion, while Kiyotaki and Moore(2003) study the relationship between inside
money and financial deepening, although their definition of inside money is slightly diﬀerent7. A
financially deepened market (with lower banking costs) does not have to rely on outside money
and can use inside money (bank-notes) instead. If the market deepens further (higher leverage),
then the economy does not need inside money as well. On the other hand, a financially sparse
market needs inside money and safer borrowers who can issue inside money (negotiable bills).
If its network is dense, the economy does not need inside money because direct loan contracts
are available.
Outside money can be defined in this model; as we have seen above, collateral can act as a
form of outside money (to be precise, commodity money or primitive money), while Kiyotaki and
Moore(2003) assume outside money to be fiat money. With collateral (commodity money), the
two curves in Figure 4-1 shift south-west and the rationed area vanishes as collateral increases.
7In tKiyotaki and Moore(2003)’s argument, inside money is a kind of bank note exogenously given with fixed
cost. In the model discussed here, inside money is defined as negotiable bills that are endogenously configurated.
79
Accordingly, we can say that the economy has to rely on outside money (collateral) as the
financial market expands (as its network becomes sparse).
This implication gives some justifications to historical facts in Antwerp or Ireland and to
the empirical finding by Petersen and Rajan(1997) and Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Maksimovic(2001):
trade credit grows when the banking system is less established or unavailable. An established
banking system can be defined in this context as a situation in which every player (or, at least
majority of the players) has a direct relationship with their bank (the network is dense). If
borrowers have direct access to lenders, there is no reason to choose less-eﬃcient multilateral
loan contracts. ”Less developed banking system” in these empirical studies means that banks
do not have a tight-knit network with borrowers. If the economy does not have such a banking
network, borrowers have to rely on multilateral loan contracts, which are equivalent to nego-
tiable bills or inside money in the model discussed here, and borrowers in the light-shaded area
of Figure 4-1 are rationed.
4.4 Other Eﬃciency-Improving Mechanisms
Throughout the above chapters I have limited my attention to a` lawless economy8. By finding
the equilibria of informal contracts, the model shows that a legal enforcement mechanism is not
essential in these financial systems However, at the same time, the informal contracts are less
eﬃcient. Some profitable projects are rationed (even though their expected profitability is very
high) and it is inevitable to punish borrowers who behave honestly. Collateral can alleviate the
problem, as we have seen. Yet borrowers need to have initial wealth to make collateralised loan
contracts. If borrowers do not have any wealth (assets or goods), they will be rationed again.
In order to improve eﬃciency further, we need to have exogenous legal enforcement. We
can, for instance, assume the existence of a mediator, who will audit a defaulting borrower’s
credit status and reveal whether the borrower behaved honestly or not. If the mediator’s an-
nouncement is common knowledge among players, players can coordinate based on the public
8See Dixit(2004) for lawlessness and economics.
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signal, as Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti(1990) argue. The importance of these legal enforcement
mechanisms has been observed historically. Kohn(1999e) points out that, without an appro-
priate legal system, the mortgaged loan in the eleventh century finally declined, because of
frequent conflicts about collateral delivery and repayment. The endorsement became popular
everywhere in the eighteenth century, after the courts ratified its legal validity. Ghate(1992)
also points out that the negotiability of bills normally becomes widespread after certain legal
supports are established.
The capability of the legal system does not impair the importance of the informal contracts
discussed here. As explained in Chapter One, the legal system (for instance, the Law of Bills of
Exchange in the UK) tended to be made in accordance with merchants’ customs. The essential
features of the informal contracts are preserved, as we have seen in the endorsement mechanism.
Moreover, legal enforcement mechanisms cannot be perfect as well, and still partly rely on an
informal incentive mechanism, even in modern financial markets.
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Part II
Optimal Post-Crisis Policies: From
Japanese Experience
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Chapter 5
Introduction: A Lost Decade
5.1 A Lost Decade and Zombie Lending
This part tries to answer three questions that arise from the so-called ”zombie lending” problem
in Japan in the1990s. This was a phenomenon in which default firms were not liquidated by
their banks and their productive capital was left unused. This raises the first question: ”Why
did banks not liquidate defaulting firms, although they knew the firms were loss-making?”. The
other questions are macroeconomic: ”Why did the Japanese economy continue to be stagnant
for more than a decade, after the burst of the bubble in the early 1990s?” and ”Why did
land prices in the last decade not act as a leading indicator of economic growth, as Kiyotaki
and Moore(1997) predict?” (see Figure 5-11). By answering to these questions, we can obtain
several interesting implications for optimal policies to resolve other banking crisis.
We will find the answer to these questions by combining two diﬀerent models: one is the
soft budget constraint model (SBC hereafter), proposed by Kornai(1979) and Dewatripont and
Maskin(1995); and the other is the credit cycles model, proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore(1997).
It has been commonly argued that unhealthy Japanese banks were one of the major contrib-
utors to this recession of the 1990s. One hypothesis argued that Japanese banks who suﬀered
1GDP statisticswere discontinued in 1995.
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Figure 5-1: GDP Growth and Land Price
from non-performing loans could not lend to productive borrowers and this caused the so-
called ”credit crunch”, and the consequent under-investment caused the long stagnation of the
Japanese economy. This credit crunch hypothesis has, however, been challenged by several
authors. For example, Motonishi and Yoshikawa(1999) argued that the credit crunch was not
empirically observed during the 1990s - except for the short period from 1997 to 1998. Financng
constraints only existed for small firms, but not for large firms. Thus, the Japanese prolonged
stagnation cannot be explained by the credit crunch hypothesis. Hayashi and Prescott(2002)
also queried the credit crunch hypothesis and argued that shortened working hours and a low-
ered Total Factor Productivity (TFP hereafter) were the main contributors to the recession,
through a calibration of a Real Business Cycle model. They also point out that some empirical
observations are inconsistent with the credit crunch hypothesis.
After the challenges to the credit crunch hypothesis, the ”zombie firm” hypothesis gripped
economists’ attention. The definition of zombie lending diﬀers in detail depending on authors,
but basically it can be defined as a situation in which banks leave non-performing borrowers
in business, by giving additional loans for their repayments (Economically, this is equivalent to
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a rescheduling of the debts). As a result, the ineﬃcient and insolvent borrowers are preserved
and continue using human and physical capital; so, aggregate productivity of the economy, or
TFP, declines. As Figure 5-2 shows, outstanding loans to poor-performing industries like real
estate or construction continued to increase after the bursting of the bubble (as pointed out
by Hoshi(2000))2. However, lending to the poor-performing industries did stop after the bank
crisis in 1998; note that this occurred despite the injection of public funds to re-capitalise the
suﬀering banking system from 1998 onwards.
Is there any empirical evidence for the existence of such zombie-lending, or Oigashi in
Japanese (which literally means ’additional lending’)? Kobayashi, Saita and Sekine(2002),
for example, tested a hypothesis of zombie lending based on the soft budget constraint (SBC
2One might feel that bank loans to manufacturing industries did not decline after the burst of the bubble in
the early 1990s. This would be because the bank loans to manufacturing industries jumped in 1993 in Figure 5-2.
It was, however, a technical jump and did not reflect any macroeconomic incident. It was due to a relaxation
of a law of commerce and deregulation of lease contracts in 1993. By excluding this jump, we can find (almost)
monotonic decline of bank loans in the manufacturing sectors.
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hereafter) and show that zombie lending was empirically observed in the construction or the
real estate industry. Mihira(2005) estimated bank-loan supply function and observed that
bank loans tended to increase to the over-borrowing firms, especially in the construction and
real estate industries. Peek and Rosengren(2005) also found a tendency for troubled Japanese
banks to lend to impaired borrowers, in order to avoid realizing losses on their balance sheets.
Since the troubled banks’ capital adequacy ratio was low and close to the threshold under the
Basel Accord (4% or 8%), any realization of loss would cause a painful suspension of their
business.
A negative externality of the zombie lending, especially its influence on the macro econ-
omy has also been empirically tested. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap(2006) argue that zombie
lending prevented the creative destruction of industries in distress. Zombie lending also had
severe eﬀects in distorting market conditions, they claim. Since the zombie firms received sub-
sidised loans, they could produce in more severe condition; their ineﬃcient production would
lower products’ prices and raise wages of the industry. This prevented entry of productive
entrepreneurs and investment of non-subsidised incumbents. Thus, zombie lending lowered the
eﬃciency of non-zombie firms as well. They tested this hypothesis empirically and obtained
aﬃrmative results. Similarly, Mihira(2006) tested the negative externality of zombie lending to
non-zombie firms, using micro data. He argued that the productivity growth in the economy
could have fallen by a third on account of the negative externality of zombie lending.
While empirical research into zombie lending has accumulated in the last five years, its
theoretical explanation is, by contrast, still relatively undeveloped. For example, Hayashi and
Prescott(2002) argue that negative change in TFP is a main contributor; but the change in TFP
is taken to be exogenous. Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap(2006) show a theoretical framework
of how the zombie lending aﬀected the aggregate economy, but do not show why banks chose
zombie lending. There has of course been some theoretical analysis. Berglof and Roland(1997)
modify Dewatripont and Maskin(1995)’s soft budget constraint model and build a model that
is similar to the zombie lending situation. Their paper is closely related to my model shown in
the next chapter, but some facts still contradict their model.
Before going into the details of the model, we will undertake fact-finding. In the rest of
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Figure 5-3: Total Debt Amount of Bankrupt Firms
this chapter, I will summarise what happened in the Japanese economy and the banks after
the burst of the bubble, and the kind of measures that were taken. This provides some stylised
facts to introduce the theoretical model developed in the next chapter.
5.2 Facts of the Lost Decade
After the bubble burst in the early 1990s, the number of bankruptcies surged (Figure 5-3). The
banks’ balance sheets were severely damaged by the bankruptcies and the following plunges in
asset prices. The amount of less-performing loans of major banks increased in 1992 and 1995,
and then peaked in 2001 (see Figure 5-43).
The bad-loan problem initially hit so-called ”Jusen”, housing loan companies initially es-
tablished for the personal housing loan business through the joint capital investment of banks4.
3The statistics were discontinued in 1999.
4Jusen had several similar characteristics to S&L in US, excluding that Jusen did not borrow from private
sector like S&L, but borrowed from banks.
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Figure 5-4: Transition of Low-Performing Bank Loans
These companies obtained finance from commercial banks and arranged housing loans to in-
dividuals. During the bubble from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, however, these Jusen
drastically increased loans to real estate agencies, which became critical for the Jusen when the
bubble burst. These companies finally went bankrupt in 1995, and their debts (JPY 6.4 trillion
' USD 60 billion) were mainly written oﬀ by the banks and partly covered by government (JPY
0.7 trillion). The public capital injection caused severe political turmoil and delayed further
public capital injections to bad banks in the following years.
In 1998, during the bank crisis triggered by the bankruptcies of several major financial
institutions in November 1997 (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities), two major
banks (Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank) went bankrupt, but it took until 1999
for the government to inject public capital into banks on a massive scale. It took several more
years to stabilise banks’ capital adequacy ratio, through the capital injection and M&A of the
banks (see Figure 5-55). As Figure 5-4 shows, the bad loan problem was finally solved by 2005.
5The line from 1997 to 1999 is the capital adequacy ratio of major banks in Japan, estimated by Okuda(2000).
The time series of capital adequacy ratios is hard to plot since its definition changed frequently and banks were
merged and absorbed from 1999 to 2002. The capital adequacy ratio of Risona bank soared in 2003, just because
of the public capital injection in 2003, as shown in the figure.
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Figure 5-5: Capital Adequacy Ratio and Capital Injections
In the decade from 1995 to 2005, we can find several salient characteristics. First, corporate
bankruptcy lagged for several years behind the lowest level of GDP growth, which was in fact
negative in 1998 (see Figure 5-3). Corporate default peaked in 2000, but GDP growth had
then improved (2.9%). A similar lag can be found in the volume of low-performing loans. The
bad loan amount peaked in 2001 (Figure 5-4). These lags are consistent with the existence
of zombie lending: by giving additional finance to suﬀering borrowers, banks could disguise
these suﬀering borrowers as less risky borrowers. This could lower corporate bankruptcy and
less-performing loans at least for the time being.
Second, bank loan amounts were not correlated with land prices (see Figure 5-6). Accord-
ing to Hart and Moore(1994)’s argument, and to the literature relating to collateralised loans,
including Kiyotaki and Moore(1997), land prices and loan amounts would have a positive cor-
relation since land is used as collateral, not only as productive capital. Land prices had kept
declining since 1992; however, bank loan growth had been positive until 1997. Bank loan growth
bottomed out in 2005, when the bad loan problem was solved (see Figure 5-4), or when land
prices bottomed out. In other words, bank loan growth was inconsistent with land prices from
the burst of the bubble until the bank crisis in 1998.
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Figure 5-6: Land Prices and Bank Loan
Third, GDP growth and the evolution of land prices were inconsistent with the logic of
Kiyotaki and Moore(1997). Their macroeconomic model predicted a multiplier eﬀect of land
prices and economic growth: a higher land price raises collateral value and thus it increases
investment. Higher investment stimulates the economy and raises land prices further. When
land price is lowered, we have the opposite vicious cycle. Such a relationship could be observed
until the burst of the bubble, as Figure 5-7 shows. But the relationship seemed to collapse after
the burst of the bubble. From 1992 to 1998, GDP growth was positive while land price declined
by 5% every year. After the bank crisis in 1998, GDP growth started to improve, while land
price declined further (see Figure 5-7).
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Figure 5-7: GDP Growth and Land Prices
5.3 Literature Review
5.3.1 Soft Budget Constraint Models
Several studies examine some of the above factors. But there is little research explaining all
of these phenomena: the existence of zombie lending, its negative eﬀect on the macroeconomy,
and some of the ”anomalies” shown above. A useful approach to tackle the problems is the
soft budget constraint model (SBC hereafter). Kornai(1979) highlighted the fact that chronic
loss-makers still obtain finance in socialist economies. Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) described
the phenomenon as a result of dynamic inconsistency. It is optimal for the bank to threaten its
borrower, by saying that the bank will liquidate its borrower when the borrower’s performance is
not satisfactory. This liquidation is painful for the borrowers and gives him an incentive to work
honestly. However, once the borrower’s poor performance is revealed, the bank does not have
an incentive to liquidate the borrower, because it is costly for the bank as well. Liquidation
is, therefore, ex ante optimal but suboptimal ex post. Thus, chronic loss-makers can avoid
liquidation and keep obtaining finance.
91
A related argument for the zombie phenomenon in SBC is Berglof and Roland(1997)6. They
showed that a bank chooses to refinance bad firms when expected profitability of alternative
firms is low or the liquidity value of the bad firm is low. They also showed the reason why the
zombie firm phenomenon occurs with credit crunch; refinancing a bad firm leads to crowding
out; it means that the bank stops lending to new firms.
Berglof and Roland(1997) is useful to explain some of the zombie phenomenon, but we can
still find several problems when applying their model to the Japanese case. First, it is diﬃcult to
think that the zombie phenomenon occurred due to low liquidation value, which is exogenously
given. Seemed as Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap(2006) show, the number of zombie firms peaked
in 1996; however, as Figure 5-3 shows, Japanese land prices had moderately declined until 1997
and then declined further from 1998 onwards. Figure 5-3 also shows that the Japanese economy
was sluggish when the number of zombie firms stopped increasing7. These observations are
opposite to Berglof and Roland(1997)’s prediction.
Note that they rely on the assumption that refinancing to the bad firm is still more profitable
than liquidation8, i.e., the going concern value is higher than its liquidation value. This has
been a common assumption in SBC since Dewatripont and Maskin(1995)’s seminal paper was
published. For Dewatripont and Maskin(1995), this makes the threat of liquidation non-credible
and leads a borrower to choose a moral hazard action. Yet if the borrower is truly a ”chronic loss
maker”, as Kornai(1979) wrote, his going concern value might be lower than liquidation value.
This is because, before the bad firms become insolvent, they sell their trade rights, patents or
the other sources of benefits, so as to avoid bankruptcy as long as possible. After they become
insolvent, talented managers and employees leave the firm. Consequently, assuming that the
bad firm’s profitability is still higher than the liquidation value is not plausible, at least in this
Japanese case.
6They studied European transitional economies, not the Japanese case. Kobayashi, Saita and Sekine(2002)
undertook empirical research of the Japanese case based on this study.
7The other possible explanation of the peaking out of the zombie phenomenon is flaws in the legislation.
Tomura(2006) argues that Japanese bankruptcy law prevents banks from liquidating collaterals of default firms.
But it is also diﬃcult to explain the peak-out, since the new bankruptcy law (like chapter-11 in US) was enacted
in 2000, several years after the peak-out.
8After the refinancing the bank receive a payoﬀ Rp. This is bigger than refinancing cost 1, but smaller than
total financing cost 2 (the bank lends twice; lending at the beginning and then refinancing). Thus, the bad firm
is ex-ante loss-making but ex-post profitable.
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These factors motivate us to study a diﬀerent type of SBC. Our model explains the fact
that banks had an incentive to make zombies even though they knew it was costly compared
with liquidation. They had to make zombies because the liquidation of bad firms (selling their
collateral, land) inevitably lowers equilibrium land price (as well as the liquidation value) and
the banks had to realise capital loss. This capital loss lowers their own capital and may trigger
a bank closure if their own capital falls below a certain threshold, i.e. the BIS accord. In order
to avoid the huge utility loss of bank closure, the banks choose to make zombies even though
it is loss-making in the long run. In other words, the zombies were made to keep the land
price higher than its intrinsic value. This is of course costly for the whole economy, because a
higher land price prevents profitable firms from joining the market and because some productive
capital (land) possessed by zombies is left unused.
This alteration of the SBC model can explain the other facts of the Japanese lost decade.
Much empirical research points out that under-investment and corresponding lower funding
demand were observed during the decade. Some papers (e.g. Hayashi and Prescott(2002))
explain these phenomena as a result of exogenous productivity shock. Caballero, Hoshi and
Kashyap(2006) argue that these were the results of zombie lending that prevented the con-
structive destruction: since less productive firms were subsidised and kept in the market, total
supply of goods and the labour demand of the industry would increase unnecessarily and lower
the profit of healthy firms. Caballero et.al.(2006) made a linkage between zombie lending and
low productivity in this way. Alternatively, Peek and Rosengren(2005) argue that banks tend
to lend to aﬃliated borrowers and do not lend to the most appropriate borrowers. This is close
to the argument of the crowding-out eﬀect: healthy firms cannot obtain finance because zom-
bie firms obtain their funds instead. In this model, instead, zombie lending raises land prices
higher than a fair value that is consistent with their current productivity. It lowers healthy
firms’ investment in land, which is assumed to be an essential productive capital.
In order to feature these characteristics, we need to create a model with the following
characteristics. First, we endogenise liquidation value. The bank makes zombies not because
liquidation value is low, but because the bank needs to limit plunges in land prices to avoid
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the bank closure required by the BIS accord9. Since this intervention or closure is assumed
to impose huge utility loss on bankers, they try to raise land prices as much as possible, by
stopping the liquidation of default firms’ collateral and squeezing land supply10.
Second, we do not assume that bad firms can be profitable even ex-post. Once firms default,
they produce nothing until the game ends. In other words, we study the phenomenon that bad
firms keep obtaining finance even when their going concern value is lower than their liquidation
value. As Hart(2000) mentions, such kinds of situation have rarely been discussed in the
previous studies, compared with the papers studying how to prevent ineﬃcient fire-selling of
debts by creditors, in the context of the Chapter 11 or debt equity swaps. this chapter studies
its opposite: how to liquidate bad firms.
5.3.2 Credit Cycles and Microeconomics
We will endogenise the liquidation value using the ideas of Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)’s Credit
Cycles (KM hereafter). KM’s seminal paper studies an amplification mechanism of economic
growth through land price in a macroeconomic framework (they show the procyclicality of land
price, at the same time). Their macroeconomic model, however, is sometimes too complicated
to deal with some microeconomic issues.
Krishnamurthy(2003) solves this complexity problem by re-modelling KM’s model into a
simple microeconomic model. He simplifies KM into a three-period model with only one com-
petitive market. The banks, deep pockets, lend to firms if they are collateralised with land
9The Basel Capital Accord requires banks to keep their capital adequacy ratio at a minimum level of 8% and
banks with insuﬃcient capital adequacy ration are not allowed to operate international services. If the ratio falls
below 4%, the government will intervene in the bank’s operation; the govenment can decide to close the bank as
well, if the ratio is lowered further.
10One possible objection is that each bank may not be large enough to aﬀect land price. Yet we can see that
the Japanese major banks were suﬃciently large to aﬀect the price. Six major banks in Japan accounted for
approximately 50% of total bank loans ($1.9trillion out of $4.2trillion) in 2003; so each major bank has 5-10%
of the total bank loans ($0.3-0.4trillion). The aggregate value of Japanese land was $18.6trillion in 1993 (now it
must be much smaller).
Caballero et.al. estimate that 15% of the firms had received the ”subsidized” loans, which make zombies, so
the size of each bank’s zombies is $60million. I think this is suﬃciently large compared to the aggregate value of
traded land in 2004, $400million.
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(human inalienability as in Hart and Moore(1994) is assumed). The firms purchase land, bor-
rowing money from the bank by pledging the purchased land as collateral , and purchase land
further (so it is a leveraged loan). Then, the firms produce output goods using their land as
a productive capital. One of the critical diﬀerences of Krishnamurthy(2003)’s model from KM
is that the economy ends at the third period. The economy vanishes at this period and land
becomes worthless because there is no production opportunity. It means that no loan contract
is made in the second period, because the banks know that collateral becomes worthless. Thus,
the leveraged loan occurs only in the first period, and thus Krishnamurthy(2003)’s amplifica-
tion eﬀect is limited compared with KM. The other critical diﬀerence from KM’s model is that
only the land market is opened. This simplification allows us to consider some microeconomic
issues, such as the introduction of insurance contract into the credit cycles model. Krishna-
murthy(2003) shows that the amplification mechanism of KM vanishes if insurance is available;
but if the banks, who act as insurance providers at the same time, are also collateral-constrained,
then the amplification mechanism is revived.
Gai, Kondor and Vause(2006) modify this Krishnamurthy(2003)’s model further. Krishna-
murthy(2003) assumes that the firms are homogeneous, but Gai, Kondor and Vause(2006)
assume there are two diﬀerent firms with negatively correlated productivity shocks. This
negative correlation of productivity shock allows them mutual insurance, without using the
banks as insurance providers. With this modification, they show the amplification mechanism
without assuming collateral-constrained banks: since the insurance contracts here are made
among collateral-constrained firms, they do not have to assume an additional constraint to
the banks. In addition, they introduce exogenous ”liquidation constraint” as in Kiyotaki and
Moore(2001)11 or Tomura(2006), which gives an upper bound to the fraction of the future value
of land holding that a firm can credibly commit to a bank when the firm borrows from the bank.
They study how this liquidation constraint aﬀects the firms’ equilibrium land holding or land
price volatility.
The model discussed in the next chapter is the other variation of Krishnamurthy(2003).
Since the purpose of the model is to describe zombie lending, or the soft budget constraint, in-
11Kiyotaki and Moore(2001) name this as ’resaleability constraint’.
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surance contracts are omitted and the amplification mechanism as in Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)
is not focused on. There are two types of firms (borrowers), good firms and bad firms. Bad
firms fail their production and go into default. This assumption is similar to Gai, Kondor
and Vause(2006), but nobody knows their own types (the banks cannot observe this either) in
this model. At the end of the first period, bad firms go bankrupt and their collateral (land)
is seized by the banks. This gives additional risk exposure of the banks against land price.
If the equilibrium land price falls due to a negative productivity shock in the second period,
the banks’ profit would be impaired and their own capital would decline. Here we assume the
balance-sheet constraint, which restricts the banks’ amount of its own capital (it is similar to
the Basel Accord). If a bank’s own capital falls below the threshold, the bank is closed and
the managers of the bank would suﬀer from huge utility loss. The other critical diﬀerence from
the models above is that we do not assume a competitive market. The bank is monopolistic or
oligopolistic: this assumption allows the bank to manipulate the equilibrium price. If the bank
does not liquidate seized land collateralised by bad firms and hides from the market, aggregate
land supply is squeezed. This would raise the equilibrium land price and would improve the
bank’s own capital, and the bank may be able to pass the balance-sheet constraint. Yet this be-
haviour of the bank makes zombie firms, because bad firms are not liquidated and their land is
left unused in the second period. Lorenzoni(2008) also uses Krishnamurthy(2003)’s framework
to discuss ineﬃcient credit boom and following firesale of assets.
Miller and Stiglitz(2008) extend KM in a diﬀerent way. They show that an asset price
bubble and its burst triggers the fire sale of collateral asset (land). Since the fire sale may
lead the economy to a complete collapse, they argue the necessity of public capital injection or
similar schemes.
In short, the critical diﬀerences from the two previous studies are the introduction of the
soft budget constraint and monopolistic (or oligopolistic) pricing. Compared with Gai, Kondor
and Vause(2006), who limit their attention to the firms’(borrowers’) behaviour (in their model,
banks virtually do nothing), this model focuses on the behaviour of banks and ignores the firms’
behaviours instead. We will look at the details of the model in the next chapter. The policy
implications of the model will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 6
Soft Budget Constraint in a Credit
Cycle
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will create a simple microeconomic model to discuss the zombie lending
problem and the behaviours of macroeconomics parameters such as land price or TFP. The
basic story is as follows. There are many firms purchasing land for their production, although
they do not have suﬃcient funds to purchase land. They can borrow the funds from a bank by
pledging their land as collateral. The firms borrow funds, purchase land, and then pledge the
land to borrow more: i.e. the firms are allowed to leverage their debts.
In the next period, some of the firms go bankrupt - this is an unanticipated shock for the
bank. The bank can liquidate the default firms and sell their collateralised land in the land
market. But this is not always the optimal choice for the bank. The bank is assumed to be
a monopolistic deep pocket, but its own capital is restricted by a public mentor: if the bank
suﬀers a huge loss and its own capital declines lower than a predetermined threshold, then the
bank is forced to close. If the bank’s own capital is close to its threshold, liquidating the default
firms is not always a good idea: the liquidation forces the bank to write oﬀ its loan, and there
is no guarantee that the value of collateralised land is suﬃciently high to cover the loss. If land
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price in this period is too low, or, if the liquidation invites the plunge of the land market, then
the bank find that the loss of liquidating insolvent firms is too costly (because it may trigger
the closure of the bank) and it can be optimal for the bank not to liquidate the insolent firms.
If the bank finds the liquidation suboptimal, the bank can leave the default firm untouched.
The bank lends additional money to the default firms for their repayments (this is equivalent
to indulgence or reschedule of debts). The default firms are assumed to be non-productive and
cannot produce anything even after indulgence, so the land held by the firms are left unused.
By this ”zombie lending”, the bank can hide its borrowers’ bankruptcy, and can squeeze the
land supply to raise its equilibrium price. The zombie lending allows the bank not to write oﬀ
default firms, and to avoid the plunge of land market: the bank can thus raise its own capital
for the time being.
This zombie lending is costly for the bank. Even if the bank reschedules the default firms’
debts, the default firms’ performance is less likely to improve. Furthermore, since some land, the
production capital of the economy, was left unused, the average productivity of the economy
decreases after zombie lending. Accordingly, future land price is less likely to increase even
if the bank postpone to sell the collateral land. In this chapter, the cost of zombie lending
is drastically simplified: the economy closes at the end of the third period and the land price
drops to zero regardless of the bank’s choice (i.e., we assumes the largest possible cost of zombie
lending). In addition, the default firms’ performance does not improve in any case. With these
two assumptions, the bank’s incentive of zombie lending is minimised: the model shows that
the bank prefers zombie lending even in this cost structure (the bank prefers zombie lending
just to survive another period). These assumptions are made to simplify the story, and to focus
on other interesting issues: when and how zombie lending occurs, how it aﬀects macro economy,
and what kind of public policy works for this sort of situations.
Although the soft budget constraint (SBC), describing why chronic loss makers can obtain
finance, is a useful framework for studying this problem, SBC has an inconvenient assumption
for the study: the chronic loss makers’ liquidation value is lower than their going-concern value
and these values are exogenously fixed. The zombie lending occurred in Japan was, as seen in
the previous chapter, leaving insolvent borrowers unliquidated; i.e. liquidation value is higher
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than going-concern value. Furthermore, to study the anomalies observed in Japan after the
burst of the bubble, we need to endogenise the liquidation value of the borrowers (land price)
and the aggregate productivity of the economy in this chapter to study the anomalies. This
requires us to modify the SBC model, to consider not only the microeconomic problem in
finance, but also the macroeconomic issues like the aggregate productivity of an economy.
In order to discuss both microeconomic (zombie lending) and macroeconomic (land price
and aggregate productivity) issues, we use a new approach to macroeconomics that studies
macroeconomic issues using microeconomic frameworks. There are several forerunners in this
area. Suarez and Sussman(1997) make an overlapping generation model of optimal debt con-
tracts and show an endogenous business-cycle-like reversion, with an amplification eﬀect of
credit imperfection. Their ”cycle” is still simple and artificial, compared with related studies in
macroeconomics, e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst(1997), but we can obtain clear implications instead.
Krishnamurthy(2003) makes a simplified microeconomic model of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997)
credit cycle, in an economy with only three periods. He succeeds in showing how insurance
contracts work in the Credit Cycle model analytically. Tirole(2006) adopts the same approach
as Suarez and Sussman(1997). He makes a dynamic model with the overlapping generation of
Holmstro¨m and Tirole(1997), and shows the existence of stationary equilibrium.
The model shown in this chapter is based on Krishnamurthy(2003)’s model. He assumes an
economy with three periods and two categories of players, banks and firms. Both players are
a continuum of unit measure. The firms are entrepreneurs, and borrowers. They have better
investment opportunities than banks, but they may not have suﬃcient amount of funds to start
their projects. The banks are deep pocket, instead, but their profitability of investment is lower
than the firms’ profitability. The banks would do better, therefore, to lend their funds to the
firms and enjoy the return. Yet human inalienability, as in Hart and Moore(1994), is assumed
and all loans must be collateralised. The firms can leverage their downpayment by purchasing
collateralisable land, which is productive capital at the same time. After production occurs,
the debt is repaid and the next period starts. This is the same as Kiyotaki and Moore(1997)’s
mechanism, and their amplification mechanism can be found in this Krishnamurthy(2003) model
as well.
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To simplify the analysis, only the land market is opened in each period in Krishnamurthy(2003)’s
model; labour or any other physical capital is not required in the model (each firm’s produc-
tion technology is necessary and a manager of each firm is ’inalienable’). Furthermore, the
economy ends at the third period: all players will die at the end of the period, thus land
price must be zero in this period as well. There are no loan contracts from the second to the
third period, because land price in the third period is zero, thus land is not collateralisable.
Since the amplification through collateralised land only occurs once in the first period, Krish-
namurthy(2003)’s amplification eﬀect is much smaller than the original credit cycles model by
Kiyotaki and Moore(1997). There are no loan contracts from the second to the third period,
because land price in the third period must be zero and land is not collateralisable. With
these simplifications, Krishnamurthy(2003) can study how insurance contracts works in the
credit cycles model analytically. Gai, Kondor and Vause(2006) modify this model and discuss
the relationship between procyclicality and insurance in a diﬀerent way. Banks give insurance
contracts in Krishnamurthy(2003), but Gai et.al.(2006) consider mutual insurance between two
diﬀerent borrowers.
These features of Krishnamurthy(2003)’s model are convenient for studying SBC, because
both Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) and Krishnamurthy(2003) are three periods models. In the
model discussed in this chapter, Krishnamurthy(2003)’s model is merged with Dewatripont and
Maskin(1995) or Berglof and Roland(1997)’s SBC model, to study the zombie lending problem.
The bank lends to borrowers in the first period and then determines whether the bank ”helps”
default borrowers or not in the second period. These choices are made in Krishnamurthy(2003)’s
credit-cycle-like framework.
The model shown here has several significant diﬀerences from Krishnamurthy(2003) or Gai,
Kondor and Vause(2006)’s model, in order to discuss the zombie lending problem. First, Kr-
ishnamurthy(2003)’s model is competitive equilibrium, but the model in this chapter is mo-
nopolistic (the competitive equilibria are also studied for comparison). This alteration enables
the bank to decide whether it will liquidate its borrowers or not. (If a borrower has many
lenders, e.g. the loan is securitised, the bank cannot determine zombie lending by itself.) The
monopoly also enables the bank to squeeze the land supply. If the bank is relatively small
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and its liquidation does not invite the collapse of the land market, zombie lending cannot be
optimal in any case. In other words, monopoly or oligopoly in both loan contract and land
market is essential in zombie lending. We will come back to this in Section 4.
Second, this model does not have insurance contracts, which are focused on in Krishna-
murthy(2003) and Gai, Kondor and Vause(2006), because here we limit our attention to the
zombie lending problem.
Third, this model has two diﬀerent shocks, macroeconomic productivity shock and idiosyn-
cratic default shock. The firms are ex-ante identical, but a fraction of the firms go bankrupt
(this is unanticipated shock) to consider the zombie lending problem.
At the same time, it is also diﬀerent from the SBC as in Dewatripont and Maskin(1995). In
their model, or in Berglof and Roland(1997), liquidation value of the bad firms is exogenously
given; but land price, the liquidation value of bad firms in this model, is endogenously deter-
mined. In addition, the SBC models assume that even ”chronic loss-makers” are profitable to
some extent: in other words, additional lending to bad firms to keep them alive is assumed to
be profitable. In the model discussed here, bad firms do not make any profit at all.
To be precise, land in this model is merely an production capital, so we can consider the
”land” can include other collateralisable production capitals; Machinery, patents, and factory
equipments. In the following argument, these production capitals are denoted as ”land” for
notational simplicity. But sometimes it is easier for readers to consider other capitals, especially
when we think about the bank’s monopoly in asset markets.
By solving the model, we will see that the zombie firm phenomenon occurs when the follow-
ing conditions hold. First, the bank’s own capital is not too high and not too low. If the bank
has suﬃcient own capital, the bank can aﬀord liquidating bad borrowers. If the own capital
is too low, the bank is forced to close even after zombie lending - the bank has no incentive
of zombie lending in this case as well. Second, if the bank lends more to the firms, zombie
lending is likely to occur. If the bank lends more, it will seise more collateral after the firms’
bankruptcy, and is exposed to the larger risk of land price. The larger exposure to land price,
and that the large amount of collateralised land allows the bank to squeeze the land market
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further. Third, if larger fraction of the firms go bankrupt, zombie lending is likely to occur as
well, due to the same reason of the overlending. These show a good fit to what happened in
Japan.
If these conditions are satisfied, the zombie lending will cause several outcomes. The de-
cline in land price becomes moderate because zombie lending raises land price by squeezing
land supply. The number of bankruptcy becomes smaller than its real figure: the bank gives
additional funding for borrowers’ repayment so these firms will not be counted as insolvent.
Aggregate productivity decreases, because some production capital is left unused.
This gives a diﬀerent explanation for the Japanese ”lost decade”: the period of economic
stagnation after the bubble in the early 1990s. In our model, the stagnation of the productivity
occurred due to the banks’ postponement of collateral-liquidation (or, postponement of the bank
crisis). The banks, with their own capital lower1, tried to postpone bank closure by making
zombies. This had supported the land price, but lowered the productivity of the Japanese
economy, until the bank crisis in 1997-982. After the crisis, banks were nationalised and they
could liquidate zombies without anxiety of closure. This improved the productivity, and lowered
land price further. In a sense, this is a model of ”delayed” credit cycles.
the chapter continues as follows. We will define a three-periods model of the reduced-form
credit cycles, mainly following Krishnamurthy(2003) in the next section. Its equilibria and
characteristics are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 studies equilibria when there are many
banks and the land market becomes competitive. Section 5 concludes. Interpretations and
possible solutions to the zombie lending problem are discussed in the next chapter.
1To be precise, we should use capital adequacy ratio for the balance-sheet constraint, rather than own capital.
We use absolute value of own capital due to technical reasons; see below.
2Practically, it is more realistic to think that banks chose to make zombies with optimistic expectations of
future land prices. They hesitated to sell their land because they expected recovery of land prices in the near
future. This mechanism is not studied directly in this model, since land price goes to zero for sure when the
economy closes; but it is easy to show that an optimistic view of future land price encourages the banks to make
zombies. See conclusion for further discussion.
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6.2 Setup of the Game
6.2.1 Stage Game and General Setup
This economy has three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The economy has continuum firms with measure
one who have profitable production opportunities. The economy has their counterparts, M
identical banks. Since we do not consider their depositors throughout the argument, they can
be named as creditors or investors. In the following argument we assume that M = 1 for
simplicity; we will consider the case of many banks later. The infinite firms (borrowers) are not
players of the game. It is a game of the banker, and firms are just devices of the game. The
firms mechanically try to maximise their short-term profits, but there is no strategic interaction
between the bank and the firms, for the sake of simplicity.
The firms have profitable investment opportunities but no input to start a project. The
bank has productive capital, land, but it has less profitable projects only. It is also assumed
that the bank is deep pocket, but due to the human inalienability a` la Hart and Moore(1994),
there is an upper bound for the loan (the bank cannot lend more than the value of the land the
firms have).
The objective of the bank is to maximise the following linear utility function:
U = E[cb0 + c
b
1 + c
b
2]
where superscript f denotes firms, b denotes the bank. Since the discount factor is assumed
to be one and the bank has a profitable investment project and a profitable lending opportunity
(as we will assume below, the bank anticipates no bankruptcy of borrowers; thus, lending is
always profit making opportunity for the bank ex-ante), the bank tries to put their wealth into
their projects as much as possible. Therefore, we can assume that they will maximise their next
period’s wealth in each period without loss of generality. The firms are assumed to be myopic
devices in the game. They try to maximise their current production based on their productivity,
own wealth and land price oﬀered by the monopolist bank (if the market is competitive, oﬀered
by a central auctioneer).
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The firms’ identical and strictly concave production function at date t is f(zt, k
f
t ), where
zt is stochastic productivity (macro shock) and k
f
t is firms’ land holding. For simplicity, we
assume3 f(zt, k
f
t ) = k
f
t (zt − k
f
t ). The bank’s production function is f(A, k
b
t ) = kbt (A − kbt ),
where kbt is the bank’s land holding and E[zt] ≥ A, which ensures that the firms are more
profitable. K is constant land supply and K = kf0 + k
b
0. A is constant, and A ≥ 2K is assumed
to ensure monotonically increasing production function globally. We further assume that the
output good is not storable.
The firms purchase land with their wealth wf0 and bring it to the bank, and borrow money.
So, they can leverage their wealth (but they have to pay its interest beforehand as a down-
payment, thus wf0 provides an upper bound on their loan). These production functions with
the collateral constraint specify the demand functions of land, and the marginal revenue of the
monopolist bank, which possesses all land at the beginning of the game. Then the production
is carried out and wft+1 is updated.
We will find subgame perfect equilibria on the extensive game defined below. We assume
firms’ behaviour is given, and omit their strategies from the equilibrium strategy set. Thus,
equilibrium land price is determined in a monopolistic market. The land market opens twice
in the period o and period 1.
6.2.2 How the game proceeds
Firms at date 0
At the beginning of date 0, firms’ productivity z0 and their initial identical wealth w
f
0 is given
exogenously. Each firm chooses kf0 , which maximises his next day wealth w
f
1 . The choice of k
f
0
is restricted by the following two constraints. The first one is budget constraint:
3With this assumption, its first derivative becomes linear and change in productivity z is described as a
parallel shift of the derivative.
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q0k
f
0 ≤ D + w
f
0 (6.1)
The firms cannot purchase kf0 more than their borrowing plus their own wealth. And the
borrowing D is restricted by the collateral constraint:
(1 + r)D ≤ q0kf0 (6.2)
r is the interest rate from date 0 to date 1, and they have to repay all the amount in the next
period, R = (1 + r)D if they can survive until the next period. To be precise, this assumption
is not perfectly coherent: we should define (1+ r)D ≤ E0[q1]kf0 or they cannot cover their risk.
Here we assume this just for simplicity.
The expected value of firms’ aggregate wealth, wf1 , is defined as follows:
E[wf1 ] = w
f
0 +D − q0k
f
0 + f(z0, k
f
0 ) +E[q1]k
f
0 −R (6.3)
wf1 = (1− γ)
n
wf0 +D − q0k
f
0 + f(z0, k
f
0 ) +E[q1]k
f
0 −R
o
where γ is default ratio, which is unanticipated by the firms and the bank and is stochas-
tically independent from any other factors. This is the second shock to the economy, with the
macro shock z0,1. The firms are ex ante identical, but diﬀerent ex post; fraction γ of the firms
go bankrupt, and the rest survive. Default firms are assumed to lose everything (wf1 = 0)
4, so
we just need to multiply 1 − γ (the default firms’ collateral is seized by the bank). The firms
maximise their wf1 by setting k
f
0 appropriately, with the budget constraint (6.1). If the two
constraints are not binding, we have their inverted demand function by maximizing (6.3) with
respect to kf0 :
q0 = E[q1] + f 0(z0, kf0 )
4This comes from the assumption that the budget constraint is binding. They spend all available funds at
date 0, the production becomes zero, and their land will be seized by the bank in the case of default. Thus we
have wf1 = 0.
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= E[q1] + z0 − 2kf0
The marginal revenue of the bank selling kf0 to the firms is:
MR =
∂q0(k
f
0 ) · kf0
∂kf0
= E[q1] + z0 − 4kf0
If the budget and collateral constraints ((6.1) and (6.2)) are binding, we have:
kf0 =
wf0
r
1+rq0
(6.4)
This budget constraint is strictly downward sloping. The revenue function with the con-
straint is:
q0k
f
0 = w
f
0
1 + r
r
Therefore, marginal revenue with respect to kf0 is equal to zero, if the constraints are binding.
That is to say, the marginal revenue function is bent at the crossing point of the inverted demand
function and the budget constraint, as Figure 6-1 shows. The marginal revenue line bends down
and is flat at zero as long as the budget constraint is binding, and again bends upward to go
back to the unconstrained marginal revenue function at the second crossing point of the demand
function and the budget constraint.
Bank at date 0
There exists one monopolistic bank here, which is a deep pocket and has less-profitable concave
production opportunity. The bank’s production function is f(A, kb0) ,where f
0(·) > 0 and
f 00(·) < 0. If it does not lend to the firms, it tries to maximise its profit, which consists of her
own investment profit f(A, kb0) and revenue from selling land to the firms q0k
f
0 = w
f
0 :
q0k
f
0 + f(A,K − k
f
0 ) + q0(K − k
f
0 ) + (E[q1]− q0)(K − k
f
0 ) (6.5)
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The first term is the bank’s revenue of selling its land to the firms. The second one is its
own production. The third one is a part of its endowment holding on its own, and the fourth
one is the capital gain by holding kb0 = K−k
f
0 . and the latter three terms are her cost function
(derivatives of the latter three with respect to kf0 are negative. The bank’s opportunity cost
increases as kf0 increases). Diﬀerentiate the latter three with respect to k
f
0 , and we have:
MC = 2kf0 − (2K −A) +E[q1] (6.6)
If the bank makes collateralised loan to the firms, the bank’s expected profit is defined as:
q0k
f
0 + f(A,K − k
f
0 ) + q0(K − k
f
0 ) + (E[q1]− q0)(K − k
f
0 )−D + (1− γ)(1 + r)D + γE[q1]k
f
0
The first four terms are the same as above. The fourth term D is loan amount, and the fifth
is successful repayment amount. The last term is collateral value seized from default firms. By
assuming that the firms are budget-constrained for simplicity, we have D = q01+rk
f
0 . Substitute
this into the above and diﬀerentiate with respect to kf0 , we have:
MC 0 =
2
1− γ1+r
kf0 −
1
1− γ1+r
(2K −A) + 1− γ
1− γ1+r
E[q1] (6.7)
Since 0 < γ1+r < 1, the sign of each coeﬃcient is the same as the no-loan case (6.6), but the
slope is steeper.
Market Clearing at date 0
Date 0 equilibrium kf0 makes MR and MC equal. If the budget constraint is not binding,
obtaining equilibrium price q0 is straightforward, as Figure 6-1 shows. If the constraint is
binding, equilibrium kf0 is determined at kˆ
f
0 . Since the MR of any k
f
0 > kˆ
f
0 is zero but the MC
is non-zero, the bank has no incentive to sell her land any more. This means that kˆf0 is an
upper-bound of kf0 .
To be precise, we need the following lemma to asset that kˆf0 is an upper-bound of k
f
0 . Since
the budget constraint is convex, the constraint becomes unbinding again if kf0 is suﬃciently
107
Figure 6-1: Land Market Equilibrium (macro schock is given)
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Figure 6-2: Possible unconstrained MR
large; if MR and MC intersect at such a large kf0 , kˆ
f
0 cannot be the upper bound. Figure
6-2 shows that there are two discontinued unconstrained marginal revenues. Yet the following
lemma excludes this possibility.
Lemma 13 There exists an upper bound of kf0 and k
f
1 , kˆ
f
0 and kˆ
f
1 respectively, which is the in-
tersection of the demand function and the budget constraint. If the budget constraint is binding,
kfi = kˆ
f
i for i = {0, 1}.
See Appendix for the proof.
We can obtain equilibrium q0 from the intersection of MR and MC, and the inverted demand
function.
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Firms at date 1
At the end of the date 0, some of the firms go bankrupt and cannot extract any profit from the
investment. The fraction of the default firms is γ: this is an unanticipated shock (e.g. negative
productivity shock), so the expected γ is zero although its actual value is strictly positive. The
surviving firms obtain the return, f(z0, k
f
0 ).
The surviving firms (fraction 1 − γ) sell all their land to the bank to repay the loan. The
default firms’ wealth becomes zero, and their land is seised by the bank. The default firms’
productivity at date 1 is fixed at zero.
Now the surviving firms’ objective is to maximize wf2 , given w
f
1 . Thus a similar procedure is
repeated at date 1, but the critical diﬀerence is now they cannot borrow money from the bank.
Since the economy finishes at date 2, everything becomes worthless by then; accordingly, the
value of land becomes zero at date 2(E[q2] = 0). This means that the bank cannot secure the
loan by the collateral land. There is no other collateralisable asset, so no financial transaction
would be carried out at date 1. Therefore, the firms’ objective function becomes:
wf2 = w
f
1 − q1k
f
1 + f(z1, k
f
1 )
subject to:
wf1 ≤ q1k
f
1
where z1 ∈ {zH , zL} is the firms’ updated productivity, chosen by nature. The bank’s
marginal revenue with non-binding budget constraint is:
MR = z1 − 4kf1
If binding, we have
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kf1 =
wf1
q1
MR = 0
Bank at date 1
As assumed above, the bank is a deep pocket and there is no budget constraint, as KM assume.
However, here we add a restriction to the bank, which resembles the BIS accord regulating
banks’ capital adequacy ratio. This is that if the bank makes a loss, which reduces its own
capital, and if the capital falls below a predetermined threshold, then the bank is forced to
be closed5. The bank closure incurs a huge utility loss to the bank’s manager (infinite loss is
assumed for simplicity). This balance sheet constraint (B/S constraint) is described as:
W1 ≥ W¯ (6.8)
Denote W1 as the bank’s own capital at date 1 and W¯ as a threshold that is required by an
external auditor. If W1 < W¯ , the auditor forces the bank to close its business. W0 is endowed
ex ante, and W1 is updated as follows:
W1 =W0+f(A, kb0)+q0k
f
0+q0k
b
0+(E[q1]−q0)kb0−D+(1−γ)(1+r)D+γ(1−θ)q1k
f
0+γθq1k
f
0 (6.9)
The second term of the RHS is the profit coming from the bank’s own investment. The
third to fifth terms are the profits by selling the bank’s land to the firms, and by holding the
land for its own. The sixth to ninth are profit coming from loans to the firms.
If the bank expects W1 < W¯ , after observing updated productivity z1, it tries to squeeze
land supply to raise equilibrium land price q∗1 and thenW1 (higher land price is always beneficial
5The BIS accord restricts capital adequacy ratio, not absolute value of capital. Here we need to modify the
restriction because no lending occurs from date 1 to date 2.
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for the bank, because it can enjoy capital gain from her land: this is proved below). The bank
can squeeze land supply by making zombies: i.e., by giving up selling failed firms’ land and
leaving it on the failed firms’ hands, whose productivity is fixed at zero. Since the land held
by zombie firms is excluded from the market, aggregate land supply declines by γθkf0 , where
θ ∈ [0, 1] is a fraction of zombies created out of default firms’ land. Since the demand function
of the firms does not change, as we will see, this squeeze raises q∗1 under certain conditions. The
bank has the incentive to do so anytime when she can raise W1, such that W1 ≥ W¯ by making
zombies, because it is assumed that the bank manager has to bear infinite utility loss.
After deciding θ, the bank enters the land market at date 1. The bank’s concave production
function is f(A, kb1) and FOC is
MC = 2kf1 −
n
2(K − γθkf0 )−A
o
Since land price will be zero in the next period, no lending occurs and E[q2] = 0; this
simplifies MC in date 1.
Equilibrium land price q∗1 is calculated with the MR and MC. Since suﬃciently low equilib-
rium q∗1 causes W1 < W¯ , (i.e. violates the B/S constraint (6.8))and the bank has to close the
business, it needs to infer q∗1 ex ante and manipulate θ before the market is cleared, in order to
ensure W1 ≥ W¯ .
6.3 Equilibria (monopolistic bank)
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategy defined in the game is a configuration of the following
actions of the bank: kf0 ∈ [0,K], θ ∈ [0, 1] and k
f
1 ∈ [0,K − θγk
f
0 ]. The bank may choose k
b
0,1
rather than kf0,1, but we use this for notational simplicity (without any loss of generality). As
explained above, the bank is assumed to be only able to choose lending or not lending: once
the bank decides to start loan business, it has to accept all borrowers with suﬃcient collateral.
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Kγθk0f
Bank’s marginal 
cost without 
zombies (θ=0)
Bank’s marginal cost
with zombies (θ=1)
q1(z1,θ=0)
q1(z1,θ=1)
q1
Figure 6-3: Normal Equilibrium and Zombie Equilibrium (qˆ is the land price that achieves
W1 = W¯ . If land price is lower than the threshold, the bank is forced to close. See appendix
for the definision.)
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In the following argument, we will assume that the firms’ budget constraint at date 0 is
always binding, for computational simplicity. Thus loan amount D becomes endogenous and
is omitted from the strategy set. We just assume that r ∈ (0,∞) is exogenously given. This
assumption is to simplify the equilibrium strategies. All the other parameters are exogenously
given.
6.3.1 Time Line
The game consists of the following stages:
date 0 The borrowers’ identical wealth wf0 , the bank’s initial own capital W0, and macro shock
z0 are given (before the game starts).
date 0 Based on the demand functions of the firms, the bank chooses kb0, and q0 is determined
(bank loan D is automatically determined).
date 0 The outputs f(z0, k
f
0 ) and f(A, k
b
0) are realised. The fraction γ ≤ 1 of the firms go
bankrupt.
date 1 The successful firms sell their land to the bank and repay (1 + r)D. The default firms
give their property right of their land to the bank.
date 1 Nature chooses z1 ∈ {zL1 , zH1 }6. Its distribution μ = {π, 1− π} is known ex ante.
date 1 The bank estimates the firms’ demand functions based on z1 and derives q1 and W1. If
W1 < W¯ , she sets θ > 0 (making zombies).
date 1 Given θ and players’ demand functions, kb1 and q1 are determined.
date 1 The mediator checks W1 and shuts the bank down if W1 < W¯ .
date 2 The output f(z1, k
f
1 ) and f(A, k
b
1) are realised.
6zH1 does not play any important role in this model. This parameter becomes important when we extend the
model allowing anticipated bankruptcy, which may discourage the bank to lend (the participation constraint of
bank loan may bind). This is left for future research.
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date 2 The firms and the bank consume everything obtained.
date 2 The economy is closed.
6.3.2 Date 1 Land Market
We will construct the equilibrium by backward induction. Since the economy closes at date
2 and no action occurs then, kf1 is the last action chosen by the bank, given z1, w
f
1 and θ:
the equilibrium kb,f1 and corresponding q1 is the first action we need to consider. The budget
constraint
wf1
q1 may or may not be binding. Actually, their actions are trivial at this moment.
q1 is determined subject to the following conditions:
MR = z1 − 4kf1 if the budget constraint is not binding.
MR = 0 if the budget constraint is binding.
MC = 2kf1 −
n
2(K − γθkf0 )−A
o
kf1 + k
b
1 = K − γθk
f
0
Thus the equilibrium action kb1 and equilibrium price q1 are determined if θ, z1 and w
f
1 are
specified beforehand. The existence of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed by the lemma 16 and
other discussions above.
6.3.3 Decision of Zombie Lending
Based on the estimation relating to the land market at date 1, which is shown above, the bank
has to decide θ. At this moment she has observed z1 and w
f
1 ; thus she can calculate correctly
whether her wealth W1 will fall below W¯ or not, from the equation (6.9). If W1 < W¯ , the bank
need to raise W1 up to W¯ or the bank is forced to close. But measures to raise W1 are limited.
Most components of W1 are fixed at date 0, except for q1 and θ, and it is obvious from (6.9)
that change in θ does not have any direct eﬀect to W1. Thus the path of the zombie lending
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eﬀect should be that higher θ raises q1, and then higher q1 raises W17. The latter one, ∂W1∂q1 > 0,
is obvious from the equation (6.9), but the former one needs to be proved. And we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 14 There exist W0, zL1 and r such that the bank finds the zombie lending optimal.
See appendix for the proof. From the proof, we have the following implications:
Remark 15 Zombie lending is prone to be chosen when r is small (bank loan was highly lever-
aged in the previous period, i.e. debt overhang), γ is large (the bankruptcy of the firms in a large
scale) and W0 is small. But if r and W0 are too small, then zombie lending cannot improve W1
enough, and the bank is forced to close.
Low r allows the firms to borrow more (i.e. high leverage), and their bankruptcy exposes
the bank to the larger risk of land price because the bank seises collateralised land from default
firms. If γ is large, the bank has a larger room to make zombie firms. Low W0 is obvious: If
the bank does not have suﬃcient cash buﬀer, they need to make zombie firms to make up their
loss. But if W0 or r is too small, the bank gives up to hide the loss and closes the business.
The following lemma assures the uniqueness of optimal θ:
Lemma 16 If there exists θ ≤ 1 such that the bank can raise its own capital W1 ≥ W¯ , the
bank chooses minimum θ that ensures W1 ≥ W¯ . I.e. the bank’s optimal θ is the one achieving
W1 = W¯ .
7To be precise, the bank can raise q1 without making zombie borrowers. The monopolist bank can make a
oﬀer with a very high q1, and the firms will purchase only the small amount of land kf1 . Theoretically there is
no reason to exclude this opportunity; but we do not consider the case since ”purchasing most of the land to
raise land price” is not a realistic scenario to describe what happened in Japan. The exclusion of the possibility
simply limits our attention to the subset of equilibrium outcome, and thus it does not aﬀect the robustness of
the study.
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See Appendix for the proof. Intuitively, the bank chooses the smallest θ because zombie
lending is costly for the bank. The bank has to keep non-productive land (γθkf0 ), which becomes
zero value for sure in the next period. To minimise the cost of zombie lending, the bank chooses
minimum feasible θ.
To be precise, if W1 < W¯ even when θ = 1, any θ ∈ [0, 1] can be an equilibrium action
since the cost of the closure is negative infinite and it dominates all the other factors. In the
following argument, I assume that equilibrium θ is equal to zero in this case to eliminate this
non-interesting multiple equilibria.
6.3.4 Decision of Date-0 Investment (kf0)
We will proceed one step backward, action at date 0. At date 0, the bank, which does not
anticipate any firm’s bankruptcy (E[γ] = 0), chooses kb0 (or, equivalently, k
f
0 ) at the intersection
of the firms’ demand function and their budget constraint, where MR of the bank plunges to
zero.
based on r, wf0 and z0 and expectation of z1, θ and k
f
1 . Since we have assumed that the
budget constraint for the firms are binding, the bank’s optimal action is:
kf0 =
(E[q1] + z0) +
q
(E[q1] + z0)2 − 81+rr w
f
0
4
from the proof of Lemma 13. Since γ is expected to be zero, E[q1] is simply defined as:
E[q1] = π · q1(zH1 , kb,H1 ) + (1− π) · q1(zL1 , kb,L1 )
where q1(·) are the equilibrium land prices at date 1 without zombie lending (any zombie
lending is not anticipated). Therefore, E[q1] is determined independently from the actions
chosen.
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6.3.5 Equilibrium Strategies
The arguments above proves the existence of the following equilibrium strategies. The strategy
set may be a subset of the whole equilibrium set of the game. The aim of the chapter is showing
the existence of the zombie lending equilibrium and finding the conditions for the equilibrium;
not finding the whole set of equilibria.
The equilibrium strategy of the game, (kf0 , θ, k
f
1 ), is defined as follows:
kf0 =
(E[q1] + z0) +
q
(E[q1] + z0)
2 − 81+rr w
f
0
4
∃1θ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. W1 = W¯ if W1(θ = 1) ≥W and W1(θ = 0) < W
θ = 0 otherwise
∃1kf1 with given γ, θ, w
f
1 and z1
6.4 Equilibria (Many Banks)
If there are many banks, we have competitive equilibria with some diﬀerent features from the
monopolistic banking we saw above. The timeline of the game is the same as the one of the
monopolistic economy. The date 0 equilibrium, however, is determined at the intersection of
the firms’ demand function and the banks’ MC, because now the banks are also price taker and
cannot sell their land at the point where MR=MC.
The banks’ supply function is firstly obtained. The banks’ profit function at date 0 is (γ is
expected to be zero):
q0k
f
0 + f(A,K − k
f
0 ) + q0(K − k
f
0 ) + (E[q1]− q0)(K − k
f
0 )−D + (1 + r)D
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Kγθk0f
q1(z1,θ=1)
q1
Bank’s marginal 
cost without 
zombies (θ=0)
Bank’s marginal cost
with zombies (θ=1)
q1(z1,θ=0)
Firms’ demand
function
Figure 6-4: Zombie lending in competitive banking (infeasible case)
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Diﬀerentiate this with respect to kf0 , we have the supply function:
q0 − (A− 2K)− 2kf0 −E[q1] + r · q0
q0 =
1
1 + r
n
2kf0 +E[q1] + (A− 2K)
o
Since it is assumed that the firms are bound by the budget constraint, the date 0 demand
function is defined as follows:
q0 =
wf0
r
1+rk
f
0
The equilibrium price q∗0 and the allocation k
f∗
0 are obtained at the intersection of the
demand and supply functions. It is obvious that the demand and supply functions have unique
intersection.
The choice of θ, the fraction of zombie lending out of unanticipated bankruptcy of the firms,
is remarkably diﬀerent in the economy with many banks. The monopolist bank can hide some
land γθkf0 from the market to push up the land price q1. But if there are many banks and
the size of each bank is infinitesimally small, single bank’s zombie lending cannot raise q1.
Equivalently, when all the other banks choose zombie lending, it is optimal for each single bank
to liquidate all insolvent borrowers (deviation from the zombie lending strategy) because each
one of the banks have an opportunity of free lunch. The banks’ optimal choice is, therefore,
θ = 0 for any parameters, even though a bank (or banks) is under-capitalised (W1 < W¯ ).
The choice of date 1 land allocation kf1 is determined in a similar way to the date 0 land
market. Since E[q2] = 0 and D = 0, the demand and supply function becomes as follows:
q1 = z1 − 2kf1 if the budget constraint is not binding
q1 =
wf1
kf1
if the budget constraint is binding
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q1 = 2k
f
1 + (A− 2K)
Since the demand function and the budget constraint are strictly decreasing and the supply
function is strictly increasing, the uniqueness of the equilibrium land allocation at date 1 is
guaranteed.
6.5 Conclusion: Zombie Lending and its Rationale
The model explored here is designed to answer the three questions raised in the previous chapter:
The mechanism of zombie lending, the reason why Japanese economy continued to be stagnant
for more than a decade, and the reason why the land price did not positively correlated with
economic growth after the bubble burst. The model provides answers to the three.
First, a bank has an incentive to make zombie firms to make up their flawed own capital.
When the bank finds that some of its borrowers go bankrupt, the bank has two choices. One is
seising the collateralised land and liquidating it (the loan itself will be written oﬀ). The other
is behaving as if the insolvent borrowers are solvent: In practice, the bank lends some money to
its insolvent borrowers to enable them to repay the interest of their debts (to the bank). The
land held by the insolvent borrowers (zombies) are left unused, and then the bank can squeeze
aggregate supply of land to raise q1. Higher q1 raises the value of the bank’s asset (kb0 + γθk
f
0 )
and then its own capital (W1) higher than the threshold W¯ . This is costly for the bank as well,
since the bank also has to buy expensive land and it has to keep some land (γθkf0 ) unused, but
the cost of forced closure triggered by W1 < W¯ is assumed to dominate the costs of making
zombies.
Second, zombie lending retains non-productive firms and hinders new entrants8 from starting
new business using cheaper production capital. This lowers the aggregate productivity of the
8Or survived productive firms; these are equivalent since we assume atomless firms.
121
economy. This part of the story is similar to Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap(2006) arguing
that zombie lending prevented creative destruction of distressed industries. In this chapter, by
contrast, zombie lending is not necessarily the bad thing, because the economy can avoid the
cost of banking crisis. If the social cost of bank closure (this is not defined in this chapter) is
huge, then zombie lending can be socially eﬃcient even though it prevents the economy from
quick recovery. During the Japanese ”lost decade”, many banks were forced to restructure their
business drastically (including M&A), but there was neither the bankruptcy of major banks,
nor the panic liquidation of borrowing firms9. The banks had several years to resolve their
problems in their balance sheets.
Third, zombie lending brakes the positive correlation between economic growth and land
price, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In a normal credit cycle, negative productivity shock
has a negative eﬀect to land price. But if we assume that there is a bank on the propagation
path, and if the bank suﬀers from insuﬃcient capital (cash), the bank has an incentive to
prevent the propagation to avoid forced closure. We also can conjecture from the model that
land price goes down when the economy experiences a positive productivity shock after zombie
lending, because the positive shock provides some cash to the bank to secure their own capital,
which allows the bank to liquidate some insolvent borrowers and write oﬀ the loan10.
The model also tells when we have zombie lending and when we don’t have. Zombie lend-
ing is likely to occur when the following four conditions are satisfied. First, unanticipated
bankruptcy shock γ is large. Second, the bank’s leverage is high (equivalently, interest rate r
is low). Third, the bank’s own capital W0 is small. Four, zL1 , lower aggregate productivity, is
low (or, q1 becomes suﬃciently high and the bank does not worry about the capital loss coming
from seised land γθkf0 ). And there is one important necessary condition - the market is not
competitive. If there are many banks, each small bank cannot raise market price q1 and their
optimal θ is always zero.
The first four conditions imply that zombie lending is prone to occur after the burst of a
9Of course, some famous banks (including LTCB, NCB and Yamaichi Securities) went bankrupt, and some
borrowers were liquidated by banks: But these did not lead to severe financial panics.
10This has not yet been studied. Proving this is left for future research.
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bubble. When a bank experiences unanticipated borrowers’ bankruptcy, after making highly
leveraged lending, the bank cannot bear the cost of de-leveraging, even if the bank knows it is
an eﬃcient choice in the long run. This is the zombie lending.
The last necessary condition implies that this zombie lending may occur only when loan
market and land (or, any other collateralisable assets) market are monopolistic or oligopolistic.
In Japan, bank loans are rarely securitised (there was virtually no securitised loan market
a decade ago) and each firm use only one bank to finance (so-called main bank system11).
Furthermore, the size of bad loan held by major Japanese banks was large compared with
annual trading amount of land in Japan (c.f. Footnote 10 of chapter 5). I.e., since the land
market was illiquid and Japanese major banks have been huge, monopoly (or oligopoly) in land
market is not an unrealistic assumption in Japan.
On the other hand, zombie lending may not occur in the US or the UK, where loans are
commonly securitised. If a bank suﬀering from low capital adequacy ratio aims at zombie
lending, the bank has to coordinate with all the other banks and investors holding the ABS
(asset-backed security) of the loan. The coordination is at least diﬃcult, since each lender has
an incentive to deviate from the coalition and liquidate its share at higher price. In the worst
case, the bank may not be able to find identity of all the lenders (coordination is of course
impossible in this case).
The arguments above implies that the post-crisis economic growth and asset price in the
US or the UK may be diﬀerent from the one in Japan. In Japan, zombie lending prevented the
economy from quick recovery, and also from falling into severe financial panic. The prolonged
stagnation, the so-called lost decade, is the result of this. In the US or the UK, by contrast, a
post-crisis economy may experience rapid de-leverage (the liquidation of insolvent borrowers) in
a large scale and a banking crisis as a result, because zombie lending is diﬃcult. But the crisis
may be followed by a quick economic recovery, because bad firms will be promptly eliminated.
This implies that optimal policy for crisis resolution in the US or the UK may be diﬀerent
from the one Japanese government took. We will compare two policies Japanese government
11See, for example, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scherfstein(2003).
123
took, public capital injection and bad assets purchasing schemes, to clarify what we can learn
from the Japanese experience, in the next chapter.
6.6 Appendix
6.6.1 Proof of Lemma 13
As shown in Figure 6-1, there are two disconnected intervals of the MR line. Here we see that
the lower, right-hand side interval does not intersect with MC in any conditions allowed by the
assumptions made above. First, we will find the intersections of the demand function and the
budget constraint. The demand function and the budget constraint are respectively defined as:
q0 = E[q1] + z0 − 2kf0
q0 =
wf0
kf0
· 1 + r
r
Solving these two equations, we have the following:
³
E[q1] + z0 − 2kf0
´
kf0 =
1 + r
r
wf0
2
³
kf0
´2
− (E[q1] + z0) kf0 +
1 + r
r
wf0 = 0
kf0 =
(E[q1] + z0)±
q
(E[q1] + z0)2 − 81+rr w
f
0
4
The bigger solution is the second intersection of the demand function and the budget con-
straint. Next, the intersection of unconstrained MR and MC is derived. We have complicated
MC if the bank lends, but any MC with bank loans is steeper than the MC without bank loans.
That is, if intersection of the unconstrained MR and MC without bank loans is smaller than
the second intersection of the demand function and the budget constraint, then the same result
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can be obtained with any other steeper MC with bank loan. Accordingly, we can limit our
attention to the non-lending MC:
MR = E[q1] + z0 − 4kf0
MC = 2kf0 − (2K −A) +E[q1]
Solving this with MR=MC, we have:
kf0 =
z0 + (2K −A)
6
Since 2K −A < 0 by assumption, E[q1] > 0 and
q
(E[q1] + z0)2 − 81+rr w
f
0 > 0, we can see
(E[q1] + z0) +
q
(E[q1] + z0)2 − 81+rr w
f
0
4
>
z0 + (2K −A)
6
Consequently, for any z0, E[q1], w
f
0 ,K and A, the second intersection of the demand function
and the budget constraint is (horizontally) larger than the intersection of unconstrained MR
and MC. This is suﬃcient to prove that the first intersection of demand function and budget
constraint is the upper bound of kf0 . We can prove that date-1 equilibrium has the same upper
bound, using a similar (and simpler) derivation. ¥
6.6.2 Proof of Proposition 14
The bank has an incentive to make zombie borrowers only when the bank can raise its own
capital W1 by stop liquidating default borrowers’ collateral (land). Namely, the conditions for
zombie lending are W1(θ = 0) < W¯ and W1(θ = 1) ≥ W¯ . We will rearrange the conditions
with respect to q1 first. Since W1 is strictly increasing w.r.t q1, we have a unique threshold qˆ1
such that W1(qˆ1) = W¯ . W1(qˆ1) = W¯ is defined as follows:
f(A, kb0) + q0k
f
0 + qˆ1k
b
0 −D + (1− γ)(1 + r)D + γ(1− θ)qˆ1k
f
0 + γθqˆ1k
f
0 +W0 = W¯ (6.10)
125
Thus the threshold qˆ1 is:
qˆ1 =
D − (1− γ)(1 + r)D
kb0 + γk
f
0
− f(A, k
b
0) + q0k
f
0
kb0 + γk
f
0
+
W¯ −W0
kb0 + γk
f
0
(6.11)
If q1 without zombie lending is lower than the threshold, i.e. q1(zL1 , θ = 0) < qˆ1, and if
q1 with zombie lending is higher than the threshold, i.e. q1(zL1 , θ = 1) ≥ qˆ1, then the bank
has the incentive of zombie lending. These two conditions are satisfied only when q1(zL1 , θ =
0) < q1(zL1 , θ = 1). The condition is satisfied by choosing appropriate z
L
1 : suﬃciently small z
L
1
ensures that the firms’ budget constraint does not bind when θ = 1.
If the zombie lending can raise q1 (if zL1 is suﬃciently small), we can prove the existence of
zombie lending by showing that qˆ1 can take arbitrary number by choosing appropriate parame-
ters in the equation (6.11). First, qˆ1 can take any small number (possibly negative) by choosing
suﬃciently large W0. As W0 goes to infinity, the threshold qˆ1 diverges to negative infinity (see
the equation 6.11). On the other hand, W0 has a lower bound: The bank’s initial cash holding
W0 plus the revenue of land sales to the firms q0k
f
0 must be equal or larger than the regulation
level W¯ (or, the bank is forced to close at date 0). Accordingly, qˆ1 cannot take any arbitrary
large number only by manipulating W0.
Suppose thatW0 is the lowest number it can take. Accordingly, W¯ −W0 = q0kf0 . Substitute
this into (6.11) and diﬀerentiate qˆ1 with respect to r, we have ∂qˆ1∂r < 0. The proof is below:
qˆ1 =
D − (1− γ)(1 + r)D
kb0 + γk
f
0
− f(A, k
b
0) + q0k
f
0
kb0 + γk
f
0
+
q0k
f
0
kb0 + γk
f
0
Substitute D = q0k
f
0 − w
f
0 , q0k
f
0 =
wf0
r/(1+r) (because it is assumed that the firms’ budget
constraint is binding at date 0 for simplicity) and kb0 = K − k
f
0 into the equation above. Then
we have:
=
1
K − (1− γ)kf0
"
{1− (1− γ)(1 + r)}
Ã
wf0
r/(1 + r)
− wf0
!
− (K − kf0 )(A−K + k
f
0 )
#
As long as the budget constraint is binding at date 0,
∂kf0
∂r < 0 because higher r tightens the
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firms’ budget constraint. Further rearranging the equation, we have:
=
1
K − (1− γ)kf0
h³
γ +
γ
r
− 1
´
wf0 −AK +K2 + (A− 2K)k
f
0 + (k
f
0 )
2
i
∂qˆ1
∂r < 0 from the equation above. As r → 0, qˆ1 → +∞. qˆ1 can take, therefore, any value by
choosing appropriate zL1 , W0 and r
12. ¥
6.6.3 Proof of Lemma 16
We need to show that the bank’s profit is strictly decreasing w.r.t. θ. Thus, the bank tries to
minimise θ and we can ensure that she chooses θ such that W1 = W¯ .
The final wealth of the bank at date 2, W2, is defined as follows:
W2 =W1 + f(A, kb1(θ)) + q1(θ)
n
kb0 − kb1 + γ(1− θ)k
f
0
o
Diﬀerentiating this w.r.t. θ, we have:
∂W2
∂θ
=
∂f(A, kb1(θ))
∂θ
−
n
q01(θ)k
b
1(θ) + q1(θ)k
0b
1 (θ)
o
−
n
γkf0 q1(θ) + γθk
f
0 q
0
1(θ)
o
=
∂f(A, kb1(θ))
∂θ
− q01(θ)
n
kb1(θ) + γθk
f
0
o
− q1(θ)
n
k0b1 (θ) + γk
f
0
o
In the above equation, all terms but
∂f(A,kb1(θ))
∂θ and k
0b
1 (θ) are strictly positive.
∂f(A,kb1(θ))
∂θ
is strictly negative. k0b1 (θ) = 0 if θ ≤ θ˜, or, if k0b1 (θ) + γk
f
0 ≥ 0 even though θ > θ˜; otherwise,
k0b1 (θ) < 0. Here, θ˜ denotes θ such that MC intersects with MR at its kinked point (if the
budget constraint is not binding at θ = 0, θ˜ would be negative). Therefore, ∂W2∂θ < 0 if θ ≤ θ˜,
or, if k0b1 (θ) + γk
f
0 ≥ 0 even though θ > θ˜. If we can show that k0b1 (θ) + γk
f
0 ≥ 0 when θ > θ˜,
∂W2
∂θ < 0 is globally ensured and the lemma is proved.
12To be precise, lower r may increase wf1 and aﬀects q1(z
L
1 , θ) (not the threshold qˆ1) if the budget constraint
is binding. But high wf1 will ease the budget constrant and q1(z
L
1 , θ) reaches its upper bound when r goes down
to a threshold. Accordingly, there exists an r such that q1 satisfies the two conditions.
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At date 1, the slope of the MC is 2 and the slope of the MR is −4. We know that if θ
changes by +4θ then the MC curve horizontally shifts leftward by γkf0 · 4θ. As a result, the
intersection of MC and MR shifts leftward as well, by 13γk
f
0 · 4θ (since θ > θ˜, the budget
constraint is not binding). That is to say, kf1 decreases by
1
3γk
f
0 · 4θ and kb1 also decreases by
2
3γk
f
0 · 4θ (since aggregate land supply decreases by γkf0 · 4θ); k0b1 (θ) = −23γkf0 . Now we see
that k0b1 (θ) + γk
f
0 ≥ 0 when θ > θ˜ and ∂W2∂θ < 0 is globally ensured. The bank has an incentive
to minimise her loss by choosing the smallest θ that ensures W1 ≥ W¯ , and the B/S constraint
holds. Therefore, the θ such that W1 = W¯ is the equilibrium action for the bank. ¥
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Chapter 7
Policy Implications for Post-Crisis
Economies
7.1 Introduction: Optimal Policies for Post-Crisis Economies
We saw, in the previous chapter, that a post-crisis economic growth is aﬀected by banks’
behaviour, and the path of the growth depends on the characteristics of banking industry,
the degree of leverage before the crisis, and the size of unanticipated bankruptcy shock that
borrowers experience. Especially, the model shows that a recovery path after crises may be
diﬀerent with oligopolistic banking (Japan) and securitised finance (the US or the UK).
We will study, in this chapter, optimal policy for post-crisis economies. The conclusions
in the previous chapter imply that the optimal policy may vary relying on some parameters -
e.g. the features of banking industries, the features of the bubble they experienced, and so on.
Particularly, we will focus on two policies Japanese government took 10 years ago: public capital
injection to banks that suﬀered from low capital adequacy ratio, and a toxic asset purchasing
scheme, which allowed banks to eliminate illiquid risky assets from their balance sheets.
The most relevant study to this chapter is Miller and Stiglitz(2008), modelling the burst
of an asset price bubble, which is caused by a scheduled technology shock and its cancellation.
The bubble burst triggers a margin call by lenders, which forces borrowers to make a fire-sale
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of their assets. The fire sale lowers land price further, and the price decline triggers another
margin call. The vicious cycle may finally make the economy completely collapse. Miller and
Stiglitz (2008) argue that some public bail-out schemes must be necessary in these cases, to
stop the vicious cycle. They suggest three possible options; debt-equity swap, public capital
injection, and loan write-down.
This chapter, instead, focuses on public capital injection and toxic asset purchasing scheme.
A question we tackle here is not whether these two policies can help banks or not. In this
model, banks can be bailed out if the government injects suﬃcient amount of capital. Which
policy is less costly for taxpayers? What kind of indirect eﬀects do they have? These questions
crystallising the costs and benefits of these two policies are what we focus on in this chapter.
Section 2 briefly explains the features of the Japanese policies aiming at resolving its banking
problems. Section 3 discusses the costs and benefits of the policies. Section 4 concludes.
7.2 Two Crisis Resolution Policies: How These Worked
After the Japanese banking crisis in late 1997, when a major security company and several
banks went bankrupt, Japanese government mainly took two diﬀerent policies to resolve the
problem. First one is public capital injection. In February 1998, the government stipulated
two bills1 for public capital injection. One bill prepared 17 trillion yen (170 billion US dollars2)
allowing the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC, which is equivalent to US Resolution
Trust Corporation, RTC) to purchase defaulted banks’ assets and then to liquidate the assets.
The other bill, stipulated in February 1998, secured fund (13 trillion yen) for Deposit In-
surance Corporation of Japan (DIC) to inject public capital to risky but still solvent banks.
The capital injection was done by mainly purchasing banks’ perpetual subordinated debts. The
interest rate of debts were 6 months LIBOR plus some spreads (from 100 bps to 300 bps), and
the rates were increased by (approximately) 150 bps if the banks could not repay the debt
1For legislative details, see Kamakura (2005) for example.
2calculated using USD1=JPY100.
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within 5 years (this step-up interest was prepared to give an incentive for banks to repay the
public capital as soon as possible). In the following March, approximately 2 trillion yen was
injected into 21 banks.
Since the performance of these bills was not very satisfactory, these bills were revised further
in October 1998. A notable feature of the revision is allowing DIC to purchase toxic assets from
solvent (but possibly risky) banks. Overall funds secured for these policies were doubled to 60
trillion yen. In March 1999, 7.5 trillion yen was additionally injected to major banks, based
on the revised bills. The injection was done by mainly purchasing preferred stocks with an
exchangeable clause. The preferred stocks did not have voting write, but the holders of the
stock have a seniority over normal stock holders in claiming issuers’ assets. The exchangeable
clause gave the government to exchange the preferred stocks to normal stocks. The clause
became selectable 3-5 years after the issuance: Namely, issuing banks that fails to buy-back the
preferred stocks within 5 years could be literally ”nationalised” by the government exchanging
its preferred stocks to normal stocks with voting rights.
A reason why the government changed its injection scheme from subordinated debts to
preferred stock is the high interest rate of subordinated debts. Since obtaining taxpayers’
support for the public capital injection schemes was very diﬃcult, the government had to
design the scheme giving top priority to the security of taxpayers’ money. In subordinated
debt, a fixed income asset, only the source of profit is its interest payments. The high interest,
however, conflicted with the scheme’s main purpose, liquidity provision to stricken banks. The
banks had to lose their precious cash every 6 months for interest payment, and the burden
was not negligible for the banks. To avoid the conflict, the government determined to rely on
capital gain, rather than income gain (interest) - preferred stock is a convenient measure for
this. The government’s decision was literally paid: By selling the stocks, the government could
earn some profit.
The toxic asset purchasing scheme from solvent banks, however, did not work well for the
time being. DIC purchased toxic assets for only 1.3 trillion yen from 1999 to 20023. This is
3from DIC’s webpage ((http://www.dic.go.jp/katsudou/katsudou4-1.html).
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mainly because DIC’s bids were too low. Since the security of taxpayers’ money was the first
priority, DIC had to purchase toxic assets only at the price that DIC was not likely to make
any loss. As a result, during the three years, DIC’s average purchasing price of the assets was
4.5% of the assets’ face value. The bids were remarkably lower than the market prices of these
assets, so no banks preferred to sell their toxic assets to DIC. The government amended the bill
obliging DIC to secure taxpayers’ money as the first priority in January 2002: DIC was then
allowed to purchase toxic assets at current price, estimated from discounted cash flow from
the assets. The amendment raised DIC’s purchasing price to 9.8% in 2002 (15.8% in 2003 and
13.2% in 2004) and the purchased amount of toxic assets surged to 2.1 trillion yen in 2002.
By 2008, most public capital injected to banks have been repaid. Total capital injection
was 12.4 trillion yen, and the current outstanding is 3.2 trillion yen at the end of September
2008. The debt-collection ratio of the toxic assets purchased from banks is 118.5% (accumulated
basis: total collection / total purchased) in 2007.
7.3 Capital Injection and Toxic Asset Purchase
7.3.1 Zombie Lending and Toxic Asset Purchase Scheme
Toxic asset purchasing scheme has a similar eﬀect to zombie lending. Zombie lending is banks’
squeeze of land supply to raise land price so that the banks can make up their own capital.
The banks squeeze the land supply by leaving insolvent borrowers un-liquidated. Toxic asset
purchasing scheme has the same eﬀect. The government, on the other hand, purchases non-
performing loans from the banks (to prevent the banks from fire-selling their collateralised land)
or their collateral assets (land) directly, to raise land price and secure the banking industry.
As Figure 7-1 shows4, toxic asset purchasing scheme is described in the exactly same way as
zombie lending.
4Competitive banking industry is assumed here for notational simplicity.
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Figure 7-1: Two policies: How these work
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Toxic asset purchasing scheme, therefore, has the same negative eﬀect to the economy. If
the government purchases insolvent borrowers’ debts (with their collateralised land) and leave
these untouched, the land, a production capital, cannot contribute to production on the period.
In other word, toxic asset purchasing scheme prevents new entrants (or solvent and productive
incumbents) from buying the land to produce. This interference of creative destruction lowers
the aggregate productivity of the economy, as we have seen in the case of Japanese ”lost decade”.
As long as the government can purchase only toxic assets, the government cannot choose
θ > 1. Accordingly, the conditions that toxic asset purchase scheme works are identical to the
one of zombie lending. This implies the risk of a government adopting toxic asset purchasing
scheme: the scheme cannot always help banks. If the banks’ own capital is too small, buying all
toxic assets still might not be able to raise land price higher than the threshold level qˆ and the
banks would be forced to close. Or, if the government cannot observe the shape of the demand
function of land (or any other collateralisable assets), the government cannot correctly predict
how much it can raise land price by purchasing toxic assets. Especially the latter problem
should be emphasized in the case of toxic asset purchase scheme. In the case of monopolistic
bank, the bank may have suﬃcient information about the market. But it is obviously unrealistic
to assume that the government has better knowledge about the market.
The problems can be eased if the government can purchase toxic assets at inflated price.
The diﬀerence between the inflated price and its market price is an income transfer from the
government to banks. In the model explained in the previous chapter, it is equivalent to
public capital injection as well. Of course, if the market price itself was hard to observe,
even purchasing toxic assets at inflated price could not secure the banking industry. Adopting
toxic asset purchase scheme should, therefore, require careful feasible study beforehand. Or, as
Japanese government did, the scheme should be combined with public capital injection policy.
7.3.2 Public Capital Injection
In the model shown in the previous chapter, public capital injection raises W1 of the bank
(or banks) directly, to ensure W1 ≥ W¯ (banking industry is secured). Since W1 and W¯ are
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obviously observable for the government, the information asymmetry problem in the toxic asset
purchase scheme does not occur. In Figure 7-1, public capital injection is described as decline in
qˆ, which is defined in the equation (6.11). If the government can lower qˆ below the market price
q1(z1, θ = 0), the banks can be secured. This is always feasible for the government, because
qˆ → −∞ as W1 → +∞.
A benefit of the public capital injection policy is that this policy does not hinder creative
destruction, i.e. the liquidation of non-productive insolvent borrowers and replacing them with
productive new entrants. This must be eﬃcient in the long run. Since the model in the
previous chapter assumes that the insolvent borrowers cannot produce anything, liquidating
these insolvents is economically costless in the model.
But, it may not be unrealistic to assume that there is a social (non-pecuniary) externality of
liquidating firms, e.g. the surge of unemployment followed by a higher crime rate. In this case,
the economy that injects its public capital to the banking sector will experience a recession (or
social instability) coming from the liquidation of insolvents, in the short run. The economy then
starts to recover since non-productive firms had been eliminated and replaced by productive
firms. From this viewpoint, public capital injection is the policy of ”hard landing and quick
recovery”. By contrast, toxic assets purchase scheme or zombie lending can be categorised as
”soft landing and slow recovery”. The economy that chooses toxic asset purchase scheme (or
zombie lending) does not have to rapidly liquidate insolvents. But the economy has to bear long
stagnation, because the economy allows the non-productive firms to occupy some production
capital for nothing, as Japanese economy experienced after the burst of the bubble.
In the following section, we will compare the performance of these two policies using the
model in the previous chapter. Since the model cannot capture the whole costs and benefits
of de-leveraging (e.g. the social and economic costs of liquidating borrowing firms, which are
assumed to be zero in the model since insolvent firms’ productivity is zero), any conclusion
obtained in the model cannot be very realistic. But at least the model provides some criterion
to consider the optimal policy. Studying the issue further is left for future research.
135
7.3.3 Costs and Benefits of Two Policies
In this section, we will compare the performance of these two policies, public capital injection
and toxic assets purchase scheme, using the model in the previous chapter. Since the model
cannot capture the social costs of liquidating insolvent borrowers mentioned above, any con-
clusion obtained in the model cannot be very realistic. But at least the model provides some
criterion to consider the optimal policy. Studying the issue further is left for future research.
In the following arguments, we assume competitive banking industry, which is closer to the US
or the UK.
The costs of public capital injection are W¯ − W1, the amount of capital injection, and
the social and economic cost of de-leveraging. Since the model economy closes at date-2, the
government cannot receive any repayment from the banks; thus whole injected capital becomes
the cost. The latter one, the cost of de-leveraging cannot be studied in this model since the
model assumes that insolvent borrowers are value zero in any criteria (the value of the borrowing
firms is measured by their productivity z alone). The benefits of capital injection are eliminating
the cost of banking crisis and the benefit of de-leveraging, i.e. solvent new comers’ production
using liquidated land.
The costs of toxic assets purchasing scheme are the purchasing amount θγq1k
f
0 , which
achieves W¯ = W1, and lower production by making zombie borrowers who do not produce
anything. Since the value of the land in the next period (date 2) is zero for sure, the whole
purchasing amount becomes cost. θγ may not be bounded above by 1 in this case, because the
government can purchase any amount of land. The benefits of the scheme are no banking crisis
and no severe de-leveraging.
We will focus on the direct cost of the policies, W¯−W1 and θγq1kf0 for the sake of simplicity.
The cost and benefit of de-leveraging are hard to capture in this model and left for future
research. Since θ is chosen by the government to achieve W¯ = W1, we have the following
equation (since q1 is not a linear function of θ, the following equation is a linear approximation):
∂W1
∂q1
∂q1
∂θ
· θˆ = W¯ −W1
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where ∂W1∂q1 = k
b
0 + γk
f
0 . Solving this for θˆ, we have:
θˆ =
W¯ −W1³
kb0 + γk
f
0
´
· ∂q1∂θ
And the cost of toxic asset purchasing scheme is:
W¯ −W1³
kb0 + γk
f
0
´
· ∂q1∂θ
γkf0
Since the cost of capital injection is W¯ −W1, the cost of capital injection is larger if the
following is positive:
¡
W¯ −W1
¢
− W¯ −W1³
kb0 + γk
f
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´
· ∂q1∂θ
γkf0
=
¡
W¯ −W1
¢⎧⎨
⎩1−
γkf0³
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f
0
´
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⎫
⎬
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Rearranging this, we have the following condition:
Toxic assets purchasing scheme is cheaper if 1 <
Ã
K/kf0 − 1
γ
+ 1
!
∂q1
∂θ
Public capital injection is cheaper if 1 >
Ã
K/kf0 − 1
γ
+ 1
!
∂q1
∂θ
We have the following proposition from the above:
Proposition 17 Toxic asset purchasing scheme is cheaper than public capital injection if firms’
demand function (or their budget constraint) is steep (∂q1∂θ is large), and the banks are exposed
to the risk of land (kb0 is large).
If the market is very illiquid and its market price is highly sensitive to new bids, toxic asset
purchasing scheme can be cheaper for taxpayers than public capital injection. If banks’ loan
137
is highly leveraged (high kf0 ), public capital injection is cheaper. The proposition implies that
the optimal post-crisis policy depends on the market conditions, and there is no trivial answer
to the question which policy is more eﬃcient.
7.4 Empirical Evidences
The results obtained in this and the previous chapters are consistent with empirical findings
in Japan. The existence of zombie lending itself has been empirically shown by some researchers
(see Kobayashi, Saita and Sekine(2002), Mihira(2005) and Peek and Rosengren(2005)) and no
counter-argument has been made to the author’s knowledge. The results obtained here are
consistent with some another details of these empirical founding.
First, zombie lending lowers aggregate productivity. In the model, aggregate productivity
declines by γθz1. Mihira(2006) estimated Japanese zombie lending lowered Japanese TFP (total
factor productivity) by 1.1 — 1.7% maximum. Caballero et.al.(2006) also find an increase in
zombie firms significantly reduces investment and employment growth.
Second, the model is consistent with Mihara’s (2006) another finding: the negative impact
of zombie lending has a spill-over eﬀect to other industries. The model in the previous chapter
does not explicitly model inter-industry externality, but the impact of zombie lending can be
transferred to another industry via common collateral asset (possibly land). Zombie lending in
an industry raises the price of a collateral asset (land), and the high asset price hinders firms
in other industries (using the same production capital) from investing.
Third, the correlation between GDP growth and land price, expected in the KM’s model,
is broken with zombie lending. As Figure 5-7 shows, the land price (major cities) declined
drastically when the bubble burst, and then only slowly decreased until the banking crisis
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in 1997. After the crisis and the following public capital injection, while the GDP growth
started picking up, the land price decline was in fact accelerated. The negative correlation had
continued until 2005, until the banks’ balance sheet problem was almost resolved.
The positive correlation between production growth and land price growth was broken in
this model, because of zombie lending and the following public capital injection. Banks tried
to minimise their liquidation of bad borrowers as much as possible to avoid forced closure
(bankruptcy), but they start liquidating bad borrowers when they receive suﬃcient public
capital (excess public capital allows the banks to liquidate bad borrowers and write-oﬀ their
non-performing debts). Accordingly, the model implies, and Figure 5-7 shows, public capital
injection may accelerate the plunge of asset price (land price). Asset price starts picking up
only after the banks finish liquidating the ”inventory” of their bad borrowers (in 2005: see
Figure 5-5 for the resolution of non-performing loan problem in Japan).
Fourth, the lagged bankruptcy of Japanese firms can be also explained in this model. The
bankruptcy of Japanese firms reached a peak (value basis) in 2000 (Figure 5-3), while the GDP
growth had started to improve (Figure 5-7) in 1999. The banks could aﬀord liquidating their
bad borrowers in 2000, because they received ample public capital in 1999. Public capital
injection can raise the number of bankruptcy in the short run.
Fifth, Mihira(2005) found out that bank loans were prone to increase to the over-borrowing
firms. This is similar to a condition for zombie lending in this model - bank loan should be
leveraged (low r). A bank with over lending (high leverage) is exposed to the larger credit risk
of its borrowers and the larger risk of the borrowers’ collateral value. The liquidation of large
amount of collateral lowers asset price, and then deteriorates the bank’s balance sheet further.
The bank with highly leveraged loan, therefore, has a strong incentive of zombie lending.
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7.5 Conclusion
Japanese banking crisis and the following so-called lost decade, and many policies tried during
the recession provide many valuable implications. First, there is a trade-oﬀ between severe
liquidation of borrowers and long economic stagnation. If a bank finds its borrowers insolvent,
the bank has two choices: liquidating them, or leaving them un-touched. In other words, they
are de-leveraging or zombie lending. This choice is essentially the same as choosing hard landing
or soft landing. (Eﬃcient middle-point can be found, although it is left for future study.)
Second, a government facing a post-crisis recession also has to choose the same option; hard
landing or soft landing. Public capital injection helps banks from bankruptcy, but accelerates
the banks’ de-leveraging in the short run. This can be the reason why a government injecting
public capital to banks tends to request (or force) the banks to keep lending their borrowers.
But in the long run, public capital injection is more eﬃcient because non-productive insolvent
firms are replaced with productive one. Toxic asset purchasing scheme also helps banks from
bankruptcy by improving the banks’ value of their assets. The scheme, by contrast, decelerates
de-leveraging because the scheme is economically equivalent to zombie lending. This scheme,
on the other hand, would invote the long stagnation of the economy, because the scheme
preserves insolvent (and thus non-productive, or at least less productive) firms in the economy.
The ”zombie” firms hold their production capital (land) for nothing, and lower the aggregate
productivity of the economy.
Third, toxic assets purchase scheme can be operationally diﬃcult, if the government does
not have suﬃcient information about the shape of the land market’s demand function. If the
price is sensitive to new bids, toxic asset purchase scheme can eﬃciently improve banks’ own
capital by purchasing the small amount of land (or bad loans). But if the price is less sensitive,
the banks may be forced to close even after the scheme. By contrast, public capital injection
scheme does not have any information asymmetry problem and the government can secure its
banking industry for sure.
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Since the model is highly simplified, many possible extensions are left for future research.
For instance, if the game continues for many (or possibly infinite) periods, we might be able
to see a diﬀerent business cycle from Kiyotaki and Moore(1997). Removing some assumptions
made for simplicity (that firms’ bankruptcy is unanticipated by banks, that firms’ budget
constraint is always binding at date 0, and so on) can be another possible extension. Whether
the implications above can be econometrically confirmed or not is also an interesting question.
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